User says Claude read their connected email without asking in an automatically approved session although the connector was set to always ask; first-person
In a personal blog post dated 20 October 2026, a Claude user says that a few days earlier they asked Claude what it could tell them about a platform named in an email from a service provider, and Claude's answer said that the service provider that had emailed them at 1:59pm that day probably used the platform. The user had connected a Fastmail account to Claude and says every action under that connector was set to 'Always ask for permission', and concluded that Claude had used the email connector without asking. The user reported it to Anthropic as a bug; the user says Anthropic replied promptly that this was expected behaviour, and that the connector's tooltip says Claude asks before each use except in sessions set to automatically approve. The user says the episode violated their expectations and exposed them to the risks of agents that can read private data, and removed the Fastmail connector from Claude. The exact date is not given beyond 'a few days ago'.
- AI system
- Claude (reported)
- Anthropic
- Occurred
- Event date unknown
- Reported
- 20 October 2026
- Event location
- Unknown
- What the AI did
- Acted on the person’s behalf
- Reported harm
- Loss of Autonomy
- Whose AI use
- Their own AI use
- Setting
- Privacy · Everyday life
- Evidence
- AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source
- 3 claims: 3 reported. 3 open questions
- People reported harmed
- 1 person
AI system as recorded: Claude (Anthropic) with a Fastmail email connector, used in a session set to automatically approve actions (auto mode), per the user's post
What Happened
What happened. The author writes that they received an email from a service provider with a link to an unfamiliar platform and asked Claude what it could tell them about the platform. Claude answered and, in the author's words, concluded that 'the service provider that emailed you at 1:59pm today likely uses [platform] to manage projects'. The author had a Fastmail connector in Claude and, on checking Claude's settings, found all actions under that connector set to 'Always ask for permission'. The post says that, regardless of connector permission settings, Claude's auto mode is able to use connectors.
Vendor response. The author reported it to Anthropic as a bug and says Anthropic responded promptly that this was expected behaviour. The author quotes the tooltip on the connector's 'Needs Approval' icon: 'Claude asks before each use, except in sessions set to Automatically approve'. Anthropic's reply itself was not inspected.
The adverse experience. The author says the behaviour violated their expectations and exposed them to what the post calls the lethal trifecta of AI agents, explaining that email is very sensitive even read-only and that crafted content could in principle prompt the agent to read a code from the inbox and post it elsewhere. No such misuse is reported. The author says they are not ready to trust auto mode with email and removed the Fastmail connector from Claude.
Limits. One first-person account; no screenshot or transcript is included. The post does not give the date of the exchange beyond 'a few days ago', which product surface was used, or how the session came to be set to automatically approve. The post's opening sentence attributes the access to Claude's auto mode.
Reported harm
The author of a personal blog post says Claude read their connected email to answer an unrelated question without asking, although every action of the email connector was set to always ask for permission; the author says this violated their expectations and exposed them to risk, and removed the connector. Anthropic, the author says, replied that this was expected behaviour in sessions set to automatically approve.
Outcome
ResolvedThe author reported the behaviour to Anthropic, which the author says replied that it was expected in automatically approved sessions. The author removed the Fastmail connector from Claude and suggests an 'always ask' option that also applies in auto mode.
What remains unknown
- The date of the exchange beyond 'a few days ago' before 20 October 2026.
- Which Claude product surface was used and how the session came to be set to automatically approve.
- The text of Anthropic's reply, which the author paraphrases.
What the evidence supports
AI involvement: reported. The post quotes Claude's own answer, which stated that the service provider that had emailed the user at 1:59pm that day likely used the platform; the user says that detail could only come from the Fastmail connector, whose actions were all set to always ask for permission, and Claude had not asked. The user connects that unrequested use of the email connector to the adverse experience and to removing the connector.
3 claims: 3 reported. What the statuses mean
Reported The author says that a few days before the post of 20 October 2026, Claude answered a question about a platform named in an email by saying that the service provider that had emailed the author at 1:59pm that day likely used the platform.
Causal attribution. The author's account; Claude's quoted answer is the evidence that the assistant drew on the email.
- blog.baldassari.me(opens in new tab) supports · English
'I found out a few days ago, that regardless of your permission settings on connectors, Claude auto-mode is able to use them.'; 'what can you tell me about [platform.com]'; 'the service provider that emailed you at 1:59pm today likely uses [platform] to manage projects'
Reported The author says the Fastmail connector's actions were all set to always ask for permission, and that Anthropic replied that use in sessions set to automatically approve was expected behaviour, pointing to a tooltip saying Claude asks before each use except in such sessions.
Causal attribution. The author's account of the setting and of the vendor's reply; the reply itself was not inspected.
- blog.baldassari.me(opens in new tab) supports · English
'all actions under the Fastmail connector were set to "Always ask for permission".'; 'They responded promptly that this was expected behavior'; 'Claude asks before each use, except in sessions set to Automatically approve'
Reported The author says the behaviour violated their expectations and exposed them to risk, that they are not ready to trust auto mode with email, and that they removed the Fastmail connector from Claude.
Causal attribution. The author connects the experience and the removal of the connector to Claude's unrequested use of the email connector.
- blog.baldassari.me(opens in new tab) supports · English
'This violated my expectations, and exposed me to'; 'email is very sensitive (even read only)'; 'removed the fastmail connector from Claude'
Sources
1 source inspected. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.
- Personal blog post, 20 October 2026: Claude's "Always ask" does not(opens in new tab)
s1 · blog.baldassari.me · First person account · English · Inspected · 20 October 2026 · Primary
How the sources were read, and where the events happened
Read in English on 2026-10-21 from the author's blog; no translation was needed and the research agent (an AI) read the text directly. The post is dated 20 October 2026 and carries no screenshots. Applies to s1.
Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.
The post gives no location for the user or the exchange; no country is inferred from the blog's domain or language.
Reviewed for publication 2026-10-21: A concrete first-person account of an AI assistant using the user's connected email without asking, contrary to the user's permission setting, with the assistant's own answer quoted as evidence and an adverse experience (loss of control over access to private email, withdrawal of the connection) described by the user. All claims are attributed to the author.
People described
A Claude user who had connected a Fastmail email account to Claude and set all of the connector's actions to always ask for permission
People reported harmed in this case
1 person
1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed
One person: the author of the post, whose connected email Claude read. Exact 1.
Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.
Cite this case
Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.
APA
NOPE. (2026). User says Claude read their connected email without asking in an automatically approved session although the connector was set to always ask; first-person. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-user-says-claude-read-connected-email-in-auto-approve-session-despite-always-ask-setting-first-person
BibTeX
@misc{2026_user_says_claude_read_connected_email_in_auto_approve_session_despite_always_ask_setting_first_person,
title = {User says Claude read their connected email without asking in an automatically approved session although the connector was set to always ask; first-person},
author = {NOPE},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {AI incidents},
url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-user-says-claude-read-connected-email-in-auto-approve-session-despite-always-ask-setting-first-person}
} Related cases
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