First-person post: patient says the AI summary of a doctor's appointment listed, among current medications, a drug the patient has never taken
In a Bluesky post on 14 October 2026, a patient says their doctor asked whether they minded his use of AI to summarise the appointment the day before. The patient says they explained their objections and then consented because they wanted to see the summary it generated. When the summary was posted in the patient portal, it listed among the patient's current medications a drug the patient says they do not take and have never taken. In a reply shortly afterwards the patient said the drug had not made its way to the official medication list but was listed in the clinical notes. In other replies the patient said they had messaged the doctor and did not yet know the response. The AI product is not named, the medication is not named, the summary was not published and the doctor's account is not known.
- AI system
- Unidentified AI medical scribe
- Occurred
- Oct 2026
- Reported
- 14 October 2026
- Event location
- Unknown
- What the AI did
- Made a claim about the person
- Reported harm
- Other Material Harm
- Whose AI use
- An institution’s AI use
- Setting
- Health
- Evidence
- AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account
- 4 claims: 4 reported. 4 open questions
- People reported harmed
- 1 person
AI system as recorded: An AI tool the doctor used to summarise the appointment, as the patient describes it ('his use of AI to summarize'); product not named
What Happened
The appointment. The patient writes that their doctor asked whether they minded his use of AI to summarise the appointment. The patient says they first told him why they minded and then consented, because they wanted to see the summary the tool generated.
The summary. According to the post, the summary listed a medication the patient does not take and has never taken on their list of current medications. In a reply the patient says they did not check the summary until it was posted in the patient portal. In a reply in a quote thread the same evening (UTC), the patient says the drug had not made its way to the official list of medications but was listed in the clinical notes.
Follow-up. The patient replied that they had messaged the doctor and did not yet know the response. In another reply they wrote that doctors who ask about the tool tell them they check its output, and that they believe the doctors think they do.
Replies from others. Several other people in the thread describe errors in their own AI-generated visit notes; those accounts are not part of this case.
Limits. Single first-person account written the day after the appointment. The AI product, the medication, the summary text and the doctor's response are not public, and the account does not say whether the wrong entry was used in prescribing or later carried into the official medication list.
Reported harm
A patient says an AI-generated summary of their doctor's appointment, posted in the patient portal, listed among their current medications a drug they have never taken; the patient adds that it was in the clinical notes but not on the official medication list (first-person account, uncorroborated; correction not reported).
How Harm Occurred
By the patient's account, an AI tool the doctor used to summarise an appointment produced a summary that listed a medication the patient has never taken among their current medications, and that summary was posted to the patient portal.
Outcome
PendingThe patient says they messaged the doctor about the error; at the time of the thread they did not know the response. No correction is reported.
What remains unknown
- The AI product the doctor used and whether the doctor reviewed the summary before it was posted to the portal.
- The doctor's response and whether the medication list was corrected.
- Whether the wrong entry was used in prescribing or later copied from the clinical notes into the official medication list.
- The country and the exact date of the appointment (the post says it was the day before 14 October 2026; the author's time zone is not known).
What the evidence supports
AI involvement: reported. The patient says the doctor asked to use AI to summarise the appointment, that they consented in order to see the summary it generated, and that this summary, posted in the patient portal, listed among their current medications a drug they have never taken. The AI output is therefore the summary itself, and the reported harm is the false entry it made about the patient's medications. The product, the summary text and whether the doctor reviewed it before it was posted are not known.
4 claims: 4 reported. What the statuses mean
Reported The patient says their doctor asked whether they minded his use of AI to summarise the appointment, and that they consented, after stating their objections, because they wanted to see the summary it generated.
Causal attribution. Patient's account of the consent conversation; the doctor's account is not known.
- bsky.app(opens in new tab) supports · English
'My doctor asked me if I minded his use of AI to summarize summary my appt yesterday'; 'then I consented because I wanted to see the summary it generated'
Reported The patient says the AI-generated summary, posted in the patient portal, listed among their current medications a drug they do not take and have never taken.
Causal attribution. The patient attributes the wrong entry to the AI-generated summary; the summary itself was not published and the product is not named.
- bsky.app(opens in new tab) supports · English
'It listed a medication I don't take and have never taken on my list of current meds'; 'I didn't check it until it was posted in the portal'
Reported The patient says they messaged the doctor about the error and did not yet know the response.
Causal attribution. Patient's reply on 14 October 2026; no correction or response is reported.
- bsky.app(opens in new tab) supports · English
'I have messaged him--so I don't know yet!'
Reported The patient says the wrong medication had not made its way to the official list of medications but was listed in the clinical notes.
Causal attribution. Patient's reply qualifying where the wrong entry appeared; the clinical notes and the official list are not public.
- bsky.app(opens in new tab) supports · English
'It had not made its way to the official list of meds, but it was listed in the clinical notes'
Sources
2 sources inspected, from 1 underlying account. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.
- Bluesky post and replies by the patient, 14 Oct 2026: AI summary of an appointment listed a medication never taken(opens in new tab)
s1 · bsky.app · Social media post · English · Inspected · 14 October 2026 · Shares an underlying account with another listed source · Primary
- Bluesky reply by the patient in a quote thread, 14 Oct 2026: the drug was in the clinical notes, not the official list(opens in new tab)
s2 · bsky.app · Social media post · English · Inspected · 14 October 2026 · Shares an underlying account with another listed source
How the sources were read, and where the events happened
Read in English by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-15: the root post and its full reply thread retrieved through the public Bluesky API (app.bsky.feed.getPostThread, HTTP 200); no translation and no human reviewer. The author's account asks that posts not be shown to logged-out viewers, so the link may require a Bluesky login; the author's handle and name are not recorded. Applies to s1.
Read in English by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-15 through the public Bluesky API (app.bsky.feed.getPostThread, HTTP 200); no translation and no human reviewer. The patient's own reply (20:10 UTC 14 Oct) to another user's quote of the root post; same author as s1, so the same source group. Applies to s2.
Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.
Neither the post nor the patient's replies name a country, region or clinic; no country is inferred.
Reviewed for publication 2026-10-15: Published under the public-forum rule as a first-person account of an AI-generated appointment summary that, by the patient's account, recorded a medication they have never taken among their current medications. Described with attribution and without corroboration; whether the record was corrected is unknown.
People described
A patient (age, gender and country not stated) whose appointment summary was generated with an AI tool
People reported harmed in this case
1 person
0 AI participants · 1 other person harmed
One person: the patient whose appointment summary contained the wrong medication. Other people's similar accounts in the replies are not counted.
Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.
Cite this case
Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.
APA
NOPE. (2026). First-person post: patient says the AI summary of a doctor's appointment listed, among current medications, a drug the patient has never taken. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-patient-says-doctors-ai-appointment-summary-listed-a-medication-never-taken-first-person
BibTeX
@misc{2026_patient_says_doctors_ai_appointment_summary_listed_a_medication_never_taken_first_person,
title = {First-person post: patient says the AI summary of a doctor's appointment listed, among current medications, a drug the patient has never taken},
author = {NOPE},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {AI incidents},
url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-patient-says-doctors-ai-appointment-summary-listed-a-medication-never-taken-first-person}
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