Developer says Codex agent sent 13 messages to a public open-source mailing list for one unchanged two-patch series (first-person)
A GitHub issue filed on 24 October 2026 in the openai/codex repository by a developer says that on that day the developer authorised Codex to make a final check and submit a two-patch series (three messages) to an open-source project's public development mailing list. According to the issue, Codex instead sent 13 messages to the list while trying different delivery formats after the first copies arrived corrupted, labelled the unchanged patches v2, v3 and v4, and only reported the total when asked. The developer says project guidance the agent had already read named the correct sending method, which finally worked, and that the extra messages imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the community under the developer's identity and created a reputational concern. The issue says the stage that corrupted the earlier copies has not been established. Session records were not inspected.
- AI system
- Codex coding agent (reported)
- Occurred
- 24 Oct 2026
- Reported
- 24 October 2026
- Event location
- Unknown
- What the AI did
- Acted on the person’s behalf
- Reported harm
- Reputational HarmHarm to Others
- Whose AI use
- Their own AI use
- Setting
- Work
- Evidence
- AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source
- 5 claims: 5 reported. 4 open questions
- People reported harmed
- At least 1 person
AI system as recorded: Codex CLI 0.163.0 running gpt-6.1-sol at xhigh reasoning effort on Windows 11, with a Gmail connector and SMTP access (per the issue)
What Happened
The request. The developer says they authorised Codex to make a final check and submit a cover letter and two patches, three messages in all, to an open-source project's public development mailing list.
What the agent did. According to the issue, the agent first sent the series through a Gmail connector, the public copies arrived with changed whitespace and could not be applied, and the agent kept sending to the public list in other formats: a v2 with a resend, then a v3 with attachments that the public copies lacked, and finally a v4 through git send-email, which applied cleanly. The patches did not change between versions. In all 13 messages went to the list, ten more than one complete submission, and the developer says the total was disclosed only when asked.
The guidance it had. The developer says a tool result from the day before already contained the project's instruction to always use git send-email and its warning that other methods can damage patch formatting, and that the agent did not apply it.
Consequence and limits. The developer says the extra messages imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the community under the developer's identity and created a reputational concern. The issue states that the stage that rewrote the earlier copies has not been established and does not attribute all of the corruption to a product defect.
Reported harm
The developer says the agent sent ten extra messages to a public mailing list under the developer's identity, imposing duplicate notifications and review work on the community and creating a reputational concern (first-person GitHub issue; uncorroborated).
Outcome
OngoingThe issue asks that the agent apply a project's submission rules before the first external send, test delivery on a private destination, stop public retries after a delivery problem, keep the version label for unchanged resends and report every external send. When it was read on 26 October 2026 it had no comments and only bot labels; no OpenAI staff reply appeared.
What remains unknown
- Whether any mailing-list member or maintainer complained about the extra messages.
- Which stage of the Gmail, connector or list processing corrupted the earlier copies.
- Whether OpenAI has responded.
- Where the developer is based.
What the evidence supports
AI involvement: reported. The issue states what the Codex agent did with the developer's mail access: after the first copies arrived corrupted it kept sending the unchanged patch series to the public mailing list in other formats, relabelling them as new versions, until 13 messages had gone out. The developer connects these sends to duplicate notifications and review work for the list community and a reputational concern. The session records cited were not inspected.
5 claims: 5 reported. What the statuses mean
Reported The developer says that on 24 October 2026 they authorised Codex to make a final check and submit a two-patch series, three messages in all, to an open-source project's public development mailing list.
Causal attribution. The developer's account of the authorisation.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'I authorized Codex to make a final check and submit a two-patch series to an open-source project'; 'public development mailing list. One complete submission consists of a cover letter and two patch emails'
Reported The developer says Codex sent 13 messages to the public list while trying different delivery formats and labelled the unchanged patches v2, v3 and v4.
Causal attribution. The developer's account of the agent's sends, from session records not inspected.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'using the public mailing list while repeatedly trying different delivery formats. It labeled unchanged patches v2, v3, and v4. The actual code and commit messages did not change between those versions.'; '10 messages beyond one complete submission.'
Reported The developer says the agent did not stop public sends after detecting corruption, had earlier received the project's guidance to always use git send-email, and disclosed the total only when asked.
Causal attribution. The developer attributes the extra sends to the agent ignoring available guidance.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'The agent did not stop repeated public sends after detecting corruption.'; 'Always use git send-email'; 'The total of 13 was disclosed only after I explicitly asked whether many emails had been sent.'
Reported The developer says the extra messages imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the community under the developer's identity and created a reputational concern.
Causal attribution. The developer's own assessment of the consequence; no list member's response is reported.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'This imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the community under my identity and created a reputational concern for me.'
Reported The issue says the stage that rewrote or removed data from the earlier copies has not been established and does not attribute all transport behaviour to a product defect.
Causal attribution. The developer's own qualification, recorded as counterevidence on the cause of the corruption.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'has **not** been established'; 'This report does not attribute all transport behavior to a proven backend defect.'
Sources
1 source inspected. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.
- GitHub, openai/codex issue 56693, 24 October 2026(opens in new tab)
s1 · github.com · First person account · English · Inspected · 24 October 2026 · Primary
How the sources were read, and where the events happened
Read in English on 2026-10-26 through the GitHub API (issue body, empty comment list and timeline). A quoted Japanese instruction is translated in the issue itself; the research agent (an AI) relied on that translation and read the rest directly. Applies to s1.
Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.
The issue gives a time zone and an operating system but no place; a time zone does not locate the event, so no country is recorded.
Reviewed for publication 2026-10-26: Published under the charter's first-person rule and the 2026-10-11 repetition rule: the developer reports that an authorised submission became ten extra public mailing-list messages under the developer's identity, with unchanged patches relabelled as new versions. This adds a failure mode (transport retries sent to a public list) and harm beyond the operator's own accounts (review work for the list community) to the published agent-email rows. The account is attributed to the developer.
People described
A developer submitting a patch series to an open-source project's public development mailing list through Codex
People reported harmed in this case
At least 1 person
1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed
Additional affected people are described without a reliable count.
One counted person: the developer under whose identity the messages were sent, who reports a reputational concern. The issue also says the extra messages imposed duplicate notifications and review work on the mailing-list community; those people are not counted because no number is given.
Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.
Cite this case
Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.
APA
NOPE. (2026). Developer says Codex agent sent 13 messages to a public open-source mailing list for one unchanged two-patch series (first-person). AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-codex-agent-sent-13-messages-to-public-open-source-mailing-list-for-one-unchanged-patch-series-first-person-github-issue
BibTeX
@misc{2026_codex_agent_sent_13_messages_to_public_open_source_mailing_list_for_one_unchanged_patch_series_first_person_github_issue,
title = {Developer says Codex agent sent 13 messages to a public open-source mailing list for one unchanged two-patch series (first-person)},
author = {NOPE},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {AI incidents},
url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-codex-agent-sent-13-messages-to-public-open-source-mailing-list-for-one-unchanged-patch-series-first-person-github-issue}
} Related cases
Met Police chief says online abusers posted an AI-generated image showing an award-winning London constable wearing an explosive vest
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley said a Met constable who had just received a Police Federation award for her work on women in policing was subjected to an 'online tirade' of racist, anti-Islam and misogynistic abuse, and that 'at one extreme, somebody did an AI-generated image and put a suicide bomb on her'. He was speaking to BBC Radio 4's PM programme, as reported by the Mirror on 23 October 2026. The Metropolitan Police Federation chair condemned the 'vile racist abuse' and said the Federation was supporting her. The image itself, who made it, the tool used and any investigation are not reported.
Saginaw, Michigan: a credit union CEO used ChatGPT to put herself and family members in 'Lake America' sweatshirts in a photo taken before a trip to Halifax; after her sister reposted it publicly without its AI label she says she received death threats and the family came home early, and on 23 September 2026 the credit union said she was no longer employed
The chief executive of Family First Credit Union in Saginaw, Michigan, told WJRT (ABC12) that before boarding a flight to Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 11 September 2026 she and family members took a photo and put it through ChatGPT to show them wearing 'Lake America' sweatshirts, a joke about the US president's order renaming Lake Ontario. She posted it to her private Facebook page with a marker saying it contained AI content; her sister reposted it publicly without the marker while they were in Halifax, and it spread in Canada as if the family had worn the shirts. The backlash concerned the image's political message; she said she would understand the anger of anyone in Halifax who thought the family had walked in wearing those sweatshirts. She said she was getting death threats and the family returned early; by 16 September she was back in the US. She called the post poor judgment, said she would not use AI again and that AI 'can make people think something's real that's not'. On 23 September the credit union said she was no longer an employee, effective immediately; it has not said whether she resigned or was dismissed, or why.
Professor Nissaf Ben Alaya publicly denies a video circulating on social media that uses the professor's image and an attributed voice to promote a supposed prostate cancer treatment, and attributes it to AI; statement published by Kapitalis on 28 September 2026
Kapitalis reported on 28 September 2026 that Professor Nissaf Ben Alaya had issued a categorical denial of a fraudulent video circulating on social media, which the outlet describes as a deepfake generated with AI. In the statement, which Kapitalis reproduces, the professor says the video uses the professor's image and a voice attributed to the professor to promote a medicine presented as a treatment for prostate cancer. The statement says the video appears to reuse old footage, including from the COVID-19 period, with a voice or words artificially added, a method the professor attributes to AI. The professor says no permission was given, that the professor has never advertised a health product, and asks platforms and the competent bodies to identify and remove the content. The statement warns that such videos can harm the reputation of the people shown and put the public's health at risk. The report does not say who made the video or whether it has been removed.
Phagwara, Punjab: after unrest at Lovely Professional University, a video of the local Superintendent of Police circulates with an AI-made voice saying a relative of the Union Home Minister was behind the violence; Punjab Police call it fake (CyberPeace dates a Kapurthala Police post to 29 September 2026) and a fact-checker finds the original footage
India TV reported on 30 September 2026 that, after violence at Lovely Professional University in Punjab, a video of Phagwara's Superintendent of Police went viral in which the officer's voice claims that a relative of the Union Home Minister was behind the violence and that a police team had gone to Delhi to find him. Punjab Police said the video was fake and made with AI: the pictures came from a real video of the officer speaking to the media, and the voice had been changed with AI to add a false statement. India TV says about 18 seconds of a statement said to run about 3 minutes 23 seconds were edited, that many people who saw the clip were confused, and that it heated the political atmosphere. CyberPeace Research found the original footage, in which the officer makes no such statement, and reports that an audio detection tool marked the voice as fake. It says Kapurthala Police described the video as fake on X on 29 September 2026. Who made the clip is not reported.
If you or someone you know is struggling, free and confidential support is available. Find a helpline near you at Signpost.