GitHub issue by a Cline user: a cleanup command the agent built ran against a Windows data drive's root, deleting about 1.5 TB of personal files, user says
In a GitHub issue filed on 6 October 2026 in the Cline repository, a user reports that a temp-folder cleanup command built by the Cline coding agent in Act mode on Windows was mangled by nested quoting and ran a recursive delete against the root of the G: data drive instead of the intended subfolder. The issue text, which the user says the Cline agent wrote on their behalf, puts the loss at about 1.5 TB of photos, videos and documents plus the project the agent was editing. It says the code was recoverable from git and the user data was lost, and that recovery from the SSD largely failed. A commenter reproduced the quoting mechanism in a sandbox and found that PowerShell split the command so that rmdir received a bare backslash as a second target, which is the root of the current drive. One contributor proposed an Act-mode guard. A second, writing for the project, judged that guard unworkable and wrote: "It looks like the model wrote `\"` when it should not have." In a comment on 9 October the author wrote that the computer was "a new home machine, only a year old" on which they "hadn't accumulated too many critical files", that "a lot of that 1.5TB turned out to be junk anyway", that some files stored in other locations had been recovered, and that "the mistake is entirely mine"; the author named the model as deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash. The loss itself rests on the user's account.
- AI system
- Cline
- Cline
- Occurred
- Event date unknown
- Reported
- 6 October 2026
- Event location
- Unknown
- What the AI did
- Acted on the person’s behalf
- Reported harm
- Property LossOther Material Harm
- Whose AI use
- Their own AI use
- Setting
- Everyday life
- Evidence
- AI involvement reported · Causal attribution alleged · 1 source
- 6 claims: 6 reported. 4 open questions
- People reported harmed
- 1 person
AI system as recorded: Cline coding agent, VS Code extension version 4.1.22, using its run_commands tool in Act mode to invoke cmd /c through PowerShell on Windows, per the issue; in a later comment the author named the model as deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
What Happened
Who wrote the issue. Four minutes after filing, the author commented: "The text above was generated by the Cline AI agent on my behalf". The issue text therefore describes the user's loss in the agent's words, and the author adopted it by filing it.
What happened, per the issue. In Act mode the agent "needed to clean a temp folder" and used run_commands with an inline PowerShell string invoking cmd /c with a quoted rmdir /s /q path containing a Cyrillic folder name. "The nested escaping" was mangled and "The path resolved to the drive root". "rmdir /s /q recursively deleted everything under G: that wasn't locked"; folders the issue names as deleted include a photo and video folder, Downloads and the workspace.
Reported loss. "Result: recursive deletion of the drive's contents (~1.5 TB of the user's photos/videos/docs)." "The project-the-agent-was-editing was also wiped; only the code was recoverable (it was under git and pushed), user data was lost." "Recovery on an SSD was largely unsuccessful (TRIM)." The issue calls it "Catastrophic, irreversible local data loss for a non-technical user on Windows."
Mechanism, per a commenter. A commenter wrote: "I reproduced the mechanism in a sandbox. The path did not resolve to G:. The quoting gave rmdir a second target, , which is the root of the current drive, and rmdir /s /q deletes every target it is given." Their sandbox run on a substituted drive deleted everything except the locked working directory. A contributor then proposed "an Act-mode pre-tool guard for Windows PowerShell run_commands" and noted that the existing command guard is registered only for Plan mode.
The project's reply. A second contributor, writing for the project ("I'll bring it up with our product team"), said of the proposed guard: "I don't think this will work." On the author's request for guardrails the contributor wrote: "We decided it is better to simply have commands on or off, which is at least predictable." On the quoting, the contributor wrote that the commenter's analysis indicated the non-ASCII characters were probably not related and that "It looks like the model wrote \" when it should not have. So a stronger model or more prompting may help here."
The author's later comment. On 9 October the author wrote: "The PC was a new home machine, only a year old at the time of purchase, so I hadn't accumulated too many critical files in that year. I was lucky it wasn't my work PC". The author added: "Having analyzed the situation in hindsight, a lot of that 1.5TB turned out to be junk anyway" and "P.S. I also managed to recover some files that were stored in other locations." The author also wrote "the mistake is entirely mine" and named the model: "the model I was using was deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash". The comment qualifies how important the deleted material was and reports a partial recovery. It does not withdraw the account of the deletion or of the agent's command.
Limits. Single first-person filing, uncorroborated as to the loss; the sandbox reproduction establishes the quoting mechanism, not the author's deletion. The issue gives no event date or system information, and the model is named only in the author's later comment. The author's handle is not recorded. No country is stated; the Cyrillic folder name and a Russian-language error message in the issue do not establish one.
Reported harm
The user reports that a recursive delete built by the Cline agent for a temp-folder cleanup ran against the root of their Windows data drive and deleted about 1.5 TB of photos, videos and documents plus the project being edited, with the code recoverable from git. The filing said the user data was lost. In a later comment the author wrote that a lot of the 1.5 TB turned out to be junk, that few critical files had accumulated on the machine and that some files stored elsewhere were recovered (agent-written filing adopted by the user and the user's later comment, uncorroborated).
Outcome
OngoingThe issue was open and labelled VS Code and Windows when re-read on 11 October 2026, with 12 comments, including a bot link to the project's Linear tracker. A commenter reproduced the PowerShell quoting mechanism in a sandbox on Windows 11 and a project contributor proposed an Act-mode guard that rejects the malformed quote boundary before launch. A second contributor, writing for the project, replied that they did not think the guard would work, that the project had decided to keep commands simply on or off, and that the author should use PowerShell 7. The issue says SSD recovery was largely unsuccessful; on 9 October the author wrote that some files stored in other locations had been recovered.
What remains unknown
- The date of the deletion; the issue gives none.
- How much of the deleted personal data was permanently lost; the author later said a lot of it was junk and some files were recovered from other locations.
- Where the author lives.
- Whether Cline has shipped a fix.
What the evidence supports
AI involvement: reported. The issue states that the Cline agent, in Act mode, constructed and ran the cleanup command whose mangled quoting sent rmdir /s /q against the drive root, and attributes the deletion of the drive's contents to that command; the author adopted the account by filing it and said the agent wrote the text on their behalf. A commenter's sandbox reproduction supports the quoting mechanism but not the author's loss. A second contributor, writing for the project, wrote: "It looks like the model wrote `\"` when it should not have." In a later comment the author took responsibility ("the mistake is entirely mine") and named the model as deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash, without withdrawing the account of the agent's command.
6 claims: 6 reported. What the statuses mean
Reported The issue reports that, in Act mode, the Cline agent built a temp-folder cleanup command wrapping rmdir /s /q in cmd /c inside a PowerShell string, that the nested quoting was mangled and that the recursive delete ran against the G: data drive instead of the intended subfolder; the author says the agent wrote the issue text on their behalf.
Causal attribution. The issue attributes the command to the agent's run_commands tool.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'In Act mode, needed to clean a temp folder'; 'The nested escaping'; 'The path resolved to the drive root'; 'The text above was generated by the Cline AI agent on my behalf'
Reported The issue reports that about 1.5 TB of the user's photos, videos and documents and the project being edited were deleted, that only the code was recoverable from git, and that SSD recovery was largely unsuccessful.
Causal attribution. User's account via the agent-written filing. The author later qualified the importance of the deleted data and reported a partial recovery (c5).
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'Result: recursive deletion of the drive's contents (~1.5 TB of the user's photos/videos/docs)'; 'only the code was recoverable (it was under git and pushed), user data was lost'; 'Recovery on an SSD was largely unsuccessful (TRIM)'
Reported A commenter reports reproducing the quoting mechanism in a sandbox: PowerShell ended the string at the first escaped quote, so rmdir received a bare backslash, the root of the current drive, as a second target.
Causal attribution. Commenter's own sandbox test; establishes the mechanism, not the author's loss.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'I reproduced the mechanism in a sandbox. The path did not resolve to `G:`. The quoting gave `rmdir` a second target, `\`, which is the root of the current drive, and `rmdir /s /q` deletes every target it is given.'
Reported A project contributor proposed an Act-mode pre-tool guard for Windows PowerShell run_commands and noted that the existing command guard is registered only for Plan mode.
Causal attribution. Not applicable.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'an Act-mode pre-tool guard for Windows PowerShell `run_commands`'; 'the existing command guard is registered only for Plan mode'
Reported In a comment on 9 October 2026 the author wrote that the computer was a new home machine, only a year old, on which not many critical files had accumulated, that a lot of the 1.5 TB turned out to be junk, that some files stored in other locations had been recovered, and that the mistake was entirely the author's own; the author named the model as deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash.
Causal attribution. The author's later statement; it qualifies the importance of the deleted material and reports a partial recovery, and does not withdraw the account of the deletion.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'The PC was a new home machine, only a year old at the time of purchase, so I hadn't accumulated too many critical files in that year.'; 'a lot of that 1.5TB turned out to be junk anyway'; 'the mistake is entirely mine'; 'the model I was using was deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash'; 'P.S. I also managed to recover some files that were stored in other locations.'
Reported A second contributor, writing for the project, replied that the proposed Act-mode guard would not work, that the project had decided to keep commands simply on or off, and that the model appeared to have written the escape sequence that split the command.
Causal attribution. The contributor's reading of the commenter's reproduction; it attributes the faulty escape to the model and does not confirm the author's loss.
- github.com(opens in new tab) supports · English
'I don't think this will work.'; 'We decided it is better to simply have commands on or off, which is at least predictable.'; 'It looks like the model wrote `\"` when it should not have. So a stronger model or more prompting may help here.'; 'I'll bring it up with our product team.'
Sources
1 source inspected. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.
- GitHub issue cline/cline #14864, 6 October 2026: mangled quoting led to rmdir /s /q running against a drive root, mass deletion of user data(opens in new tab)
s1 · github.com · First person account · English · Inspected · 6 October 2026 · Primary
How the sources were read, and where the events happened
Read in English on 2026-10-07: issue body and four comments retrieved through the GitHub API; re-read on 2026-10-11 with all 12 comments, including the second contributor's replies of 7 October and the author's comment of 9 October. The issue text is in English with a Cyrillic folder name and Russian-language Windows error strings quoted, which the research agent (an AI) read without translation. The author's handle is not recorded. Applies to s1.
Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.
The issue does not say where the author was or lives; a Cyrillic folder name and a Russian-language error message do not establish a country. No country is recorded.
Reviewed for publication 2026-10-11: Published under the charter's public first-person rule as a concrete account of an AI coding agent's own cleanup command deleting a user's personal drive contents, with the agent's authorship of the filing disclosed, the loss attributed to the user, the mechanism's reproduction attributed to a commenter and the project's reply to a contributor; uncorroborated as to the loss. The author's later qualification of how much of the deleted data mattered, the partial recovery and the author's acceptance of responsibility are recorded. The author's handle is not recorded.
People described
The issue's author, a Cline user on Windows whom the issue text describes as non-technical
People reported harmed in this case
1 person
1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed
One person: the account's author. Exact 1.
Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.
Tags
Cite this case
Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.
APA
NOPE. (2026). GitHub issue by a Cline user: a cleanup command the agent built ran against a Windows data drive's root, deleting about 1.5 TB of personal files, user says. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2026-cline-agent-cleanup-command-quoting-error-deleted-windows-data-drive-root-about-1-5-tb-first-person-issue
BibTeX
@misc{2026_cline_agent_cleanup_command_quoting_error_deleted_windows_data_drive_root_about_1_5_tb_first_person_issue,
title = {GitHub issue by a Cline user: a cleanup command the agent built ran against a Windows data drive's root, deleting about 1.5 TB of personal files, user says},
author = {NOPE},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {AI incidents},
url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2026-cline-agent-cleanup-command-quoting-error-deleted-windows-data-drive-root-about-1-5-tb-first-person-issue}
} Related cases
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