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Low reported severity

First-person forum account: a Facebook user says a video face-scan security check failed to recognise them after their appearance changed, an automated ID check then rejected their government ID over a nickname, and they were locked out of a five-year-old account

In a public post to r/facebook on 28 September 2026, a user writes that their five-year-old Facebook account was hit with a security check that asked for a video face scan, which 'failed completely'. They say their face had changed a lot through recent life circumstances and 'The AI simply didn't recognize me.' Facebook then asked for ID, and 'the automated system instantly rejected' their government ID because their profile uses a shortened nickname. The poster says they are locked out of years of memories, friends and active Marketplace listings and are looking for a way to reach a human or download their data. Meta has said that video selfies used to regain access to compromised accounts are compared with the account's profile pictures using facial recognition; whether this check worked that way is not known. The account is uncorroborated.

AI system
Facebook video face-scan check
Meta
Occurred
Event date unknown
Reported
28 September 2026
Event location
Unknown
What the AI did
Made a decision about the person
Reported harm
Other Material HarmPsychological Distress
Whose AI use
An institution’s AI use
Setting
Everyday life · Privacy
Evidence
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources
4 claims: 1 documented, 3 reported. 3 open questions
People reported harmed
1 person

AI system as recorded: Facebook's video face-scan security check (Meta describes video-selfie verification for account recovery as using facial recognition technology); the specific system is not named in the post

What Happened

The check. The poster writes that their '5-year-old account got hit with a random security check. The app asked for a video face scan, but it failed completely.' They attribute the failure to changes in their appearance after recent life circumstances ('my face and physical definition have changed a lot') and write: 'The AI simply didn't recognize me.'

The ID step. Facebook then asked for identification. Because they use 'a shortened nickname on my profile for basic privacy', they say 'the automated system instantly rejected my government ID for a name mismatch', and that where they live they cannot get secondary official documents in the nickname.

The effect. 'It’s pretty gutting.' The poster says they are 'locked out of years of memories, friends, and active Marketplace listings' and would settle for 'a way to bypass the lock screen to download my archive data and photos.'

Context. Meta's newsroom post on account recovery says that with video selfies 'we’ll use facial recognition technology to compare the selfie to the profile pictures on the account they’re trying to access.' That describes the feature in general. It does not establish how this particular check was made, and the post does not say whether the check followed a suspected compromise.

Limits. Single anonymous account; no screenshots or messages from Facebook were published, and the date of the check is not stated.

Reported harm

The poster reports that a Facebook video face-scan check failed to recognise them and an automated ID check rejected their ID over a nickname, locking them out of a five-year-old account with years of photos, contacts and active Marketplace listings, which they describe as 'pretty gutting' (first-person account, uncorroborated).

Outcome

Ongoing

At the time of posting the poster was still locked out and asking how to reach a human reviewer or download their archive. No response from Meta is reported.

What remains unknown

  • The date of the security check and the poster's location.
  • Why the security check was triggered and whether a human reviewed the face scan or the ID.
  • Whether the poster regained access or obtained a data download.

What the evidence supports

AI involvement: reported. The poster says a video face scan in Facebook's security check failed and that 'The AI' did not recognise them. Meta's newsroom documents that video selfies used to recover compromised accounts are compared with profile pictures using facial recognition, without saying whether a human reviews the result or covering routine security checks; the ID rejection is attributed by the poster to an 'automated system' and is not established as AI.

4 claims: 1 documented, 3 reported. What the statuses mean

Reported The poster's five-year-old Facebook account was put through a security check that asked for a video face scan, and the scan failed; the poster attributes this to changes in their appearance and says the AI did not recognise them.

Causal attribution. Poster's account and attribution; no messages from Facebook were published.

  • reddit.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'My 5-year-old account got hit with a random security check.'; 'The app asked for a video face scan, but it failed completely.'; 'my face and physical definition have changed a lot'; 'The AI simply didn't recognize me.'
Reported Facebook then asked for ID, and an automated system rejected the poster's government ID because the profile uses a shortened nickname.

Causal attribution. Poster's account; the post does not say the ID check used AI.

  • reddit.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'Then it asked for ID.'; 'I use a shortened nickname on my profile for basic privacy'; 'the automated system instantly rejected my government ID for a name mismatch'
Reported The poster says they are locked out of years of memories, friends and active Marketplace listings, describes the loss as gutting, and is seeking a way to reach a human reviewer or download their data.

Causal attribution. Poster's own statement of the effect.

  • reddit.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'It’s pretty gutting.'; 'locked out of years of memories, friends, and active Marketplace listings'; 'a way to bypass the lock screen to download my archive data and photos'; 'hoping someone here has navigated this specific deadlock or found a way to reach a human'
Documented Meta says that, when people verify their identity with a video selfie to regain access to a compromised account, it uses facial recognition technology to compare the selfie with the profile pictures on the account.

Causal attribution. General product description by Meta; it does not establish how this check was decided.

  • about.fb.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'The user will upload a video selfie and we’ll use facial recognition technology to compare the selfie to the profile pictures on the account they’re trying to access.'

Sources

2 sources inspected. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.

How the sources were read, and where the events happened

Read in English on 2026-09-29: full self-text retrieved through the arctic_shift archive API by post ID. The poster handle is not recorded. Applies to s1.

Meta newsroom post first published 21 October 2024 with later updates, fetched 2026-09-29 (200). Describes the feature in general; it does not address this account. Applies to s2.

Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.

The post says only 'Where I live' without naming a place; the comments add nothing. Unknown after review.

Reviewed for publication 2026-09-29: Published under the 2026-09-15 charter's public-forum rule as a concrete first-person account of a Facebook video face-scan security check, which the poster describes as AI, failing to recognise them and, with an ID rejection, locking them out of their account; described with attribution and without corroboration. Meta's own description of video-selfie verification is cited as context only. Personal circumstances the poster gives for their changed appearance are summarised, not reproduced. No handle is recorded.

People described

An adult Facebook user (the poster; not named, location not stated)

People reported harmed in this case

1 person

1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed

One person: the poster, locked out of their own account. Commenters describing their own lockouts are not counted. Exact 1.

Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.

Cite this case

Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.

APA

NOPE. (2026). First-person forum account: a Facebook user says a video face-scan security check failed to recognise them after their appearance changed, an automated ID check then rejected their government ID over a nickname, and they were locked out of a five-year-old account. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-facebook-video-selfie-face-scan-failed-account-lockout-first-person

BibTeX

@misc{2026_facebook_video_selfie_face_scan_failed_account_lockout_first_person,
  title = {First-person forum account: a Facebook user says a video face-scan security check failed to recognise them after their appearance changed, an automated ID check then rejected their government ID over a nickname, and they were locked out of a five-year-old account},
  author = {NOPE},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {AI incidents},
  url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-facebook-video-selfie-face-scan-failed-account-lockout-first-person}
}

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