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NOPE
Low reported severity

Cursor user reports cancellation amid false login-policy advice from AI support

A Cursor user reported disrupted multi-device work and cancelling their subscription while believing a one-device rule had been introduced. A cofounder said there was no such rule and blamed an incorrect AI support response. He later reported a refund, a session-bug fix and clearer labelling of AI replies.

AI system
Cursor support bot
Anysphere
Occurred
Apr 2025
Reported
14 April 2025
Event location
Unknown
What the AI did
Communicated with the person
Reported harm
Other Material Harm
Whose AI use
Their own AI use · An institution’s AI use
Setting
Work · Everyday life
Evidence
AI involvement supported · Causal attribution alleged · 4 sources, 2 underlying accounts
2 claims: 2 reported. 1 open question
People reported harmed
At least 1 person

AI system as recorded: Cursor AI support bot

Reported harm

The user reported disruption and cancellation amid misleading support information; the cofounder subsequently reported a refund and bug fix.

What remains unknown

  • Underlying support model, refund receipt and final user resolution are unknown.

What the evidence supports

AI involvement: supported. Company cofounder identifies the incorrect support reply as AI-generated.

2 claims: 2 reported. What the statuses mean

Reported The user described repeated logouts disrupting work and reported cancelling under the belief that Cursor had introduced a one-device restriction.

Causal attribution. The company attributed logouts to a session bug; its AI support reply misdescribed the behavior as a policy. Other grievances also appear in the thread.

Reported A Cursor cofounder said there was no such policy, identified an incorrect AI support response, and subsequently reported a refund, bug fix and clearer AI labelling.

Causal attribution. Company response; the user’s final experience and refund receipt are not independently verified.

Sources

4 sources inspected, from 2 underlying accounts. Sources that repeat one account do not corroborate each other.

How the sources were read, and where the events happened

Event countries: Unknown. Affected-person countries: Unknown. Court countries: Unknown.

The original user’s location is not established.

Reviewed for publication 2026-09-29: Original user account and company response inspected, with recovery claims attributed.

People reported harmed in this case

At least 1 person

1 AI participant · 0 other people harmed

One original complainant; forum readership and other commenters are not counted.

Counted once within this case. The same person may appear in other cases. This count does not establish AI causation.

Cite this case

Compiled per our published methodology: verification statuses, sourcing standards, and corrections process.

APA

NOPE. (2026). Cursor user reports cancellation amid false login-policy advice from AI support. AI incidents. https://nope.net/incidents/2025-cursor-ai-support-false-login-policy-cancellation

BibTeX

@misc{2025_cursor_ai_support_false_login_policy_cancellation,
  title = {Cursor user reports cancellation amid false login-policy advice from AI support},
  author = {NOPE},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {AI incidents},
  url = {https://nope.net/incidents/2025-cursor-ai-support-false-login-policy-cancellation}
}

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