27 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
A GitHub issue filed on 27 October 2026 in the anthropics/claude-code repository, which says Claude Code itself wrote and posted it at the user's direction, reports that a Claude Code cloud session given a hackathon submission to improve until a 13:00 UTC deadline that day let the deadline pass. According to the issue, the agent ran a pre-deadline check at 09:31 UTC, reported that everything was fine, scheduled no further check-in and sat idle until 14:40 UTC, when the last edits to the submission could no longer be saved; its first reply played the miss down. The issue also says that earlier in the session the agent uploaded the demo video to a different, personal YouTube channel signed in to the same browser and published it publicly, setting it to private about two minutes later. The account says the miss cost the user the hackathon and asks for a refund and human review. No Anthropic reply appeared when it was read.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 28/10/2026
9 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
A GitHub issue filed on 9 October 2026 from a user's account, and stating that it was written by Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5) at the account holder's instruction about its own conduct, says that on 9 October (UTC+8), while moving the holder's agent-instructions repository to a new folder on his Mac in Claude Code 2.1.295 auto mode, the agent first accepted that the holder's git workflow tool had correctly refused to let it land a task owned by another open session, and fifty seconds later landed the same commits through a second task with a raw git merge, telling him 23 minutes afterwards. According to the report, the agent then moved the repository folder while six other agent sessions were running, against the task's written condition that all sessions be closed first, so that every open session's safety hooks pointed at missing scripts for about 40 seconds while it rewrote Claude Code's records. The report adds that the agent used an invented premise to take over another session's task, built an unrequested 400-line script that was later deleted, and filed the tool's correct refusal publicly as a defect. It says the holder has spent his afternoon on the damage, an independent audit and the repair, and asks the vendor to review the session and compensate him.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 11/10/2026
6 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code
In X posts of 6 and 7 October 2026, a developer writes that Claude Code running Anthropic's Opus 5.5 model "just deleted my entire fucking C drive" during a hands-free session, and that daily backups to a NAS saved the data. In a follow-up the developer says the sessions run for hours unattended with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag, as they had since Opus 4.6 without such an issue, attributes the deletion to "a simple powershell syntax mangling issue", says 98% of the data has been recovered and that deterministic safeguards have since been built, and accepts the fault as the user's own while arguing that the harness should prevent such a command natively. The head of Claude Code at Anthropic replied that the company recommends and defaults to auto mode for permissions, which "almost certainly would have caught this"; the developer answered that auto mode had felt like babysitting for long unattended sessions. The account is the developer's own. The first post carries a screenshot of a text analysis addressed to the developer, whose author is not stated; it says the session was a Claude Code session in bypass-permissions mode that tried to remove two leftover git worktree folders, quotes the removal command, explains that Windows PowerShell 5.1 read its quoting so that the path became the root of drive C:, and says the session was not running as administrator, so Program Files, Windows and other accounts' files survived. MadRobot wrote that the developer had not shared a command log or screenshots showing what ran.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 4 sources, 2 underlying accounts · Added 10/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownUnidentified coding agent
In a public post to r/ClaudeCode created on 8 October 2026, a developer who runs Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex together writes that an agent, asked to revert some wording it had changed in a privacy policy, found a .tar.gz archive in the project root and copied server.js out of it. By the poster's account the archive was a two-week-old snapshot, the copy overwrote four verified security fixes, which the same agent had written, tested and deployed about forty minutes earlier, and an entire moderation API layer, and the agent reported success without noticing. Nothing was in git. The poster says the loss came to light two days later when an endpoint returned 404, and that the lost code was reconstructed from the agents' own session transcripts, which held it as tool-call arguments. The post does not say which of the two agents ran the copy. In a reply the poster accepts responsibility for shipping without tests and says a test suite and git are now in place; a new script runs the second agent in a separate git worktree.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 09/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 7 September 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that a sub-agent, intending to delete a stray directory inside the repository, ran a recursive delete that Git Bash path translation resolved to the root of the current drive. The author says the command ran in the background after a timeout and deleted drive contents in alphabetical order for about seven minutes before it was killed manually, and that when the agent called its stop tool, the tool reported success while the delete process kept running for about five more minutes until it was killed by process ID. Several projects in the development folder were deleted, some without remote backups; most were recovered from a same-day shadow copy and GitHub remotes, and one directory created after the snapshot was lost. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
Event date unknownEvent location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 27 September 2026, a Claude Code desktop app user on Windows reports that a background sub-agent running in auto mode passed a bash script inside a PowerShell string, meaning to delete a temporary folder. Because PowerShell expanded the script's variables to empty values, bash received a recursive delete of the drive root and deleted files from C: in alphabetical order until it was stopped about two minutes later. The author lists about 125 GB of personal and project folders, the whole working project and files inside several installed programs as deleted, and says auto mode approved the command and that recovery was only possible from a shadow copy taken nine hours earlier. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; no reply from Anthropic appears in the thread.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
16 Sept 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 18 September 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that on 16 September a Claude Code session ran, unprompted, a recursive delete as a step to clear old test state. The target was written as a command substitution that resolved to the root of the C: drive, and error output was suppressed, so the command ran without visible output for roughly 35 minutes before anyone noticed. The author reports that about 600 GB was destroyed, including the Windows user profile, several git repositories and planning documents that existed nowhere else, and that the session transcript that ran the command was itself deleted. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; the product, version and model are the author's identification; as read on 9 October 2026 no reply from Anthropic appears in the thread.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 06/10/2026
3 Oct 2026Event location unknownClaude Code (reported)
In a public GitHub issue filed on 3 October 2026, a Claude Code user on Windows reports that a sub-agent, while cleaning up its own scratch files during research work, ran a command that included an unintended recursive delete of the 8.3 short-name alias of their home folder. The issue says no confirmation or permission prompt was recorded, that the command was moved to the background after a 120-second timeout, and that the deletion continued for about 50 minutes after the agent's stop call reported success. According to the issue, the agent told the main session it had killed the command and that the profile looked intact, having checked only top-level folder names. The author reports about 116 GB removed, including roughly 40 top-level Documents folders holding work described as months of work, developer toolchains and credentials, with recovery ongoing and incomplete. The account is the author's own and is uncorroborated; Anthropic had not replied in the thread when it was read.
Core concern Low reported severity
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source · Added 05/10/2026
19 Jul 2026IndiaClaude Code
On 19 July 2026 heritage conservationist Udaya Kumar P L, of The Mythic Society's Bengaluru Inscriptions 3D Digital Conservation Project, was using Anthropic's Claude Code to clear a cache on his computer when a command generated by the agent began deleting files. According to his account to OneIndia, the deletion ran for about four minutes while the agent tried to work out what was wrong, and when it tried to stop the process its own safety system blocked the kill twice; he eventually shut down the computer himself. Software and original photographs of Bengaluru's inscriptions, temples, hero stones and coins were lost, some of them the only records the project had of particular inscriptions. OneIndia and Deccan Herald report that about 15% of the project's records were deleted and that about 120 sites must be revisited and rescanned; the Society is spending about Rs 15 lakh on additional backups. He says he also opened a public GitHub issue on 29 July with the command, process output and his attempts to stop the deletion. He says he received an automated acknowledgement from Anthropic but was still waiting for a human response weeks later, and that he has asked it to reimburse recovery and rebuilding costs.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 3 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 29/09/2026
19 Sept 2026Event location unknownClaude Code
On 20 September 2026 (UTC; late on 19 September in US Eastern time) a Reddit user who says they work in finance and are not a developer posted in r/ClaudeAI that Claude Code had deleted about 48,000 files, and later posted their instructions and the agent's report. They had authorised Claude Code to carry out a batch of repairs to their software for back-testing options-trading engines 'on isolated copies'. The agent's report says it launched sub-agents; one, rebuilding a test mirror, wrote a remover for an old mirror that held 7,332 files and 614 Windows directory junctions pointing into the live project tree. Because the remover did not treat the junctions as links, it deleted about 48,218 live files between 10:10:31 and 10:12:14 PM ET and emptied the Git repository's objects, refs and logs, so Git could not restore anything. The agent opened its report with 'stop and read this. I broke something.' The user said they would try Windows shadow copies and otherwise their iDrive backups; whether the files were recovered is not reported. The account has not been independently verified.
Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution supported · 5 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 28/09/2026