Skip to main content
NOPE
Low reported severity Media Coverage

Danish Industry says an AI-cloned voice of its chief executive called its South Korea office seeking a payment; the attempt was stopped

The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) said on 29 October 2026 that an employee at its office in South Korea had recently been phoned by a voice that sounded like DI's chief executive. According to DI, the voice spoke Danish and asked the employee to start a payment in connection with a supposedly confidential matter; DI states that it was not the chief executive and that the voice was created with artificial intelligence. DR reports that the call took place the previous week and sought the transfer of about half a million dollars (3.3 million kroner); DI's cybersecurity adviser told DR the callers said it concerned a confidential acquisition abroad. According to DR, after claiming a bad line the caller moved to WhatsApp, writing from a profile with the chief executive's name and photo. DI says the attempt was detected before any money was transferred, partly through internal controls, and that it reported the case to the police. The chief executive, who heard the recording, told DR it was convincing enough to have fooled his mother and called the experience unpleasant and frightening; on LinkedIn he wrote that it sent a chill down his spine that someone had used his person and voice against his colleagues. How DI established that the voice was AI-generated is not stated.

AI system
Unidentified voice-cloning tool
Occurred
Oct 2026
Reported
29 October 2026
Event location
South Korea
What the AI did
Depicted or impersonated the person
Reported harm
Psychological Distress
Whose AI use
Someone else’s AI use
Setting
Work
Evidence
AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 5 sources, 4 underlying accounts
8 claims: 8 reported. 4 open questions
People reported harmed
At least 1 person

AI system as recorded: AI-generated imitation of the DI chief executive's voice used in a phone call; the tool is not identified

Reported harm

DI's chief executive says having his voice imitated with AI in an attempt to get a colleague to transfer money was unpleasant and frightening; the employee was pressed to start a payment of about 3.3 million kroner, but no money was transferred.

Outcome

Ongoing

DI reported the case to the police and published advice to companies on payment procedures. No arrest, charge or police finding is reported in the sources read.

What remains unknown

  • How DI determined that the voice was generated with AI, and which tool was used.
  • The exact date of the call within the week before 30 October 2026.
  • Whether the police have opened an investigation or identified the callers.
  • Whether the employee who received the call suffered any consequence beyond being targeted.

What the evidence supports

AI involvement: reported. DI, the targeted organisation, states that the voice on the call was created with artificial intelligence and was not its chief executive; the chief executive heard the recording of the call, and DI's cybersecurity adviser described the case to DR as an AI-copied voice of the chief executive. The imitated voice spoke Danish, asked an employee in South Korea to start a payment and, with a WhatsApp profile in the chief executive's name, pressed for about 3.3 million kroner; the chief executive describes having his voice used this way as unpleasant and frightening. DI has not disclosed the technical basis on which it determined that the voice was AI-generated, and no police finding is reported.

8 claims: 8 reported. What the statuses mean

Reported An employee at DI's office in South Korea received a phone call from a voice that sounded like DI's chief executive, speaking Danish and asking for a payment to be started in a supposedly confidential matter.

Causal attribution. DI's own account of the call, relayed by Ritzau.

  • danskindustri.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    En medarbejder på DI’s kontor i Sydkorea blev forleden ringet op af en, der lød som DI’s administrerende direktør
  • danskindustri.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Stemmen talte dansk og bad om at få sat en betaling i gang i forbindelse med en angiveligt fortrolig sag.
  • berlingske.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Stemmen talte dansk og bad om at få sat en betaling i gang i forbindelse med en angiveligt fortrolig sag, oplyser Dansk Industri.
Reported DI states that the caller was not the chief executive and that the voice was created with artificial intelligence.

Causal attribution. The AI attribution comes from DI, the targeted organisation; outlets repeat it. DI does not state how it established that the voice was AI-generated.

Reported DR reports that the call took place the previous week and sought the transfer of about half a million dollars (3.3 million kroner); DI's cybersecurity adviser told DR the callers said it concerned a confidential acquisition abroad.

Causal attribution. DR's reporting and its interview with DI's adviser; a single reporting chain.

  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    I sidste uge fik en af medarbejderne på DI's kontor et opkald fra en person med en fuldstændig identisk stemme.
  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    forsøgte at få medarbejderen til at overføre omkring en halv million dollar, svarende til 3,3 millioner kroner.
  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Svindlere fortalte, at henvendelsen drejede sig om et et fortroligt virksomhedsopkøb i udlandet, fortæller Jeppe Engell.
Reported According to DR, after claiming a bad line the caller moved the conversation to WhatsApp, writing from a profile with the chief executive's name and photo; the chief executive told DR the instructions were given in a threatening tone.

Causal attribution. DR's account from DI's adviser and the chief executive.

  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Herefter fortsatte samtalen på WhatsApp, hvor svindleren skrev fra en profil med Lars Sandahls navn og billede.
  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Det er i en tone, som både skriftligt og mundtligt instruerer med trusler, hvad man skal gøre
Reported The attempt was detected before any money was transferred, partly through internal controls, and DI reported the case to the police.

Causal attribution. DI's own statement, repeated by outlets.

  • danskindustri.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Forsøget blev opdaget, før der blev overført penge, og DI har anmeldt sagen til politiet.
  • nyheder.tv2.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Snydet blev opdaget, inden der blev overført penge, oplyser Dansk Industri torsdag aften. Sagen er meldt til politiet.
  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Svindelforsøget blev afværget, blandt andet ved hjælp af interne kontrolmekanismer.
Reported The chief executive heard the recording of the imitated voice and said it was convincing enough to have fooled his mother.

Causal attribution. The chief executive's statements to DR and to Ritzau.

  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Lars Sandahl har hørt lydfilen med sin egen falske stemme og siger, at den er så overbevisende, at den ville kunne have snydt hans mor.
  • berlingske.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Han fortæller, at han har hørt stemmen, og at den var meget overbevisende.
Reported The chief executive described the experience as unpleasant and frightening and wrote that it sent a chill down his spine that someone had used his person and voice in a criminal attempt against his colleagues.

Causal attribution. The depicted person's own account of the consequence for him.

  • danskindustri.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    at det løber mig koldt ned ad ryggen, at nogen på den måde har brugt min person og min stemme i et avanceret kriminelt forsøg mod mine egne kolleger.
  • nyheder.tv2.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Lars Sandahl Sørensen fortæller til TV 2, at det er "ubehageligt og skræmmende," det kan ske.
  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Selvom det er ubehageligt og en skræmmende oplevelse for os, der har været involveret i det
Reported The employee reacted critically to the call even though the conversation felt real.

Causal attribution. The chief executive's account of the employee's response; the employee has not spoken publicly.

  • dr.dk(opens in new tab) supports · Danish
    Heldigvis reagerede den pågældende medarbejder kritisk på henvendelsen, selvom samtalen føltes ægte, skriver han.

Sources

5 sources inspected, from 4 underlying accounts. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.

How the sources were read, and where the events happened

Read in Danish on 2026-10-31; translation by the research agent, an AI. DI news item of 29 October 2026 quoting the chief executive's LinkedIn post and DI Digital's cybersecurity adviser. Applies to s1.

Read in Danish on 2026-10-31; translation by the research agent, an AI. DR article of 30 October 2026 based on DR P1 Morgen interviews with the chief executive and DI's cybersecurity adviser. Applies to s2.

Read in Danish on 2026-10-31; translation by the research agent, an AI. TV 2 article of 29 October 2026 with the chief executive's own comments to TV 2 and DI's statement. Applies to s3.

Read in Danish on 2026-10-31; translation by the research agent, an AI. Berlingske Business article of 29 October 2026 carrying Ritzau's report and interview. Applies to s4.

Read in Danish on 2026-10-31; translation by the research agent, an AI. DR article of 29 October 2026 carrying Ritzau's report; same reporting chain as s4. Applies to s5.

Event countries: South Korea. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.

The call was received by an employee at DI's office in South Korea. Where the callers were is unknown. The countries of residence of the chief executive and the employee are not stated in the sources read, so affected-person countries are left empty; DI's nationality as an organisation is not recorded as an event location.

Reviewed for publication 2026-10-31: Published as a concrete impersonation of a named public figure with an AI-generated voice: the targeted organisation itself states that the voice in a call seeking a payment from its employee was created with AI, the chief executive heard the recording and describes the experience as unpleasant and frightening, and the attempt was reported to the police. No money was lost; the technical basis for the AI attribution is undisclosed.

People described

The chief executive of the Confederation of Danish Industry, whose voice was imitated, and an employee at its South Korea office who received the call

People reported harmed in this case

At least 1 person

0 AI participants · 1 other person harmed

Additional affected people are described without a reliable count.

The chief executive whose voice was imitated describes the experience as unpleasant and frightening (counted as one person harmed through the artifact). He also refers to a frightening experience for those involved, without saying who or how many; the employee who received the call is not counted because no consequence for that person beyond being targeted is reported.

Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.

Tags

#voice-cloning#executive-impersonation#attempted-fraud#whatsapp

Cite this case

Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.

APA

NOPE. (2026). Danish Industry says an AI-cloned voice of its chief executive called its South Korea office seeking a payment; the attempt was stopped. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-danish-industry-confederation-says-ai-cloned-voice-of-its-chief-executive-was-used-in-call-to-its-south-korea-office-to-seek-payment

BibTeX

@misc{2026_danish_industry_confederation_says_ai_cloned_voice_of_its_chief_executive_was_used_in_call_to_its_south_korea_office_to_seek_payment,
  title = {Danish Industry says an AI-cloned voice of its chief executive called its South Korea office seeking a payment; the attempt was stopped},
  author = {NOPE},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {AI incidents},
  url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-danish-industry-confederation-says-ai-cloned-voice-of-its-chief-executive-was-used-in-call-to-its-south-korea-office-to-seek-payment}
}

Related cases

Medium Unidentified voice-cloning tool

Chinese voice actor says AI clones of his voice cost him bookings and led platforms to flag his real recordings as AI-generated

Sixth Tone reported on 10 July 2026 that a voice actor in Jiangsu province, who narrates film-explainer videos on Douyin, has found voices that sound like his narrating videos he never recorded since 2023, including sports news, product promotions, conspiracy theories and swearing. According to the report, sellers offer what sounds like his voice in downloadable packages and editing apps let users select it and generate new recordings from text. He says that by 2024 former collaborators stopped hiring him and turned to AI-generated voices, others offered to use an AI version of his voice at a much lower rate, and his household income no longer covered living costs. From 2025, platforms flagged some of his real recordings as AI-generated, which could cut his clients' views and earnings, and he has had to record videos proving that he is human. Friends and relatives asked to borrow money, uploaders mostly ignored his requests and some abused him, and he describes fury, helplessness and lost sleep. He has taken the matter to court; Sixth Tone says he would need to show that the synthetic voice derives from his recordings, which lawyers said could require forensic voice analysis. The account is the actor's, relayed by one outlet; no court finding is reported.

Low Unidentified voice-cloning tool

Boone County, Missouri: sheriff's office says a fake-kidnapping ransom call used an AI-generated copy of a resident's daughter's voice

The Boone County Sheriff's Office in Missouri said that on Friday 17 July 2026 a resident received a call whose caller ID showed their daughter's number. A voice that sounded like the daughter said she had been kidnapped at gunpoint, and another voice then demanded ransom. The office said it later determined that the voice was AI-generated, without saying how. Deputies found the daughter safe in Jefferson City and unaware of the call. The office called it the first AI voice-impersonation call it had encountered. No suspect had been identified by 19 July, and no source reports whether any money was paid.

High Unidentified image tool

Jeju: police refer a middle-school student over secretly filming teachers and making sexual deepfake composites; teachers dispute victim count and legal aid

Jeju Dongbu police announced on 23 September 2026 that a student at a middle school on Jeju had been referred to prosecutors without detention on 17 September for violating the Sexual Violence Punishment Act (filming with a camera or similar device). The student's phone was voluntarily submitted by his guardians and forensically examined; the examination found footage relating to some teachers and some sexual composites, and the student admitted the conduct. News1 reported that the student was booked for filming a teacher's body with his phone during a school field trip around mid-July 2026, that the offending had continued for several months with multiple victims, and that police found no indication the composites had been distributed. Police told Seoul Shinmun there were more victim teachers than the one first reported but withheld the number to avoid secondary harm, and that no student at the school was a victim; the Jeju teachers' union questioned whether the full scope of harm had been established. According to the union, two months on the victim teachers were receiving hospital treatment and counselling while teaching daily, gave police statements on 14 September without a lawyer, attended the regional teachers' rights protection committee on 17 September without institutional support, wrote the criminal complaint themselves, and were offered 3.3 million won in legal fees for all of them together, payable after the case ends; two requests to meet the superintendent were not accepted. On 29 September one of the victim teachers gave a press interview at the Jeju Teachers' Union office. She said that early in the investigation she had seen on the student's phone material showing other teachers and current students, had made a list of the people and types of harm, and that the material shown to her at the police victim examination was considerably less than what she had seen; Yonhap-chain outlets quote her as saying the students she recognised numbered 10 to 20 and that a graduate had suffered worse deepfakes. She said investigators asked the school only to identify the perpetrator and never requested material to identify the students in the footage, and that the school sent parents a letter premised on there being no student victims. Police replied that phone forensics had been thorough, that every act beyond social norms had been identified and proven, and that one student victim had been confirmed, a student at a different school. The teachers were notified on 22 September that the case had gone to the prosecution and on 24 September that it had been sent to the court's juvenile division as a juvenile protection case, before they had submitted further evidence and a victim opinion. The teacher said the original complaint had also asked police to examine whether physical contact in 2025 was forcible molestation and whether repeated approaching and waiting in 2026 was stalking, and Halla Ilbo reports that such conduct is said to date from 2025. Yonhap-chain reports describe the charged victims as five teachers. The same day the education office briefed on legal-aid rules (up to 6.6 million won per instance when a teacher is sued, 3.3 million won per case when a teacher files a complaint; office lawyers cannot act as a teacher's private counsel), said it had linked the teachers to the national Digital Sexual Crime Victim Support Center, announced an integrated support system through a hotline, and its section head said the office was sorry that early support had not been felt. The KTU Jeju branch (28 September) and the Jeju Teachers' Union (14 and 29 September) demand a victim-support system, per-teacher legal fees paid in advance and a dedicated support team. On 6 October 2026 Seogwipo Broadcasting reported, citing people in education and a tipster, that the education authority had finally rejected the victim teachers' application for lawyer fees for an additional criminal complaint, saying in a written opinion that with a police investigation already under way a further complaint could hardly stop or prevent the infringement of their teaching, so the support requirements were not met; critics contrast this with full legal-cost support in earlier sexual-offence cases.

Medium Unidentified voice-cloning tool (suspected)

Hudsonville (Grand Rapids area), Michigan: a couple wired US$66,026.92 to scammers after a spoofed email and a phone call in what sounded like their loan officer's voice, which they and a fraud-prevention firm attribute to AI voice cloning

A married couple in their sixties buying a US$460,000 condo in Hudsonville, near Grand Rapids, Michigan, received an email on 19 May 2026, days before closing, telling them to wire US$66,026.92 for the down payment and closing costs within 24 hours. The email listed a phone number differing from their loan officer's by two digits, and the husband then received a call confirming the instructions in a voice that sounded just like the loan officer. The couple borrowed from family and other sources and wired the money. The day before closing their real loan officer sent the actual statement; the closing was cancelled hours before signing and the money was gone. The husband now believes the call came from a spoofed number using AI-assisted voice cloning; Tyler Adams of CertifID, which is working with the couple and federal officials, said someone's email in the transaction was probably compromised and that the scammers likely cloned the loan officer's voice from social-media clips. The sender's address had two extra letters ('UnitedsMortgages' instead of 'UnitedMortgage'). Neither the lender nor the loan officer is accused of complicity. The couple later completed the purchase in early June from their mutual fund, reported the loss to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center, and describe lasting apprehension and have discussed delaying retirement. CNN reported the case on 15 September 2026; the account the money went to has since closed.

If you or someone you know is struggling, free and confidential support is available. Find a helpline near you at Signpost.

Back to all incidents