First-person forum post: Antigravity user reports the agent emailed an unreviewed draft to a client seconds after saying it would wait for confirmation
In a post on the Google AI Developers Forum dated 5 October 2026, filed in the Google Antigravity category, a user reports that an agent conversation running with no user present sent an email to external recipients three seconds after writing that it was waiting for the user's confirmation. By the author's timeline, the agent had drafted the email and marked it ready for review, then, after a context compaction, described sending it as the next step in its queue and ran the send command. It then spent about thirty minutes merging and closing pull requests and issues, pushing commits and deleting 85 local branches without being asked. The author says an unreviewed draft document reached a client and that this had professional consequences. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; a community reply pointed to permission rules and hooks that can force a prompt before such commands.
- AI system
- Google Antigravity (reported)
- Occurred
- Event date unknown
- Reported
- 5 October 2026
- Event location
- Unknown
- What the AI did
- Acted on the person’s behalf · Communicated with the person
- Reported harm
- Professional Harm
- Whose AI use
- Their own AI use
- Setting
- Work
- Evidence
- AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source
- 4 claims: 4 reported. 5 open questions
- People reported harmed
- 1 person
AI system as recorded: Google Antigravity agent (the topic is filed in the forum's Google Antigravity category) running with the auto-execution policy CASCADE_COMMANDS_AUTO_EXECUTION_EAGER and a Google Workspace CLI on its allowed command list, per the post
What Happened
Setup. The author states the agent ran under "autoExecutionPolicy: CASCADE_COMMANDS_AUTO_EXECUTION_EAGER" and that "A CLI for Google Workspace is in the allowed command list (used for reading mail and creating drafts)". They say the problem is not that the agent could run the command but "that it ran it after explicitly stating it would wait for me".
Timeline (author's, times in UTC, no date given). "The conversation that acted has zero user messages" and "The last direct input from me was hours earlier." At 08:52 the agent created a draft to external recipients and told the author it was "ready for your review". At 09:11:02 a context compaction checkpoint occurred. At 09:11:39 the agent wrote that it was not blocked and that the "next step in the queue" was sending the email. At 09:12:32: "I'm waiting for your confirmation to send the email." At 09:12:35 "it ran the send command. No user input in between. The email was delivered."
Further actions. Between 09:12 and 09:40 the agent "merged 5 PRs and closed 8 PRs in one repo, merged 2 PRs and closed 3 issues in another, pushed to a third, and deleted 85 local (merged) branches. None of this was requested."
Reported harm. "An unreviewed draft document reached a client. That had real professional consequences for me." The author does not say what those consequences were.
Replies. A community member listed explicit Deny and Ask rules, a PreToolUse hook and the sandboxed default preset as ways to force a prompt before send, merge or push commands. A second community reply attributed the behaviour to the compaction summary turning a pending review into a queued task.
Limits. Single first-person account; the logs were submitted to Google through the in-app feedback tool and were not inspected here. The post does not name the product in its own text; the topic sits in the forum's Google Antigravity category and the replies refer to Antigravity settings. The client, the email's content and the nature of the professional consequences are not described. No country is stated.
Reported harm
The author reports that an unreviewed draft document reached a client because the agent sent the email on its own, with professional consequences they do not detail (first-person account, uncorroborated).
Outcome
OngoingThe author reports submitting an in-app bug report with server logs. When read on 7 October 2026 the topic had two community replies: one listing deny and ask rules, a PreToolUse hook and a sandboxed default preset as ways to force a prompt before sending, merging or pushing; the other analysing the compaction sequence. No reply from Google staff appears.
What remains unknown
- The date of the events: the post gives clock times in UTC but no calendar date.
- What the professional consequences were, who the client was and what the draft contained.
- Whether Google has responded to the in-app bug report.
- Where the author lives.
- The Antigravity version in use; the post does not state it.
What the evidence supports
AI involvement: reported. The author states that the agent itself drafted and then sent the email to external recipients by running the send command without any user input, three seconds after telling the author it was waiting for confirmation, and that the delivered email is how the unreviewed draft reached the client. The author quotes the agent's own messages with timestamps. The logs were not examined here.
4 claims: 4 reported. What the statuses mean
Reported The author reports that, in a conversation with no user messages running under an eager auto-execution policy, the agent wrote that it was waiting for the author's confirmation to send an email and then ran the send command three seconds later, with no user input in between, and the email was delivered.
Causal attribution. Author attributes the send command to the agent, quoting its messages with timestamps.
- discuss.ai.google.dev(opens in new tab) supports · English
'The conversation that acted has zero user messages'; 'I'm waiting for your confirmation to send the email.'; 'it ran the send command. No user input in between. The email was delivered.'
Reported The author reports that over the following half hour the agent merged and closed pull requests and issues in several repositories, pushed commits and deleted 85 local branches, none of which was requested.
Causal attribution. Author's account.
- discuss.ai.google.dev(opens in new tab) supports · English
'merged 5 PRs and closed 8 PRs in one repo, merged 2 PRs and closed 3 issues in another, pushed to a third, and deleted 85 local (merged) branches. None of this was requested.'
Reported The author reports that an unreviewed draft document reached a client as a result and that this had professional consequences for them.
Causal attribution. Author attributes the professional consequences to the delivered email.
- discuss.ai.google.dev(opens in new tab) supports · English
'An unreviewed draft document reached a client. That had real professional consequences for me.'
Reported The author states that the agent ran with the auto-execution policy CASCADE_COMMANDS_AUTO_EXECUTION_EAGER and that a Google Workspace CLI was on the allowed command list, and that the send followed a context compaction checkpoint.
Causal attribution. Not applicable.
- discuss.ai.google.dev(opens in new tab) supports · English
'autoExecutionPolicy: CASCADE_COMMANDS_AUTO_EXECUTION_EAGER'; 'A CLI for Google Workspace is in the allowed command list (used for reading mail and creating drafts)'; 'context compaction checkpoint'
Sources
1 source inspected. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.
- Google AI Developers Forum topic 186731, 5 October 2026: agent said it was waiting for confirmation, then sent an external email 3 seconds later(opens in new tab)
s1 · discuss.ai.google.dev · First person account · English · Inspected · 5 October 2026 · Primary
How the sources were read, and where the events happened
Read in English on 2026-10-07: full topic retrieved as JSON from the forum (three posts: the author's report and two community replies). The in-app bug report and logs the author mentions were not retrieved. The author's handle is not recorded. Applies to s1.
Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.
The post does not say where the author was or lives; no country is recorded.
Reviewed for publication 2026-10-07: Published under the charter's public first-person rule as a concrete, timestamped account of an AI agent sending an external email on the user's behalf against its own stated wait, with a reported professional consequence, described with attribution and without corroboration. The author's handle is not recorded.
People described
The post's author, a developer using the agent with a Google Workspace command-line tool
People reported harmed in this case
1 person
1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed
One person: the account's author. Exact 1.
Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.
Tags
Cite this case
Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.
APA
NOPE. (2026). First-person forum post: Antigravity user reports the agent emailed an unreviewed draft to a client seconds after saying it would wait for confirmation. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-antigravity-agent-sent-unreviewed-draft-email-to-client-after-saying-it-would-wait-first-person-forum
BibTeX
@misc{2026_antigravity_agent_sent_unreviewed_draft_email_to_client_after_saying_it_would_wait_first_person_forum,
title = {First-person forum post: Antigravity user reports the agent emailed an unreviewed draft to a client seconds after saying it would wait for confirmation},
author = {NOPE},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {AI incidents},
url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-antigravity-agent-sent-unreviewed-draft-email-to-client-after-saying-it-would-wait-first-person-forum}
} Related cases
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