{"meta":{"exportedAt":"2026-10-14T15:48:46.175Z","formatVersion":2,"selection":{"q":"suspension","system":"","harm":"","context":"","country":"","role":"","relation":"contextual","evidence":"","year":"2026","response":"","severity":"","verification":"","view":"incidents","sort":"added"},"totalIncidents":3,"coverage":{"cases":3,"countries":3,"languages":2,"unknownLocation":0,"locationPending":0,"unknownLanguage":0,"unknownDate":0,"lawsuits":0,"regulatory":2,"minors":0,"coreRelations":0,"contextualRelations":3,"mixedRelations":0,"unknownRelations":0,"relationPending":0,"relationUnknown":0},"countingNote":"Distinct public cases in this selection. People counts apply within individual cases only; cross-case person overlap has not been resolved. No population incidence estimate.","affectedCountNote":"Interpret person counts with affectedCountStatus and the reported effects. Unquantified zeros are placeholders, not a measured zero.","source":"AI incidents","publisher":"NOPE","url":"https://nope.net/incidents","license":"CC BY 4.0"},"incidents":[{"id":"2026-ninth-circuit-immigration-lawyers-suspended-over-ai-hallucinated-citations-board-reciprocal-suspension","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'Sethi filed an opening brief in this case with multiple fabricated citations and quotations'; 'Sethi cited two cases that do not exist and never existed'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The opening brief filed for the asylum petitioners and signed by Sethi cited two cases that do not exist and attributed quotations to real opinions that do not contain them.","causal_attribution":"The court's own finding in its order."},{"id":"c2","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'to which Rounds said that AI “was not used.”'; 'Rounds finally conceded that it was “possible” that AI might have been used by the individual who drafted the briefs'; 'Sethi Law Group employs law school graduates, who are not yet licensed attorneys, to write briefs'; 'that no licensed attorney read the cases cited by the unlicensed brief writer'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"At oral argument Rounds said AI was not used and later conceded it was possible that the person who drafted the briefs had used AI; the drafter was an unlicensed law graduate whose citations no licensed attorney read.","causal_attribution":"The court's record of the oral argument and of the attorneys' response."},{"id":"c3","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'that the errors were the product of unauthorized AI use by their Brief Writers and a failure to cite check'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"Responding to the order to show cause, the attorneys conceded that the errors were probably the product of unauthorised AI use by their brief writers and a failure to check citations.","causal_attribution":"The attorneys' concession as recorded by the court; no AI tool, prompt or output was identified."},{"id":"c4","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'Neither of them suspected the use of generative AI because the Firm prohibited its use and required the Brief Writers to check all their citations'; 'it is beyond belief that he knew for a fact that it was not used'; 'is owed to this repeated failure of candor'; 'We do not sanction Sethi and Rounds for the simple fact that they or'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The attorneys said that at the time of the motion to correct they did not suspect AI because the firm prohibited its use; the court found that Rounds could not have known AI was not used, said it was not sanctioning AI use as such, and attributed the severity of discipline to their repeated failure of candour.","causal_attribution":"The attorneys' explanation and the court's findings, both from the order."},{"id":"c5","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'Sethi and Rounds are each personally sanctioned in the amount of $2,500'; 'Sethi and Rounds are hereby suspended from practice before this Court for a period of six months starting ten days after this Order is filed'; 'provide a copy of this Order to their clients'; 'serve a copy of this Order on the State Bar of California'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The Ninth Circuit fined each attorney $2,500, suspended both from practice before the court for six months, ordered them to give the order to their clients in every pending case, and directed service of the order on the State Bar of California.","causal_attribution":"Established by the court's order."},{"id":"c6","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'The Board hereby suspends the respondent from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and DHS for 6 months, effective June 13, 2026.'; 'On July 1, 2026, the Board granted the Joint Petition for Immediate Suspension.'; 'previously issued unpublished on September 15, 2026'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The Board of Immigration Appeals suspended Sethi from practice before the Board, the immigration courts and DHS for six months, effective 13 June 2026, after granting an immediate suspension on 1 July 2026, and designated the decision as precedent after first issuing it unpublished on 15 September 2026.","causal_attribution":"Established by the Board's decision."},{"id":"c7","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'the respondent contests the sufficiency of the evidence that he knew that certain errors in his filings were caused by the use of artificial intelligence'; 'the respondent’s claims of hardship to his clients are conclusory'; 'the application of our rules of attorney discipline to misconduct related to the use of AI is not an “outlier penalty,” as the respondent claims'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Before the Board, Sethi disputed that he knew AI had been used and argued that suspension would harm his clients and was an outlier penalty for AI-related misconduct; the Board rejected these arguments.","causal_attribution":"The respondent's arguments and the Board's ruling as stated in the decision."},{"id":"c8","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'The petition for review, which we granted'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The court granted the asylum petitioners' petition for review.","causal_attribution":"The court's statement; it does not address any effect of the sanctions on the clients."}],"effects":[{"label":"two attorneys were fined and suspended from practice before a federal appeals court, and one was suspended from immigration practice, over briefs with AI-hallucinated citations and false statements about them","claim_id":"c5","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/03/24-4790.pdf","kind":"court_record","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in full in English by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-14 from the court's own site (HTTP 200, PDF text extracted with pdftotext); no translation was needed.","independence_group":"ninth-circuit-order-24-4790"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1463666/dl?inline","kind":"court_record","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in full in English by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-14 from the court's own site (HTTP 200, PDF text extracted with pdftotext); no translation was needed.","independence_group":"bia-matter-of-sethi"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["justice","work"],"unknowns":["Which AI tool the brief writers used; the order records only the attorneys' concession that AI use was probable.","Whether the State Bar of California opened proceedings after the referral.","Whether the suspensions affected the attorneys' clients; the Board found the hardship claims conclusory and no source describes a harmed client.","The date the opening brief was filed; the inspected sources do not state it."],"geography":{"basis":"The briefs were filed in and sanctioned by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the reciprocal suspension was imposed by the US Board of Immigration Appeals; the order describes the firm as based in Orange County, California. The attorneys' residence is not used.","court_countries":["US"],"event_countries":["US"],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published as a court decision about two attorneys informed by AI-generated fabricated authorities in their briefs: the Ninth Circuit's order fines and suspends two attorneys for filing briefs with AI-hallucinated citations and for repeatedly denying the AI source, and the Board of Immigration Appeals imposes a reciprocal suspension on one of them. Both records were read in full from the courts' own sites.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-14"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The harm is two courts' response to AI use in filings: the Ninth Circuit order describes briefs with nonexistent cases and misattributed quotations, records the attorneys' concession that the errors were probably the product of unauthorised AI use by the firm's brief writers, and imposes fines and a six-month suspension for filing them and for repeatedly denying the AI source; the Board of Immigration Appeals imposed a reciprocal suspension on that basis. The court read the fabricated authorities in the briefs, identified them and based its discipline of the two attorneys on filing them and on their statements about their source, so the AI output informed a decision about them (informed_decision_about); no tool is named.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["informed_decision_about"]},"name":"Ninth Circuit fines and suspends two immigration lawyers over briefs with AI-hallucinated citations and denials of AI use; immigration board follows","summary":"On 3 June 2026 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fined immigration attorneys Mike Singh Sethi and William Rounds $2,500 each and suspended both from practice before the court for six months. Briefs filed in an asylum petition for review cited two cases that do not exist and attributed quotations to opinions that do not contain them. In a motion to correct, the attorneys called the errors typographical, and at oral argument Rounds twice said AI was not used. In their response to the court's order to show cause, they conceded that the errors were probably the product of unauthorised AI use by the firm's unlicensed brief writers and a failure to check citations. The court said the suspension was owed to their repeated failure of candour. The Board of Immigration Appeals then suspended Sethi from practice before the Board, the immigration courts and the Department of Homeland Security for six months, effective 13 June 2026, and designated that decision as a precedent on 1 October 2026.","incidentDate":"2026-06-03","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"unknown","reportedDate":"2026-06-03","aiSystem":"Generative AI that, according to the attorneys' concession recorded by the Ninth Circuit, the firm's unlicensed brief writers probably used against firm policy; no tool is named in the order or the Board's decision","aiProduct":"Unidentified AI tool","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["professional_harm","financial_loss","legal_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to the Ninth Circuit's order, both attorneys were fined $2,500 and suspended from practice before the court for six months over briefs whose AI-hallucinated citations they had denied were AI errors; according to the Board of Immigration Appeals, one of them was then suspended from practice before the immigration courts, the Board and DHS for six months.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"established","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":2,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"Two attorneys, each named in the Ninth Circuit order as fined and suspended; the Board's reciprocal suspension concerns one of them. The asylum applicants are not counted: the court granted their petition for review and no source reports harm to them.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"US","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"regulatory_action","outcomeStatus":"resolved","primarySourceUrl":"https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/03/24-4790.pdf","primarySourceLabel":"US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, order in No. 24-4790 (3 June 2026): attorney discipline over AI-hallucinated citations","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-14T03:02:36.457192+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-14T03:02:36.457192+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["united-states","legal-profession","sanction","suspension","hallucinated-citations","immigration"]},{"id":"2026-goias-electoral-court-judgment-removing-councillor-suspended-over-suspected-unsupervised-ai-drafting","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'acórdão feito pelo Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de Goiás (TRE-GO), que cassou o mandato da vereadora Aava Santiago (PSB)'; 'no texto que determinou a cassação por infidelidade partidária'; 'A decisão havia sido mantida nesta terça-feira (6) e encerrava a condição suspensiva do processo'; 'Nesta sexta-feira (9), Michel Magul (PSDB) havia assumido a vaga de Aava Santiago na Câmara Municipal.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The TRE-GO judgment removed councillor Aava Santiago from office for party infidelity; it was upheld on 6 October 2026, ending its suspensive condition, and a substitute took her seat on 9 October.","causal_attribution":"G1's account of the electoral proceedings."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'No documento, a vereadora alega que no texto final da decisão há comandos, instruções e registros de conferência que revelariam o possível uso de IA com falhas na revisão humana.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'A parlamentar acionou o CNJ alegando que o texto final do julgamento continha comandos de conferência, instruções e registros de revisão que indicariam possível utilização de inteligência artificial sem a supervisão humana exigida pela Resolução CNJ nº 615/2025.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The councillor alleged to the CNJ that the final text of the judgment contained commands, instructions and review records indicating the use of artificial intelligence without the human supervision required by CNJ Resolution 615/2025.","causal_attribution":"The councillor's allegation, as both outlets report it; the petition was not inspected."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'evidencia, em tese, a existência de anotações que aparentam corresponder a instruções internas de revisão, destinadas justamente à conferência da correção de premissas fáticas e jurídicas utilizadas na construção da fundamentação do julgado'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'A liminar foi concedida nesta sexta-feira (9) pelo corregedor nacional de Justiça, ministro Benedito Gonçalves.'; 'Na decisão, Benedito Gonçalves considerou plausíveis, em análise preliminar, as alegações de descumprimento das regras de governança, supervisão humana e controle da utilização de inteligência artificial no Judiciário.'; 'O corregedor determinou a suspensão cautelar dos efeitos do acórdão e dos atos administrativos dele decorrentes.'; 'O TRE-GO terá prazo de 15 dias para prestar informações sobre o caso.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"On 9 October 2026 the national inspector of justice found, on a preliminary analysis, the allegations of non-compliance with the CNJ's AI supervision rules plausible, writing that the passages reproduced in the petition show in theory annotations that appear to be internal review instructions; he suspended the judgment's effects and gave the TRE-GO 15 days to report.","causal_attribution":"The inspector's preliminary finding as relayed by both outlets from the same decision; it is not a finding that AI was used."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Embora Benedito Gonçalves tenha ressaltado que a medida não representa revisão do mérito nem declaração de nulidade do julgamento eleitoral'; 'A eventual utilização irregular de inteligência artificial ainda será objeto de apuração.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'A decisão liminar do CNJ possui caráter instrumental e provisório, motivada por questões formais de procedimento administrativo e governança no âmbito do tribunal.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The inspector stated that the suspension neither reviews the merits nor declares the electoral judgment void, and that the possible irregular use of AI is still to be investigated; the substitute described the injunction as provisional and procedural.","causal_attribution":"Limits stated by the inspector and the substitute; they bound how far the removal can be attributed to AI drafting."}],"effects":[{"label":"an elected councillor was removed from her seat by a judgment she says shows signs of unsupervised AI use, until the national inspector suspended it","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://g1.globo.com/go/goias/noticia/2026/10/10/cnj-suspende-a-cassacao-do-mandato-da-vereadora-aava-santiago.ghtml","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"pt","translation_note":"Read in full in Portuguese by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-13 (HTTP 200); the English assertions are the agent's translation and no human translator reviewed them. G1 quotes the inspector's decision and statements from the councillor's office and the substitute; the CNJ decision and the petition were not themselves inspected.","independence_group":"g1-goias-reporting"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://jurinews.com.br/destaques-ultimas/cnj-suspende-cassacao-da-vereadora-aava-santiago-apos-suspeita-de-falhas-no-uso-de-inteligencia-artificial","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"pt","translation_note":"Read in full in Portuguese by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-13 (HTTP 200); the English assertions are the agent's translation and no human translator reviewed them. Jurinews reports the CNJ injunction; the decision itself was not inspected.","independence_group":"jurinews-reporting"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["justice"],"unknowns":["Which passages of the judgment contain the disputed annotations, and which tool, if any, produced them.","Whether AI-drafted text affected the July 2026 merits vote or only the later judgment text.","The TRE-GO's response to the CNJ and the outcome of the CNJ investigation."],"geography":{"basis":"The removal concerns a seat on the Goiânia city council, Goiás, Brazil, decided by the Regional Electoral Court of Goiás and suspended by Brazil's National Council of Justice (G1, Jurinews). The councillor holds office in Goiânia.","court_countries":["BR"],"event_countries":["BR"],"affected_person_countries":["BR"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published because the national inspector of justice, after examining passages from an electoral court judgment that removed a councillor from office, found her allegation of unsupervised generative-AI drafting plausible on a preliminary analysis and suspended the judgment the day a substitute took her seat. AI use remains suspected and is attributed to her allegation and the inspector's preliminary finding.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-13"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The output at issue is text in the TRE-GO judgment about the councillor: she alleges, and G1 and Jurinews report, that the final text contained commands, instructions and review records indicating AI use without human review. The national inspector of justice, who examined the passages reproduced in her petition, wrote that they show in theory annotations that appear to be internal review instructions for checking the premises of the judgment's reasoning, and found the allegation of non-compliance with the CNJ's AI supervision rules plausible on a preliminary analysis. That judgment removed her from office until he suspended it. No tool is named, the passages are not reproduced, and AI use has not been established; the merits vote of July 2026 was made by the judges.","status":"suspected"},"person_relations":["informed_decision_about"]},"name":"Goiás, Brazil: national judicial inspector suspends an electoral court judgment removing a councillor who alleged signs of unsupervised AI drafting","summary":"Goiânia city councillor Aava Santiago (PSB) told Brazil's National Council of Justice (CNJ) that the final text of a judgment of the Regional Electoral Court of Goiás (TRE-GO), which removed her from office for party infidelity, contained commands, instructions and review records indicating the use of artificial intelligence without the human supervision that CNJ Resolution 615/2025 requires. On 9 October 2026, the day a substitute took her seat, the national inspector of justice, Minister Benedito Gonçalves, found the allegations plausible on a preliminary reading, suspended the judgment and the administrative acts that followed from it, and gave the court 15 days to explain its review procedures, G1 and Jurinews report. The suspension does not review the merits of the removal, and whether AI was used irregularly has yet to be investigated.","incidentDate":"2026-10-01","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"unknown","reportedDate":"2026-10-10","aiSystem":"Generative artificial intelligence allegedly used in drafting the TRE-GO judgment; no tool is named, and its use is alleged by the councillor and found plausible only on a preliminary reading by the national inspector of justice","aiProduct":"Unidentified AI drafting tool (suspected)","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["legal_harm","professional_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to G1 and Jurinews, a judgment that the councillor says shows signs of AI use without the required human review removed her from her council seat, and a substitute took the seat on 9 October 2026 before the national inspector of justice suspended the judgment the same day. The AI connection is her allegation, found plausible only on a preliminary reading.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"alleged","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":1,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One person: the councillor removed by the judgment whose drafting is disputed. Voters and the council are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"BR-GO","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"investigation_opened","outcomeStatus":"pending","primarySourceUrl":"https://g1.globo.com/go/goias/noticia/2026/10/10/cnj-suspende-a-cassacao-do-mandato-da-vereadora-aava-santiago.ghtml","primarySourceLabel":"G1 Goiás, 10 October 2026: CNJ suspends the removal of councillor Aava Santiago","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-13T03:15:09.553524+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-13T03:15:09.553524+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["brazil","electoral-court","suspected-judicial-ai-use","human-supervision","cnj","injunction"]},{"id":"2026-south-africa-sassa-elife-certification-portal-facial-verification-failures-reported-by-pensioners","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"The eLife Certification was implemented on March 30, 2026, as a digital verification tool to curb fraud.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Beneficiaries who fail to complete the process risk having their grants suspended.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"secure biometric verification through the electronic Know Your Client (eKYC) system","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Beneficiaries who fail to complete life certification as directed may face payment delays or suspension of their grants.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"SASSA's eLife Certification is a self-service life certification on its online portal that uses biometric verification through its electronic Know Your Client (eKYC) system. IOL reports it was implemented on 30 March 2026. SASSA said beneficiaries who fail to complete life certification as directed may face payment delays or suspension of their grants.","causal_attribution":"The implementation date comes from IOL alone. SASSA statements read do not give a start date. The suspension consequence is SASSA's own stated rule and no suspension of either pensioner's grant is reported."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"SASSA would like to apologise to all our beneficiaries who could not access our self-service portal after they were notified to undertake the eLife Certification verification process by the Agency.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"there were system glitches which led to delay and disruptions in completing eLife Certification, leading to long queues at SASSA offices.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"the Agency can report that the challenge has been resolved.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"On 10 April 2026 SASSA apologised to beneficiaries who could not access its self-service portal after being notified to complete eLife Certification. It said system glitches linked to interfaces with other departments had caused delays and disruptions and long queues at its offices, and said the challenge had been resolved.","causal_attribution":"SASSA's own account of its portal. The statement does not mention facial recognition and attributes the glitches to interfaces with other departments."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"both pensioners, told IOL they had tried to complete the facial recognition option on the portal but to no avail.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"We have been trying since Thursday, April 2, to do the selfie bit but it does not work after trying for 22 times","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A pensioner couple told IOL they had tried the facial recognition option on the eLife portal 22 times since 2 April 2026 without success. IOL published the account on 23 April 2026.","causal_attribution":"Single first-person account relayed by one outlet. The cause of the failures is not established. The department attributes facial verification problems in general to poor lighting, unstable connectivity or missing Home Affairs biometric records (see c6)."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"IOL has been inundated with emails and calls from beneficiaries nationwide claiming they were unable to complete the mandatory certification process.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"beneficiaries cite consistent failures with facial recognition and one-time pins (OTPs).","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"The system just kept on loading and never went through to my profile. I have been struggling for three weeks","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Then also indicated that the Department of Home Affairs is not available to verify my particulars","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"IOL reported that beneficiaries nationwide contacted it to say they could not complete the certification and cited failures with facial recognition and one-time PINs. One pensioner said the site kept loading without reaching their profile for three weeks, and reported a one-time PIN rejection and a message that Home Affairs was not available to verify their particulars.","causal_attribution":"Unquantified accounts relayed by IOL. The pensioner who described the loading failure and the one-time PIN rejection did not describe a facial recognition failure."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"The Sassa portals are working as evidenced by the number of clients who have accessed the online services.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"As of April 16, 2026, 13,644 (88%) of the 15,499 unique clients who accessed the online verification services via the client portal were successfully verified","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"However, Sassa admitted the system has been working intermittently.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A SASSA spokesperson told IOL the portals are working and that, as of 16 April 2026, 13,644 (88%) of 15,499 unique clients who accessed the online verification services via the client portal were successfully verified. IOL reports SASSA admitted the system had been working intermittently.","causal_attribution":"SASSA's own figures and account, which were not independently verified. The figures count clients who accessed online verification and do not report how many failed the facial step."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"SASSA said most non-verification cases were driven by beneficiaries failing to respond to notifications, not completing life certification, or unsuccessful facial recognition attempts on online platforms.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"In such cases, beneficiaries are redirected to fingerprint biometric verification at local offices.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"The agency said it had recorded 7,779 complaints linked to its electronic facial biometric system","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"The department attributed facial verification issues to poor lighting, unstable connectivity, or missing biometric records at the Department of Home Affairs.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"The agency said it had recorded 7 779 complaints linked to its electronic facial biometric system.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"IOL's 24 May 2026 report on a parliamentary reply says SASSA said most non-verification cases were driven by beneficiaries who did not respond to notifications, did not complete life certification, or had unsuccessful facial recognition attempts on online platforms, and that such beneficiaries are redirected to fingerprint verification at local offices. IOL says SASSA had recorded 7,779 complaints linked to its electronic facial biometric system and that the department attributed facial verification issues to poor lighting, unstable connectivity or missing biometric records at the Department of Home Affairs.","causal_attribution":"SASSA's account relayed by two outlets that share one reporter and one reply, so they are one chain. The reports do not date the complaints or say whether they concern eLife Certification or earlier online facial verification, and do not say how many were repeat complaints."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"with 67,868 grants suspended in the third quarter alone","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"a grant is suspended 2 months after a beneficiary was notified to conduct a review and has not yet done so","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"around 70 000 grants have been suspended due to beneficiaries failing to come forward for review","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"The parliamentary reply reported 67,868 grants suspended in the third quarter (the reports do not identify the period) under a rule that a grant is suspended two months after a beneficiary was notified to conduct a review and has not yet done so. A Parliament committee statement of 5 February 2026 reported around 70,000 grants suspended for beneficiaries failing to come forward for review.","causal_attribution":"The suspension figures are context. No inspected report says how many suspensions followed a facial verification failure, and the committee statement predates the eLife implementation date reported by IOL."}],"effects":[{"label":"Pensioners reported repeated failures of the facial recognition step in a mandatory online life certification, with a stated risk of payment delay or grant suspension if it is not completed","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"},{"label":"SASSA reported delays, disruptions and long queues at its offices after beneficiaries could not use the self-service certification portal, which SASSA attributed to interfaces with other departments (its statement does not mention facial recognition)","claim_id":"c2","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://iol.co.za/news/south-africa/2026-04-23-sassa-elife-certification-portal-beneficiaries-report-ongoing-glitches-despite-agency-denials/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"iol-elife-glitches-report"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/sassa-self-service-system-restored-following-earlier-challenges-10-apr-2026","kind":"official_statement","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"sassa-10-apr-2026-statement"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://iol.co.za/news/south-africa/2026-05-24-sassas-biometric-rollout-leaves-thousands-without-grants-amid-fraud-crackdown/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"parliamentary-reply-iol-report"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://dailyvoice.co.za/news/2026-05-25-sassas-face-palm-facial-recognition-tech-linked-to-the-suspension-of-68-000-grants/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"parliamentary-reply-iol-report"},{"id":"s5","url":"https://www.parliament.gov.za/index.php/press-releases/media-statement-committee-notes-grant-reviews-are-necessary-protect-poor-and-public-funds","kind":"official_statement","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"parliament-committee-5-feb-2026-statement"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["public_services","accessibility"],"unknowns":["The reports do not say how many of the 67,868 grant suspensions (third quarter, period not identified) followed unsuccessful facial recognition. The suspensions are governed by a review non-response rule, and a committee statement dated 5 February 2026 already reported around 70,000 suspensions before the eLife implementation date reported by IOL.","The 30 March 2026 implementation date comes from IOL only. The SASSA statements read do not give a start date.","SASSA's statement refers to facial recognition on online platforms in general. Neither IOL 24 May 2026 nor Daily Voice 25 May 2026 mentions eLife Certification, and IOL places the reply within a biometric verification rollout dated from September 2025 (compulsory biometric enrolment for new applicants, verified at local offices). Whether the 7,779 complaints and the redirections to fingerprint checks concern eLife Certification at all is not stated. Facial photo verification through the same eKYC system for Social Relief of Distress grant applicants was reported earlier (Biometric Update, August 2024, and Corruption Watch, January 2025) and is a separate earlier deployment that this case does not cover.","Whether the pensioner couple later completed certification, or whether any grant was delayed or suspended, is not reported.","The cause of the couple's failed attempts is not established (lighting, connectivity, missing Home Affairs records, or the facial matching itself).","SASSA said on 10 April 2026 that the problem was resolved, and IOL reported failures continuing on 23 April 2026. The 88% success figure is SASSA's and was not checked.","The pensioner accounts come from one outlet (IOL). A Joburg ETC article of the same date relays it and adds nothing independent.","IOL page dates were taken from the URLs (23 April and 24 May 2026) because the page bodies show only relative ages."],"geography":{"basis":"IOL reports social grant recipients across South Africa struggling with the portal, and the SASSA statement and parliamentary reply concern the South African Social Security Agency's beneficiaries.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["ZA"],"affected_person_countries":["ZA"]},"publication":{"basis":"IOL (23 April and 24 May 2026), SASSA's 10 April 2026 statement on gov.za, Daily Voice and a Parliament committee statement were read in full. SASSA's and IOL's accounts are attributed and left at reported, and the pensioners' failures come from one outlet. The pensioners are not named. No inspected report attributes any grant suspension to facial verification failures.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-29"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The sources describe a facial recognition step in SASSA's eLife Certification portal, which uses biometric verification through the eKYC system and integration with Home Affairs systems, and IOL's 24 May 2026 report of a parliamentary reply refers to SASSA's electronic facial biometric system without saying whether it is the eLife portal. The vendor and model are not identified. The department attributes facial verification problems to poor lighting, unstable connectivity or missing Home Affairs biometric records, and a SASSA spokesperson says the portals work with intermittent downtime, so the cause of any individual failure is not established.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about"]},"name":"South Africa: pensioners report repeated failures of the facial recognition step in SASSA's eLife certification portal, and SASSA reports disruptions and office queues","summary":"The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) introduced an online eLife Certification (life certification) for grant beneficiaries that uses biometric verification through its electronic Know Your Client (eKYC) system. IOL reports the certification was implemented on 30 March 2026. SASSA says beneficiaries who do not complete life certification as directed may face payment delays or suspension. On 10 April 2026 SASSA apologised to beneficiaries who could not access the portal, said system glitches linked to interfaces with other departments had caused delays, disruptions and long queues at its offices, and said the problem was resolved. On 23 April 2026 IOL reported that a pensioner couple said they had tried the facial recognition option 22 times since 2 April without success, and that beneficiaries nationwide told IOL they could not complete the certification, citing failures with facial recognition and one-time PINs, with one pensioner also reporting a message that Home Affairs was not available to verify their particulars. A SASSA spokesperson said the portals work and that 13,644 (88%) of the 15,499 unique clients who accessed the online verification services by 16 April were verified, and IOL reports SASSA admitted the system has been working intermittently. In a May 2026 report on a parliamentary reply, IOL said SASSA stated that unsuccessful facial recognition attempts on online platforms were among the causes of non-verification (those beneficiaries are redirected to fingerprint checks at local offices) and that it had recorded 7,779 complaints linked to its electronic facial biometric system. The department attributed facial verification issues to poor lighting, unstable connectivity or missing biometric records at Home Affairs. Neither May report mentions the eLife portal, and IOL places the figures within a biometric verification rollout that it dates from September 2025. The reports do not say how many grants were suspended because of facial verification failures.","incidentDate":"2026-03-30","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"repeated_interactions","reportedDate":"2026-04-23","aiSystem":"Facial recognition step in SASSA's eLife Certification portal (biometric verification through the eKYC system, integrated with Home Affairs systems). Vendor and model not identified in the sources.","aiProduct":"SASSA eLife facial verification","aiCompany":"South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), deployer","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"unverified","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"SASSA said glitches caused delays, disruptions and long queues at its offices, and a pensioner couple told IOL they had tried the facial recognition step 22 times since 2 April without success. SASSA warned that beneficiaries who do not complete life certification as directed may face payment delays or suspension. No inspected report says that either pensioner's grant was delayed or suspended.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"alleged","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":2,"affectedCountStatus":"partial","affectedCountEvidence":"IOL reports one pensioner couple (two people) who said the facial recognition step failed 22 times. IOL says it was inundated with emails and calls from beneficiaries nationwide and SASSA recorded 7,779 complaints, but complaints are not people and the number of beneficiaries who failed facial verification is not reported, so no larger count is recorded. The 67,868 grant suspensions are not counted because no inspected report attributes them to facial verification.","victimAgeRange":"adult","platformType":"other","primarySourceUrl":"https://iol.co.za/news/south-africa/2026-04-23-sassa-elife-certification-portal-beneficiaries-report-ongoing-glitches-despite-agency-denials/","primarySourceLabel":"IOL (23 Apr 2026)","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-29T21:16:13.146866+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:54.03839+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["historical-2026"]}]}