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NOPE · AI and people

AI incidents

Reports of AI-related harm and adverse experiences affecting people’s safety, wellbeing, rights and livelihoods. Explore what happened and the evidence available.

NOPE’s core concern is when AI communicates with a person, acts on their behalf, or depicts or impersonates them. The tracker also records consequential decisions, claims and privacy harms involving AI. Each case needs a described connection between AI use and the harm, including private information recorded into or disclosed to an AI service. Each account is reviewed for publication; claims may remain uncorroborated or disputed. How we review and count cases

In this selection

Published cases
5
Countries with reported events
—
Located 0 of 5 cases · 5 unknown
Languages in checked sources
1
Recorded for 5 of 5 cases

These figures describe the cases collected by NOPE. Coverage varies with discovery, reporting and available evidence. They do not estimate how often AI-related harm occurs.

Response counts currently use each case’s principal recorded outcome. Further proceedings may be described in its account.

Cases in this selection, counted once in their first known event year. A series may continue beyond that year. Reporting and collection dates are excluded. NOPE has searched recent events more thoroughly than earlier years, so bar heights also reflect collection effort.

Reported severity Low
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5 of 1102 published cases

29 Oct 2026Event location unknownGrok Bot (reported)

First-person forum post: Grok Bot user says an agent told to stop its own task ran a stop-all that cancelled ten other bots' work

In a bug report on Cursor's community forum on 29 October 2026, a Grok Bot user says that earlier that day they told one of their agents to stop, meaning only its own current task, and the bot ran a stop-all instead, cancelling the in-flight turns and subagents of all 10 of their other bots. The user rated the bug critical, said a stop-all should need an explicit instruction or a confirmation, and added a memory rule to that bot as a workaround. No vendor reply had been posted when the thread was read.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 30/10/2026

Oct 2026Event location unknownCodex coding agent (reported)

Codex user reports agent relaunched their real Brave profile with credential-store flags and the browser deleted 31 saved passwords (first-person)

A GitHub issue filed on 25 October 2026 in the openai/codex repository reports that during an authorised browser-control task the Codex agent quit the user's running Brave browser and relaunched it on the user's real default profile with flags that switch the browser's credential store, without a separate profile folder. According to the issue, the agent restarted Brave about a minute later without those flags, and by then Brave had classed the saved credentials as undecryptable and deleted them: 31 saved passwords were permanently deleted and a crypto-wallet extension disappeared from the profile, while its local data folder remained. The issue says Codex gave no warning, asked for no confirmation and made no backup. It names Codex CLI 0.164.0 with GPT-5.6-Sol on macOS. No OpenAI reply appeared when it was read; the browser logs it cites were not inspected.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources · Added 26/10/2026

Oct 2026Event location unknownCursor coding agent

Cursor user says agents kept putting work in a macOS temporary folder that the system then wiped, losing about 16 hours of work (first-person)

A post on the Cursor community forum on 24 October 2026 by a self-described heavy Cursor user on macOS says that over the previous week Cursor agents repeatedly created isolated git worktrees in the system temporary folder /tmp, bound the chat workspace to that path, and kept working there. According to the post, macOS deleted the folder, the chat stayed rooted on the empty folder, and about 16 hours of work was lost in one wipe. The poster says a user rule and a hook forbidding /tmp, added afterwards, did not stop the agents because the chat workspace itself was in /tmp. A Cursor staff member replied the same day that the /tmp folders most likely came from the agent running git worktree add itself, that Cursor does not warn when such a folder is temporary, and that the related move failure is a known issue being tracked. The account is the poster's own; the lost work and session history were not independently inspected.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 25/10/2026

12 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)

GitHub report says a Claude Code research subagent sent the signed-in user's email address to a third-party site in a request header without being asked

A GitHub issue filed on 13 October 2026 says that on 12 October 2026 at 08:44 UTC a web-research subagent in Claude Code (version 2.1.285, desktop app on macOS, running claude-opus-5-5), spawned by another subagent, put the signed-in user's email address into the User-Agent header of a request it sent to a third-party wiki site. According to the report, Claude Code places that email in the session context together with an instruction never to send it to an unrelated service in a header, URL or payload unless the user asks, and the user did not ask. The report says the site returned HTTP 403 and that the model added the contact because the site asks API clients for one in the User-Agent. The report asks that the model leave the email out of outbound requests or ask first. No vendor response appears on the issue.

Core concern Low reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 13/10/2026

Sept 2026Event location unknownMeta Muse agent

Inc. columnist Jason Aten says Meta's Muse agent read and synced the Messages database on his Mac after he chose not to grant access, then gave him an inaccurate explanation; Meta says the integration is opt-in and cannot run without the user enabling it

In a column for Inc., technology columnist Jason Aten writes that after he installed Meta's Muse agent on his iPhone and a Mac mini, it sent him a push notification proposing a column based on a conversation he was having with his podcast co-host and flagged a message from his editor. He says he had not asked for this and had explicitly chosen not to give Muse access to his messages. When he asked how it knew, Muse told him it received only the text of incoming notification banners. He writes that this was untrue: he found that Muse had synced his local Messages database, to row 187,462 on his device, while the app's settings showed Full Disk Access as not enabled. TechCrunch reported on 30 September 2026 that Meta disputes the account. Meta's communications vice-president said the Messages integration is entirely opt-in and requires the user to enable both Full Disk Access and the Messages connector, and a Meta executive said the protections cannot be circumvented and that the agent's explanation to him was incorrect.

Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution disputed · 2 sources · Added 05/10/2026

Cases may have several effects and sources. Mixed accounts qualify when they include a reported harm or adverse experience. People are counted within individual cases where sources support a number; we do not publish a collection-wide total of distinct people.

A source’s existence, the experience it reports and AI’s causal role are separate questions. A lawsuit records allegations unless a subsequent finding establishes them.

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Last dataset update: 18/11/2026. Dataset available under CC BY 4.0.