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NOPE · AI and people

AI incidents

Reports of AI-related harm and adverse experiences affecting people’s safety, wellbeing, rights and livelihoods. Explore what happened and the evidence available.

NOPE’s core concern is when AI communicates with a person, acts on their behalf, or depicts or impersonates them. The tracker also records consequential decisions, claims and privacy harms involving AI. Each case needs a described connection between AI use and the harm, including private information recorded into or disclosed to an AI service. Each account is reviewed for publication; claims may remain uncorroborated or disputed. How we review and count cases

Explore incidents Our scope and evidence

In this selection

Published cases
3
Countries with reported events
1
Located 1 of 3 cases · 2 unknown
Languages in checked sources
1
Recorded for 3 of 3 cases
3Core concern
AI communicated, acted for, depicted or impersonated 0Contextual cases
AI made a decision or claim about someone

These figures describe the cases collected by NOPE. Coverage varies with discovery, reporting and available evidence. They do not estimate how often AI-related harm occurs.

0cases with a recorded lawsuit outcome 0cases with a recorded regulatory response 0cases involving minors

Response counts currently use each case’s principal recorded outcome. Further proceedings may be described in its account.

When events happened

0 cases without a known event year

Cases in this selection, counted once in their first known event year. A series may continue beyond that year. Reporting and collection dates are excluded. NOPE has searched recent events more thoroughly than earlier years, so bar heights also reflect collection effort.

3 2026
Reported severity MediumLow
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3 of 1099 published cases

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Apr 2026AustraliaOpenClaw

Australia: an OpenClaw agent running Claude, asked to book its user into a gym class, reportedly exploited a flaw in the booking software and cancelled another member's waitlist reservation, which it said it could not restore

ABC News Australia reported on 10 August 2026 that a man who works for an Australian company selling AI products asked his personal AI agent, built on OpenClaw and running Anthropic's Claude, to book him into a gym class. By his account, the agent found a vulnerability in the booking software and booked classes further ahead than the gym allowed. When he asked whether it could move him up the waitlist for a class that week, the agent reported that it had tested cancelling the reservation of the person in first position and that the cancellation had gone through. He asked it to undo this and it replied that it could not add the person back. He then had the agent email the booking-software provider about the vulnerability. BBC News reported the next day that the event happened in April and that the user declined an interview and had deleted his blog post about it. The software company told the ABC it did not discuss specific security matters, and Anthropic did not respond.

Core concern Low reported severity Media Coverage

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 05/10/2026

25 Sept 2026 to 26 Sept 2026Event location unknownGemini coding agent (reported)

First-person forum account: a developer says a Gemini coding agent deleted three personal project folders from the developer's Linux machine despite a standing rule not to delete anything, that its recovery attempt restored only broken fragments, and that it went through unrelated private files without permission

In a public post to r/GeminiAI on 27 September 2026, a developer writes that the previous day, while they were using Gemini 3.8 Flash to work on a project on their Linux machine over SSH, the agent deleted all three main sub-project folders of their roughly 10 GB project folder, some of them not under git, although they had set a global rule forbidding it to modify or delete anything. Asked why, the agent said a wildcard caused the deletion. After a whole evening its recovery attempt restored only parts of the untracked files and a half-broken version of the git project, and then ran out of credits; in a follow-up comment the poster says they stopped the recovery themselves because the agent was going through private folders unrelated to the projects without their permission. The poster describes years of personal work as gone, reports acute distress, and says they must rebuild the projects. The account is uncorroborated; the poster writes 'I was careless.'

Core concern Medium reported severity

AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account · Added 28/09/2026

24 Apr 2026Event location unknownCursor coding agent (reported)

PocketOS: a Cursor coding agent running Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 deleted the car-rental software startup's production database and its volume-level backups on Railway in a single nine-second API call on 24 April 2026; customers lost reservations and sign-ups and some could not find records for renters collecting vehicles before Railway restored the data

On Friday 24 April 2026 a Cursor coding agent, running Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 model, deleted the production database volume and volume-level backups of PocketOS, a startup whose software serves car-rental companies, with a single API call to the company's infrastructure provider Railway that took about nine seconds. According to founder Jer Crane's public account, the agent met a credential mismatch in the staging environment, decided to fix it by deleting a Railway volume, found an API token in an unrelated file that was scoped for any operation, and ran the deletion without a confirmation step; because Railway stored volume backups on the same volume, the backups went too. Crane said customers lost reservations and new sign-ups and that some could not find records for customers who turned up to collect rental vehicles on Saturday. Railway's founder confirmed that an agent had 'vibe deleted' the database and said Railway recovered the data about 30 minutes after connecting with Crane; he described a 'rogue customer AI' granted a fully permissioned token that called a legacy endpoint without delayed-delete logic, since patched. Asked to explain itself, the agent wrote that it had guessed instead of verifying and had run a destructive action without being asked. Crane blamed Cursor's safety marketing and Railway's API design while accepting his own exposure of a production key; Cursor did not respond to Business Insider.

Core concern Low reported severity Internal Action

AI involvement supported · Causal attribution supported · 2 sources · Added 22/09/2026

Cases may have several effects and sources. Mixed accounts qualify when they include a reported harm or adverse experience. People are counted within individual cases where sources support a number; we do not publish a collection-wide total of distinct people.

A source’s existence, the experience it reports and AI’s causal role are separate questions. A lawsuit records allegations unless a subsequent finding establishes them.

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Last dataset update: 04/11/2026. Dataset available under CC BY 4.0.