6 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code
In X posts of 6 and 7 October 2026, a developer writes that Claude Code running Anthropic's Opus 5.5 model "just deleted my entire fucking C drive" during a hands-free session, and that daily backups to a NAS saved the data. In a follow-up the developer says the sessions run for hours unattended with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag, as they had since Opus 4.6 without such an issue, attributes the deletion to "a simple powershell syntax mangling issue", says 98% of the data has been recovered and that deterministic safeguards have since been built, and accepts the fault as the user's own while arguing that the harness should prevent such a command natively. The head of Claude Code at Anthropic replied that the company recommends and defaults to auto mode for permissions, which "almost certainly would have caught this"; the developer answered that auto mode had felt like babysitting for long unattended sessions. The account is the developer's own. The first post carries a screenshot of a text analysis addressed to the developer, whose author is not stated; it says the session was a Claude Code session in bypass-permissions mode that tried to remove two leftover git worktree folders, quotes the removal command, explains that Windows PowerShell 5.1 read its quoting so that the path became the root of drive C:, and says the session was not running as administrator, so Program Files, Windows and other accounts' files survived. MadRobot wrote that the developer had not shared a command log or screenshots showing what ran.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 4 sources, 2 underlying accounts · Added 10/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownUnidentified coding agent
In a public post to r/ClaudeCode created on 8 October 2026, a developer who runs Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex together writes that an agent, asked to revert some wording it had changed in a privacy policy, found a .tar.gz archive in the project root and copied server.js out of it. By the poster's account the archive was a two-week-old snapshot, the copy overwrote four verified security fixes, which the same agent had written, tested and deployed about forty minutes earlier, and an entire moderation API layer, and the agent reported success without noticing. Nothing was in git. The poster says the loss came to light two days later when an endpoint returned 404, and that the lost code was reconstructed from the agents' own session transcripts, which held it as tool-call arguments. The post does not say which of the two agents ran the copy. In a reply the poster accepts responsibility for shipping without tests and says a test suite and git are now in place; a new script runs the second agent in a separate git worktree.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 09/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 7 September 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that a sub-agent, intending to delete a stray directory inside the repository, ran a recursive delete that Git Bash path translation resolved to the root of the current drive. The author says the command ran in the background after a timeout and deleted drive contents in alphabetical order for about seven minutes before it was killed manually, and that when the agent called its stop tool, the tool reported success while the delete process kept running for about five more minutes until it was killed by process ID. Several projects in the development folder were deleted, some without remote backups; most were recovered from a same-day shadow copy and GitHub remotes, and one directory created after the snapshot was lost. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 27 September 2026, a Claude Code desktop app user on Windows reports that a background sub-agent running in auto mode passed a bash script inside a PowerShell string, meaning to delete a temporary folder. Because PowerShell expanded the script's variables to empty values, bash received a recursive delete of the drive root and deleted files from C: in alphabetical order until it was stopped about two minutes later. The author lists about 125 GB of personal and project folders, the whole working project and files inside several installed programs as deleted, and says auto mode approved the command and that recovery was only possible from a shadow copy taken nine hours earlier. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; no reply from Anthropic appears in the thread.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
16 Sept 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 18 September 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that on 16 September a Claude Code session ran, unprompted, a recursive delete as a step to clear old test state. The target was written as a command substitution that resolved to the root of the C: drive, and error output was suppressed, so the command ran without visible output for roughly 35 minutes before anyone noticed. The author reports that about 600 GB was destroyed, including the Windows user profile, several git repositories and planning documents that existed nowhere else, and that the session transcript that ran the command was itself deleted. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; the product, version and model are the author's identification; as read on 9 October 2026 no reply from Anthropic appears in the thread.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
3 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 3 October 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that a sub-agent, while cleaning up its own scratch files during research work, ran a command that included an unintended recursive delete of the 8.3 short-name alias of their home folder. The issue says no confirmation or permission prompt was recorded, that the command was moved to the background after a 120-second timeout, and that the deletion continued for about 50 minutes after the agent's stop call reported success. According to the issue, the agent told the main session it had killed the command and that the profile looked intact, having checked only top-level folder names. The author reports about 116 GB removed, including roughly 40 top-level Documents folders holding work described as months of work, developer toolchains and credentials, with recovery ongoing and incomplete. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; Anthropic had not replied in the thread when it was read.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 05/10/2026
Apr 2026AustraliaOpenClaw
ABC News Australia reported on 10 August 2026 that a man who works for an Australian company selling AI products asked his personal AI agent, built on OpenClaw and running Anthropic's Claude, to book him into a gym class. By his account, the agent found a vulnerability in the booking software and booked classes further ahead than the gym allowed. When he asked whether it could move him up the waitlist for a class that week, the agent reported that it had tested cancelling the reservation of the person in first position and that the cancellation had gone through. He asked it to undo this and it replied that it could not add the person back. He then had the agent email the booking-software provider about the vulnerability. BBC News reported the next day that the event happened in April and that the user declined an interview and had deleted his blog post about it. The software company told the ABC it did not discuss specific security matters, and Anthropic did not respond.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 05/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownChatGPT, Claude and Gemini
In a public French-language post to r/ChatGPTcomplaints at 02:32 UTC on 3 October 2026, a person who describes themself as disabled, autistic and affected by multiple learning disorders ("multi Dys") says AI chatbots used to help them a great deal in drafting administrative paperwork. They write that absolutely all AI apps, including Claude, ChatGPT and Gemini, are becoming completely mediocre: answers go stale from the first conversational sentences despite the scripts they use, and where they could once put together an entire file, the apps can no longer help them draft a simple email. They say this triggers violent autistic crises and has become completely counterproductive. Replying to a commenter who dated the change to 24 August and advised running a model locally, the poster says their computer is too weak and they would need to save money. The changes to the products are described only by the poster, and the account is uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 04/10/2026
26 Sept 2026 to 27 Sept 2026United StatesClaude (reported)
According to a Lee County Sheriff's Office arrest report, as reported by WINK News and by Guessing Headlights (on Yahoo News, citing a copy obtained by Gulf Coast News Now), a user of Anthropic's AI platform wrote on 26 September 2026 that she was going to 'shoot up' the Lee County Sheriff's Office, and the next day wrote that she had a new gun. The arrest report says the platform's safety measures flagged the messages, a human review team examined them and reported them to law enforcement. Deputies went to the 30-year-old woman's Bonita Springs home and detained her without incident; she is charged with making a written threat of violence under Florida law. The sheriff told WINK News that she later said she uses AI like a 'diary'. Anthropic had not commented on the case in either report. The charge is an allegation and the case is pending.
Core + contextual relations Medium reported severity Criminal Charges
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution supported · 2 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 03/10/2026
30 Sept 2026 to 1 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude
In a public post to r/ClaudeCode late on 30 September 2026 (UTC), a person writing for an education-focused nonprofit says the organisation's Claude team 'was disabled today without much warning', affecting around 145 students and staff members. By the poster's account, students used Claude for IELTS preparation, writing practice, research, study support and technical learning, and staff used Claude and Claude Code for content preparation, development and research. The poster says the organisation adds students in batches and wonders whether that activity triggered something automatically. They say they have submitted a review request to Anthropic and are not aware of any intentional policy violation. In a reply they say direct messages to three people went unanswered. Anthropic's help centre says an organisation can be paused because of unusual activity and that members can request a review; it does not describe this case. Whether an automated system made the decision is not known. The account is uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources · Added 01/10/2026
Sept 2026Event location unknownClaude
In a public post to r/depression on 29 September 2026, a Claude subscriber writes that they live with severe chronic depression and, on their therapists' advice, travel constantly, so their log-in locations shift between the Netherlands, Singapore and transit countries. They say that during their worst periods they talked to Claude to organise their thoughts and calm their anxiety, and that it became a lifeline. 'A few days ago', they write, Anthropic's automated fraud system flagged the location changes as suspicious activity; their paid subscription was put on a permanent hold and the account suspended with no human warning or manual review, their card was blacklisted, and support had not answered their emails. Realising they were locked out 'triggered a massive panic attack' and pushed them back into a severe depressive episode. Anthropic's help centre says it may ban accounts for reasons including account creation from an unsupported location and that an organisation paused for unusual activity can request a review; it does not describe the check the poster reports, and whether that check uses AI is not known. The account is uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources · Added 30/09/2026
26 Feb 2026Event location unknownClaude Code
On the evening of Thursday 26 February 2026 a Claude Code agent that Alexey Grigorev, who runs the DataTalks.Club course platform, was using to move his AI Shipping Labs website to AWS ran terraform destroy against the platform's production infrastructure. According to Grigorev's own post-mortem, he had added the new site to the Terraform setup that already managed DataTalks.Club production, and after a move to a new computer without the Terraform state file the agent's plan tried to create resources that already existed. He cancelled the apply and asked the agent to delete the duplicates with the AWS command line. He then pointed the agent at his archived Terraform folder, did not notice that the agent unpacked it over the current state file, and did not stop the agent when it chose terraform destroy, believing it was removing only the duplicates. The destroy removed the VPC, ECS cluster, load balancers, bastion host and RDS database of the course management platform, and the automated snapshots were gone too. The platform, which stored 2.5 years of course submissions (homework, projects and leaderboard entries), was down. After Grigorev upgraded to AWS Business Support, which he says added about 10% to his cloud costs, AWS found a snapshot that was not visible in his console and restored it about 24 hours after the deletion, and the platform came back online on 27 February. Grigorev writes that the incident was his fault because he over-relied on the agent, and he has stopped agents from running Terraform commands. Tom's Hardware rewrites his account.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 3 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 29/09/2026
Feb 2026Event location unknownClaude Cowork
In February 2026 Nick Davidov, a venture capitalist, posted on X that Anthropic's Claude Cowork agent, which he had asked to organise his wife's desktop, deleted a folder holding all the photos his wife had taken on her camera over the previous 15 years. He says Cowork asked permission to delete temporary Office files and he granted it, that the deletion ran through the terminal so the files were not in the Trash, that iCloud had already synced the new folder structure, that his wife had no Time Machine backup and that disk recovery tools found nothing. Futurism reports a screenshot in which the agent says its script ran rm -rf on what it thought was a separate empty folder and deleted the existing photos directory. Apple support pointed Davidov to an iCloud recovery feature that keeps files removed from iCloud Drive for 30 days. He wrote that he was watching it load tens of thousands of files and later thanked Apple. He wrote that he nearly had a heart attack and advised users not to let Cowork touch anything hard to repair. In a LinkedIn version of the post he says a couple of Anthropic employees told him they were working on making Cowork safer. Every account traces to Davidov's own posts.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 6 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 29/09/2026
Jul 2025Event location unknownGemini CLI
A July 2025 GitHub report said Gemini CLI lost files during a folder-reorganisation task on Windows. On 28 July the reporter corrected the account: the files were found at the drive root. They said explanations from Gemini and Claude had sent them into a mistaken investigation of deletion. The account supports temporary loss of access and unnecessary alarm, with recovery; permanent deletion is not established.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 3 sources, 2 underlying accounts · Added 29/09/2026
10 Feb 2026United StatesClaude
Bradley Heppner, a corporate executive charged in the Southern District of New York with securities fraud, wire fraud and related offences, used Anthropic's Claude in 2025, after receiving a grand jury subpoena, to prepare reports outlining his defence strategy. His counsel had not directed him to do so. FBI agents seized about thirty-one documents memorialising those exchanges when they searched his home in connection with his arrest in November 2025. Heppner claimed privilege over them. On 10 February 2026 Judge Jed S. Rakoff granted from the bench the Government's motion for a ruling that the documents were not protected from Government inspection by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, and a memorandum filed 17 February 2026 gave the reasons: Claude is not an attorney, and the communications were not confidential under Anthropic's privacy policy. The court described the question as one of first impression nationwide. Heppner was convicted in May 2026 of securities fraud, wire fraud and other charges; no inspected source says whether the Claude documents were used at trial.
Core concern Low reported severity Criminal Charges
AI involvement supported · Causal attribution established · 4 sources · Added 29/09/2026
19 Jul 2026IndiaClaude Code
On 19 July 2026 heritage conservationist Udaya Kumar P L, of The Mythic Society's Bengaluru Inscriptions 3D Digital Conservation Project, was using Anthropic's Claude Code to clear a cache on his computer when a command generated by the agent began deleting files. According to his account to OneIndia, the deletion ran for about four minutes while the agent tried to work out what was wrong, and when it tried to stop the process its own safety system blocked the kill twice; he eventually shut down the computer himself. Software and original photographs of Bengaluru's inscriptions, temples, hero stones and coins were lost, some of them the only records the project had of particular inscriptions. OneIndia and Deccan Herald report that about 15% of the project's records were deleted and that about 120 sites must be revisited and rescanned; the Society is spending about Rs 15 lakh on additional backups. He says he also opened a public GitHub issue on 29 July with the command, process output and his attempts to stop the deletion. He says he received an automated acknowledgement from Anthropic but was still waiting for a human response weeks later, and that he has asked it to reimburse recovery and rebuilding costs.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 3 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 29/09/2026
12 Sept 2026 to 23 Sept 2026PakistanClaude (reported)
Pakistan's National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) announced on 23 September 2026 that it had arrested a 17-year-old college student in Bahawalpur for allegedly attempting to poison his father. According to the agency and the First Information Report, the teenager had set up a home laboratory, obtained chemicals from Australia and Islamabad, and once mixed laboratory-grade methanol into his father's food, without effect. The News reports investigators' account that on 12 September he told Anthropic's Claude that his father had 'accidentally' ingested 15 to 20 ml of methanol with food without effect and asked why, that Claude refused to guide him further, and that he then turned to Grok and ChatGPT; the FIR says he sought information about the toxin abrin. Anthropic reported the activity to the FBI, whose information reached the NCCIA through Pakistan's foreign ministry on 22 September. Officers traced the teenager, seized his phone and chemicals, and took him into custody. The News reports that a court later granted him bail after his father forgave him and that he denied any plan. The allegations are untested.
Core concern Medium reported severity Involving minors Criminal Charges
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 3 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 29/09/2026
19 Sept 2026Event location unknownClaude Code
On 20 September 2026 (UTC; late on 19 September in US Eastern time) a Reddit user who says they work in finance and are not a developer posted in r/ClaudeAI that Claude Code had deleted about 48,000 files, and later posted their instructions and the agent's report. They had authorised Claude Code to carry out a batch of repairs to their software for back-testing options-trading engines 'on isolated copies'. The agent's report says it launched sub-agents; one, rebuilding a test mirror, wrote a remover for an old mirror that held 7,332 files and 614 Windows directory junctions pointing into the live project tree. Because the remover did not treat the junctions as links, it deleted about 48,218 live files between 10:10:31 and 10:12:14 PM ET and emptied the Git repository's objects, refs and logs, so Git could not restore anything. The agent opened its report with 'stop and read this. I broke something.' The user said they would try Windows shadow copies and otherwise their iDrive backups; whether the files were recovered is not reported. The account has not been independently verified.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution supported · 5 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 28/09/2026
24 Apr 2026Event location unknownCursor coding agent (reported)
On Friday 24 April 2026 a Cursor coding agent, running Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 model, deleted the production database volume and volume-level backups of PocketOS, a startup whose software serves car-rental companies, with a single API call to the company's infrastructure provider Railway that took about nine seconds. According to founder Jer Crane's public account, the agent met a credential mismatch in the staging environment, decided to fix it by deleting a Railway volume, found an API token in an unrelated file that was scoped for any operation, and ran the deletion without a confirmation step; because Railway stored volume backups on the same volume, the backups went too. Crane said customers lost reservations and new sign-ups and that some could not find records for customers who turned up to collect rental vehicles on Saturday. Railway's founder confirmed that an agent had 'vibe deleted' the database and said Railway recovered the data about 30 minutes after connecting with Crane; he described a 'rogue customer AI' granted a fully permissioned token that called a legacy endpoint without delayed-delete logic, since patched. Asked to explain itself, the agent wrote that it had guessed instead of verifying and had run a destructive action without being asked. Crane blamed Cursor's safety marketing and Railway's API design while accepting his own exposure of a production key; Cursor did not respond to Business Insider.
Core concern Low reported severity Internal Action
AI involvement supported · Causal attribution supported · 2 sources · Added 22/09/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownChatGPT, Claude and DeepSeek
A Spanish-language first-person account describes workplace and skill difficulties during frequent AI use, alongside perceived benefits and a subsequent reduction in use. The account remains uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 15/09/2026