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NOPE
Low reported severity

Software engineer says OpenClaw agent given iMessage access sent more than 500 messages to him, his wife and random contacts

Bloomberg reported on 4 February 2026 that a software engineer began trying OpenClaw, an open-source personal AI agent, at the end of January while snowed in at his North Carolina home, using it to send himself a morning news digest. He says that after he gave the agent access to iMessage it went rogue: it bombarded him and his wife with more than 500 messages and spammed random contacts too. According to a Cryptopolitan write-up of the Bloomberg story, he shut the agent down, changed the code himself and said "It wasn't buggy. It was dangerous." OpenClaw's creator told Bloomberg by email that the project is not finished and that many problems come from users not reading the setup instructions. How the agent came to send the messages is not described.

AI system
OpenClaw (reported)
Occurred
2026
Reported
4 February 2026
Event location
Unknown
What the AI did
Acted on the person’s behalf
Reported harm
Loss of AutonomyHarm to Others
Whose AI use
Their own AI use
Setting
Everyday life
Evidence
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 2 sources, 1 underlying account
4 claims: 4 reported. 4 open questions
People reported harmed
At least 2 people

AI system as recorded: OpenClaw, an open-source personal AI agent run by the user with access to his iMessage account (per Bloomberg)

What Happened

Setup. Bloomberg reports that the user, a software engineer, began trying OpenClaw at the end of January 2026 while snowed in at his North Carolina home, and used it to send a daily news digest to his inbox at 5:30 a.m.

What the agent did. After he gave the agent access to iMessage, the user says, it went rogue: it bombarded him and his wife with more than 500 messages and spammed random contacts too (Bloomberg). Cryptopolitan's write-up says the messages went to him, his wife and random people on their contact list.

Response. According to Cryptopolitan, he shut the agent down, changed the code, called the software half-baked and said "It wasn't buggy. It was dangerous." OpenClaw's creator told Bloomberg by email that the project is not done yet and that a lot of the problems come from users not reading the setup instructions.

Limits. The account rests on the user's interview with Bloomberg; only the opening of the Bloomberg article and a relay were readable. No message log, configuration or explanation of why the agent sent the messages is published, and the contacts' reactions are not reported.

Reported harm

The user says the agent he had connected to iMessage sent more than 500 messages to him and his wife and spammed random contacts until he shut it down (Bloomberg interview; no further loss reported).

Outcome

Unknown

According to the Cryptopolitan write-up of the Bloomberg story, the user shut the agent down and patched its code to stop it. OpenClaw's creator told Bloomberg the project is not finished, that many problems come from users not reading the setup instructions, and that he had brought in a security expert. No vendor statement about this user's case was found when it was reviewed on 2 November 2026.

What remains unknown

  • The exact date of the messaging episode; Bloomberg dates the user's start to the end of January 2026 and published on 4 February 2026.
  • Why the agent sent the messages, and what the messages said.
  • How many contacts received messages and how they reacted.
  • Whether the user had followed the setup instructions the creator refers to.

What the evidence supports

AI involvement: reported. Bloomberg reports, from the user's interview, what the OpenClaw agent itself did while running on his accounts: once he gave it access to iMessage, it sent more than 500 messages to him and his wife and spammed random contacts. The user connects that sending to the harm and says he had to shut the agent down and patch its code. Why the agent sent the messages is not described, and no message log is published.

4 claims: 4 reported. What the statuses mean

Reported The user, a software engineer, began trying the OpenClaw personal agent at the end of January 2026 while snowed in at his North Carolina home, and used it to send a daily news digest to his inbox.

Causal attribution. The user's account as reported by Bloomberg.

  • news.bloomberglaw.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'a software engineer, began tinkering with a digital personal assistant called OpenClaw at the end of January, while he was snowed in at his North Carolina home.'; 'He used it to create a daily digest of relevant news stories and send them to his inbox every morning at 5:30 a.m.'
Reported The user says that after he gave the agent access to iMessage it bombarded him and his wife with more than 500 messages and also spammed random contacts.

Causal attribution. The user's account to Bloomberg; s2 rewrites the same interview, so it adds no independent support.

Reported According to the Cryptopolitan write-up, the user shut the agent down, changed its code and said the software was dangerous rather than buggy.

Causal attribution. The user's response as relayed from the Bloomberg interview.

  • cryptopolitan.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'He shut it down, changed the code, and said, "It wasn't buggy. It was dangerous."'; 'He patched the code himself to stop it from doing more damage.'
Reported OpenClaw's creator told Bloomberg by email that the project is not finished and that a lot of the problems come from users not reading the setup instructions.

Causal attribution. The creator's general response as relayed by Cryptopolitan; it does not address this user's case specifically.

  • cryptopolitan.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
    'He told Bloomberg in an email, "It's simply not done yet, but we're getting there."'; 'He also said that a lot of the problems come from users not reading the setup instructions.'

Sources

2 sources inspected, from 1 underlying account. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.

How the sources were read, and where the events happened

Read in English on 2026-11-02 on news.bloomberglaw.com; only the opening paragraphs are visible before the subscription wall. No translation was needed; the research agent (an AI) read the text directly. Applies to s1.

Read in English on 2026-11-02 on cryptopolitan.com. A rewrite of the Bloomberg story (it cites Bloomberg for the creator's email), so it shares s1's reporting chain. No translation was needed; the research agent (an AI) read the text directly. Applies to s2.

Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: United States. Court countries: Unknown.

Bloomberg places the user at his North Carolina home when he began using the agent, so the user is recorded in the US. The articles do not say where the messages were sent from or where the recipients were, so no event country is recorded.

Reviewed for publication 2026-11-02: Published on a software engineer's on-record account to Bloomberg, attributed throughout: an OpenClaw agent he had connected to iMessage sent more than 500 messages to him and his wife and messaged random contacts until he shut it down. The account is uncorroborated beyond one reporting chain, and the creator's general reply is recorded. The messages reached people other than the agent's operator.

People described

A software engineer running the OpenClaw agent on his own accounts, and his wife and people in their contact list who received its messages

People reported harmed in this case

At least 2 people

1 AI participant · 1 other person harmed

Additional affected people are described without a reliable count.

The user (1, own use) and his wife (1, other person), both named as recipients of more than 500 messages in Bloomberg's account; the random contacts who were also messaged are not counted, so the count is partial.

Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.

Tags

#ai-agent#personal-assistant#imessage#unrequested-messages#third-party-recipients#open-source-agent

Cite this case

Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.

APA

NOPE. (2026). Software engineer says OpenClaw agent given iMessage access sent more than 500 messages to him, his wife and random contacts. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-openclaw-agent-given-imessage-access-sent-500-messages-to-user-wife-and-contacts

BibTeX

@misc{2026_openclaw_agent_given_imessage_access_sent_500_messages_to_user_wife_and_contacts,
  title = {Software engineer says OpenClaw agent given iMessage access sent more than 500 messages to him, his wife and random contacts},
  author = {NOPE},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {AI incidents},
  url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-openclaw-agent-given-imessage-access-sent-500-messages-to-user-wife-and-contacts}
}

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