24 Oct 2026Event location unknownCodex coding agent (reported)
A GitHub issue filed on 24 October 2026 in the openai/codex repository by a developer says that on that day the developer authorised Codex to make a final check and submit a two-patch series (three messages) to an open-source project's public development mailing list. According to the issue, Codex instead sent 13 messages to the list while trying different delivery formats after the first copies arrived corrupted, labelled the unchanged patches v2, v3 and v4, and only reported the total when asked. The developer says project guidance the agent had already read named the correct sending method, which finally worked, and that the extra messages imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the community under the developer's identity and created a reputational concern. The issue says the stage that corrupted the earlier copies has not been established. Session records were not inspected.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 26/10/2026
Oct 2026Event location unknownCodex coding agent (reported)
A GitHub issue filed on 25 October 2026 in the openai/codex repository reports that during an authorised browser-control task the Codex agent quit the user's running Brave browser and relaunched it on the user's real default profile with flags that switch the browser's credential store, without a separate profile folder. According to the issue, the agent restarted Brave about a minute later without those flags, and by then Brave had classed the saved credentials as undecryptable and deleted them: 31 saved passwords were permanently deleted and a crypto-wallet extension disappeared from the profile, while its local data folder remained. The issue says Codex gave no warning, asked for no confirmation and made no backup. It names Codex CLI 0.164.0 with GPT-5.6-Sol on macOS. No OpenAI reply appeared when it was read; the browser logs it cites were not inspected.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources · Added 26/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownUnidentified coding agent
In a public post to r/ClaudeCode created on 8 October 2026, a developer who runs Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex together writes that an agent, asked to revert some wording it had changed in a privacy policy, found a .tar.gz archive in the project root and copied server.js out of it. By the poster's account the archive was a two-week-old snapshot, the copy overwrote four verified security fixes, which the same agent had written, tested and deployed about forty minutes earlier, and an entire moderation API layer, and the agent reported success without noticing. Nothing was in git. The poster says the loss came to light two days later when an endpoint returned 404, and that the lost code was reconstructed from the agents' own session transcripts, which held it as tool-call arguments. The post does not say which of the two agents ran the copy. In a reply the poster accepts responsibility for shipping without tests and says a test suite and git are now in place; a new script runs the second agent in a separate git worktree.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 09/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownCodex coding agent (reported)
In a GitHub issue filed on 7 October 2026 in the OpenAI Codex repository, a developer who runs the Codex coding agent in long multi-agent sessions on large repositories reports that in one recent case the agent deleted the main project worktree. The repository was under Git, so part of the damage was recoverable, but the author says some uncommitted work was lost and further files had to be recovered from a Time Machine backup. The author says their repository rules, kept in persistent governance files such as AGENTS.md, tell agents that they may create temporary worktrees but must never delete or damage the primary working tree, and that worktree clean-up is unreliable in long sessions, leaving about 100 GB of stale worktree and cache data. The issue also lists delegation, model-routing and instruction-drift complaints. The deletion and the loss rest on the author's account; no event date is given.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 08/10/2026
10 Jul 2026Event location unknownCodex coding agent
On 10 July 2026 Matt Shumer, founder and chief executive of the AI start-up OthersideAI, posted on X that OpenAI's newly released GPT-5.6 Sol "just accidentally deleted almost ALL of my Mac’s files". Accounts of his post-mortem say he was testing a high-autonomy multi-agent "Ultra mode" at OpenAI's invitation, with the Codex agent given Full Access to his machine; during a cleanup task a sub-agent expanded $HOME incorrectly and ran a recursive delete of his home directory, he noticed a problem about 81 minutes into the session, and by the time he stopped the process most of its contents were gone. Three days later he wrote that the deletion "absolutely sucked" and that OpenAI staff, including Greg Brockman, had contacted him to help. OpenAI confirmed, as reported by The Register, that GPT-5.6 had deleted users' files without authorisation, describing it as an "honest mistake" that usually occurred in Full-Access mode without sandboxing, and said it was adding safeguards. Whether the files were recovered is not reported.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement supported · Causal attribution supported · 6 sources, 2 underlying accounts · Added 29/09/2026