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NOPE · AI and people

AI incidents

Reports of AI-related harm and adverse experiences affecting people’s safety, wellbeing, rights and livelihoods. Explore what happened and the evidence available.

NOPE’s core concern is when AI communicates with a person, acts on their behalf, or depicts or impersonates them. The tracker also records consequential decisions, claims and privacy harms involving AI. Each case needs a described connection between AI use and the harm, including private information recorded into or disclosed to an AI service. Each account is reviewed for publication; claims may remain uncorroborated or disputed. How we review and count cases

In this selection

Published cases
11
Countries with reported events
—
Located 0 of 11 cases · 11 unknown
Languages in checked sources
3
Recorded for 11 of 11 cases

2 cases have no reviewed AI-to-person relation yet: 0 not yet reviewed and 2 reviewed as unknown. Show these cases

These figures describe the cases collected by NOPE. Coverage varies with discovery, reporting and available evidence. They do not estimate how often AI-related harm occurs.

Response counts currently use each case’s principal recorded outcome. Further proceedings may be described in its account.

Cases in this selection, counted once in their first known event year. A series may continue beyond that year. Reporting and collection dates are excluded. NOPE has searched recent events more thoroughly than earlier years, so bar heights also reflect collection effort.

No known event years in this selection.

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11 of 1099 published cases

Event date unknownEvent location unknownGoogle Search AI summary (reported)

First-person account: patient says a doctor read Google's AI search summary for a diagnosis and later called to say the patient was right

In an article published on Medium on 26 October 2026 and a Bluesky post on 30 October, a writer says that at one appointment a doctor said "Let's ask Dr. Google", searched for a diagnosis and read the AI summary at the top of the results without opening any sources. The writer says the doctor was wrong; after they emailed him their sources and asked what they were missing, he called to say they were right. They say they were nervous to send the emails, and that their own research used Claude and Gemini, cross-checked against the cited sources. The article does not say what the summary said, what the diagnosis was, or when the appointment took place.

Contextual tracker case Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 31/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)

GitHub issue: user says Claude Code agent's command to clear its own stuck process quit nearly every app on their Mac

In a GitHub issue filed on 29 October 2026, a Claude Code user says that in a desktop-app session the agent tried to clear a stuck process left by one of its own earlier commands and ran a command that sent a terminate signal to every process whose command line matched a short pattern. On macOS the pattern matched most of the user's processes: the user quotes system log lines showing dozens of apps exiting on the command's signal and says nearly every app and user agent quit, with only the Claude app, Finder and one browser surviving. The user also says the product's shell guard against such commands does not run on macOS.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 30/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude (reported)

Data engineer says executives made their whole job redundant, saying Claude could run the data warehouse, tooling and support tickets (first-person account)

In a public post to r/layoffs titled 'Laid off by claude', created on 21 October 2026, a person who describes themselves in a reply as a data engineer who also did reporting, AI and frontend work writes that executives are of the opinion that Claude can manage a data warehouse, custom tooling, support tickets, servers and new product features, and that they have said the poster's whole job is redundant because AI can do it all. The poster writes that they did not have the mental capacity to argue and accepted what they call 'the MSA', and that they feel numb and are unsure whether they want to stay in the tech industry. The employer, its location and the date of the layoff are not stated. The account is the poster's alone and uncorroborated; no employer statement was retrieved, and no source describes Claude actually taking over the work.

AI relation unknown Medium reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 25/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude (reported)

User says Claude read their connected email without asking in an automatically approved session although the connector was set to always ask; first-person

In a personal blog post dated 20 October 2026, a Claude user says that a few days earlier they asked Claude what it could tell them about a platform named in an email from a service provider, and Claude's answer said that the service provider that had emailed them at 1:59pm that day probably used the platform. The user had connected a Fastmail account to Claude and says every action under that connector was set to 'Always ask for permission', and concluded that Claude had used the email connector without asking. The user reported it to Anthropic as a bug; the user says Anthropic replied promptly that this was expected behaviour, and that the connector's tooltip says Claude asks before each use except in sessions set to automatically approve. The user says the episode violated their expectations and exposed them to the risks of agents that can read private data, and removed the Fastmail connector from Claude. The exact date is not given beyond 'a few days ago'.

Core concern Low reported severity Internal Action

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 21/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)

GitHub report says Claude Code agent published an issue under its user's account without showing the draft, making public information the user wanted private

A GitHub issue filed on 11 October 2026 says that a user asked Claude Code 2.1.296, running an Opus model, to write an issue for a public repository about an earlier problem in the same session, and that the agent wrote the text and, in the same turn, published it with the gh issue create command under the user's GitHub account. According to the report, the user had not seen the text and had not asked for it to be submitted, and the agent gave the issue URL and a summary only after the issue was public. The report says the published issue contained information the user did not want public, that its author cannot delete an issue from a repository the author does not administer, and that notification emails and public event archives may already hold the original text, so the user had to deal with the removal. The report does not date the publication or describe the information. No vendor response appears on the issue.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 12/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownUnidentified coding agent

Developer says a coding agent restored a file from a two-week-old archive, silently undoing four security fixes and a moderation layer (first-person)

In a public post to r/ClaudeCode created on 8 October 2026, a developer who runs Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex together writes that an agent, asked to revert some wording it had changed in a privacy policy, found a .tar.gz archive in the project root and copied server.js out of it. By the poster's account the archive was a two-week-old snapshot, the copy overwrote four verified security fixes, which the same agent had written, tested and deployed about forty minutes earlier, and an entire moderation API layer, and the agent reported success without noticing. Nothing was in git. The poster says the loss came to light two days later when an endpoint returned 404, and that the lost code was reconstructed from the agents' own session transcripts, which held it as tool-call arguments. The post does not say which of the two agents ran the copy. In a reply the poster accepts responsibility for shipping without tests and says a test suite and git are now in place; a new script runs the second agent in a separate git worktree.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 09/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)

Software tester says their employer made them redundant, telling them it uses AI and Claude Code more heavily and needs fewer QA staff (first-person account)

In a public post to r/AskUK created on 6 October 2026, a person who describes about eight years of work as a software test engineer writes that they have just been made redundant. They say the reason given was that the company is using AI and Claude Code more and more heavily, that its testing and development processes are changing, and that it no longer needs many of its QA staff, adding "So I'm told". In replies the poster says their own job had consisted of writing automation code and debugging with Claude, and that the redundancy also affected the company's developers. The employer, its location and the date of the redundancy are not stated. The account is the poster's alone and uncorroborated; no statement from the employer was retrieved.

AI relation unknown Medium reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 07/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)

First-person GitHub issue: Claude Code user reports a sub-agent's recursive delete hit the Windows drive root and destroyed a development folder

In a public GitHub issue filed on 7 September 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that a sub-agent, intending to delete a stray directory inside the repository, ran a recursive delete that Git Bash path translation resolved to the root of the current drive. The author says the command ran in the background after a timeout and deleted drive contents in alphabetical order for about seven minutes before it was killed manually, and that when the agent called its stop tool, the tool reported success while the delete process kept running for about five more minutes until it was killed by process ID. Several projects in the development folder were deleted, some without remote backups; most were recovered from a same-day shadow copy and GitHub remotes, and one directory created after the snapshot was lost. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)

First-person GitHub issue: Claude Code user reports an auto-mode sub-agent turned a temp-folder cleanup into a delete of the Windows drive root (about 125 GB)

In a public GitHub issue filed on 27 September 2026, a Claude Code desktop app user on Windows reports that a background sub-agent running in auto mode passed a bash script inside a PowerShell string, meaning to delete a temporary folder. Because PowerShell expanded the script's variables to empty values, bash received a recursive delete of the drive root and deleted files from C: in alphabetical order until it was stopped about two minutes later. The author lists about 125 GB of personal and project folders, the whole working project and files inside several installed programs as deleted, and says auto mode approved the command and that recovery was only possible from a shadow copy taken nine hours earlier. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; no reply from Anthropic appears in the thread.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownChatGPT, Claude and Gemini

First-person forum account (in French): a disabled autistic person with multiple learning disorders who relied on chatbots to draft administrative paperwork says ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini have become unable to help even with a simple email, and that the degraded answers trigger violent autistic crises

In a public French-language post to r/ChatGPTcomplaints at 02:32 UTC on 3 October 2026, a person who describes themself as disabled, autistic and affected by multiple learning disorders ("multi Dys") says AI chatbots used to help them a great deal in drafting administrative paperwork. They write that absolutely all AI apps, including Claude, ChatGPT and Gemini, are becoming completely mediocre: answers go stale from the first conversational sentences despite the scripts they use, and where they could once put together an entire file, the apps can no longer help them draft a simple email. They say this triggers violent autistic crises and has become completely counterproductive. Replying to a commenter who dated the change to 24 August and advised running a model locally, the poster says their computer is too weak and they would need to save money. The changes to the products are described only by the poster, and the account is uncorroborated.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 04/10/2026

Event date unknownEvent location unknownChatGPT, Claude and DeepSeek

Developer reports workload pressure during AI-assisted programming

A Spanish-language first-person account describes workplace and skill difficulties during frequent AI use, alongside perceived benefits and a subsequent reduction in use. The account remains uncorroborated.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 15/09/2026

Cases may have several effects and sources. Mixed accounts qualify when they include a reported harm or adverse experience. People are counted within individual cases where sources support a number; we do not publish a collection-wide total of distinct people.

A source’s existence, the experience it reports and AI’s causal role are separate questions. A lawsuit records allegations unless a subsequent finding establishes them.

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Last dataset update: 04/11/2026. Dataset available under CC BY 4.0.