{"meta":{"exportedAt":"2026-10-23T09:26:46.315Z","formatVersion":2,"selection":{"q":"investigation","system":"","harm":"","context":"","country":"","role":"","relation":"","evidence":"","year":"2023","response":"regulatory","severity":"","verification":"","view":"incidents","sort":"added"},"totalIncidents":2,"coverage":{"cases":2,"countries":2,"languages":2,"unknownLocation":0,"locationPending":0,"unknownLanguage":0,"unknownDate":0,"lawsuits":0,"regulatory":2,"minors":0,"coreRelations":1,"contextualRelations":1,"mixedRelations":0,"unknownRelations":0,"relationPending":0,"relationUnknown":0},"countingNote":"Distinct public cases in this selection. People counts apply within individual cases only; cross-case person overlap has not been resolved. No population incidence estimate.","affectedCountNote":"Interpret person counts with affectedCountStatus and the reported effects. Unquantified zeros are placeholders, not a measured zero.","source":"AI incidents","publisher":"NOPE","url":"https://nope.net/incidents","license":"CC BY 4.0"},"incidents":[{"id":"2023-slovakia-ai-voice-deepfake-of-party-leader-and-journalist-discussing-election-rigging-spread-during-moratorium","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"Len dva dni pred parlamentnými voľbami zdieľali tisíce slovenských používateľov sociálnych sietí podozrivý zvukový súbor, ktorý bol prezentovaný ako rozhovor medzi Michalom Šimečkom, predsedom Progresívneho Slovenska (PS), a Monikou Tódovou, novinárkou Denníka N. ... Na nahrávke hovoria, že voľby 30. septembra budú zmanipulované v prospech PS.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Neznámy dezinformátor alebo dezinformátori vypustili tesne pred voľbami 2023 novú formu hoaxu, ktorý mal potenciál ovplyvniť výsledky hlasovania. Terčom takzvaného deepfaku – počítačom vyrobenej nahrávky – sa stali predseda PS Michal Šimečka a novinárka Denníka N Monika Tódová. V nahrávke zneli ich hlasy tak, akoby sa dohodovali o manipulácii volieb.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Shortly before Slovakia's 2023 parliamentary election, an audio file spread on social media in which the voices of the Progressive Slovakia leader and a Denník N journalist appear to discuss rigging the election.","causal_attribution":"AFP observed the posts and file itself; Denník N reports the same file from its own position as the journalist's employer."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Na základe nášho vyhodnotenia predmetná nahrávka vykazuje viaceré znaky, že je vytvorená umelou inteligenciou pomocou algoritmov umožňujúcich vytvorenie syntetického/umelého hlasu vytrénovaného na hlasoch reálnych osôb (tzv. audio deepfake) ... Preukazuje to tón hlasu, neprirodzená dikcia, výber slov a podobne.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The director of the Interior Ministry's Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats told AFP that the centre's evaluation found several signs that the recording was created with AI algorithms producing a synthetic voice trained on real people's voices, citing tone, unnatural diction and word choice.","causal_attribution":"Government examining unit's assessment as quoted by AFP; its full method is not published."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Viacerí analytici však pre agentúru AFP na základe hneď niekoľkých faktorov zvukového záznamu uviedli, že nahrávka je podvod vytvorený umelou inteligenciou a technológiou syntetického hlasu.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"Several analysts consulted by AFP said, on the basis of several features of the recording, that it was a fake created with artificial intelligence and synthetic-voice technology.","causal_attribution":"Expert assessments gathered by AFP; one expert said it could alternatively be spliced from other calls."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"bývalý poslanec strany Sme Rodina, ktorý ho 28. septembra zverejnil na svojom facebookovom účte. ... napísal v príspevku, ktorý nazbieral viac ako 2200 zdieľaní. ... Jeden z príspevkov na Facebooku bol zdieľaný viac ako 3 000-krát pred tým, ako bol odstránený.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A former member of parliament posted the recording on Facebook on 28 September as authentic and called the party leader a traitor and fraudster, in a post shared more than 2,200 times; another Facebook post was shared more than 3,000 times before removal.","causal_attribution":"AFP's observation of the posts."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Naši súperi vytvorili ďalšie falošné video s hlasom od umelej inteligencie","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The party leader called the recording fake and said his opponents had made another fake video with an AI voice.","causal_attribution":"Depicted person's own statement, relayed by AFP."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Novinárkin advokát Tomáš Kamenec postavil trestné oznámenie na paragrafoch o ohováraní a poškodzovaní cudzích práv. ... Jej trestné oznámenie polícia prvýkrát odmietla už po pár týždňoch. Vyšetrovateľ síce uznal, že išlo o zjavný podvrh, podľa neho však bol málo presvedčivý, a teda nemohol ovplyvniť významnejšiu skupinu voličov. ... S postupom polície sa vtedy nestotožnil ani prokurátor Okresnej prokuratúry Bratislava III, ktorý vyšetrovateľom nariadil prípad riadne prešetriť.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The journalist filed a criminal complaint through her lawyer on defamation and interference with others' rights; police first dismissed it, saying the fake was obvious and unconvincing, and the district prosecutor then ordered a proper investigation.","causal_attribution":"Reported by the journalist's employer; the police and prosecutor decisions themselves were not read."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Vyšetrovateľka Okresného riaditeľstva Bratislava III prerušila trestné stíhanie s vysvetlením, že „sa nepodarilo zistiť skutočnosti oprávňujúce vykonať trestné stíhanie voči konkrétnej osobe“. ... Novinárka Tódová podala prostredníctvom advokátskej kancelárie Paul Q proti tomuto rozhodnutiu sťažnosť.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"After almost a year, an investigator suspended the prosecution because no specific suspect could be identified, and the journalist filed a complaint against that decision.","causal_attribution":"Reported by the journalist's employer."}],"effects":[{"label":"party leader and journalist falsely depicted plotting election fraud; recording spread as genuine; criminal complaint filed","claim_id":"c6","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://fakty.afp.com/doc.afp.com.33WY9LF","kind":"fact_check","access":"read","language":"sk","translation_note":"Read in Slovak by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-22 and translated by the research agent (an AI) into English; no human translator or reviewer was involved. AFP Fakty fact-check published 28 Sep 2023 21:51, updated 29 Apr 2024; direct fetch 403, read in full from an Internet Archive capture (web.archive.org/web/2024id_/).","independence_group":"afp-fakty-sep-2023"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://dennikn.sk/4249286/policia-povedala-ze-nevie-vypatrat-autora-deepfaku-ktory-sa-snazil-ovplyvnit-volby/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"sk","translation_note":"Read in Slovak by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-22 and translated by the research agent (an AI) into English; no human translator or reviewer was involved. Denník N report of 27 Oct 2024; Denník N employs the depicted journalist. Direct fetch 403, read in full from an Internet Archive capture (web.archive.org/web/2025id_/).","independence_group":"dennik-n-oct-2024"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["public_life","justice"],"unknowns":["Who made the recording and with which tool.","How the hybrid-threats centre and the analysts assessed the recording beyond the features they cite.","What happened to the journalist's complaint against the 2024 suspension; later reports were not read for this review."],"geography":{"basis":"AFP reports the file spread among Slovak social-media users before the Slovak parliamentary election, so the event country is Slovakia. The party leader leads a Slovak party and the journalist works for the Slovak daily Denník N and filed her complaint with Slovak police (Denník N), so both are placed in Slovakia. No court proceeding is reported.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["SK"],"affected_person_countries":["SK"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published as a core case (depicted_or_impersonated): the Slovak Interior Ministry's hybrid-threats centre, which evaluated the recording, said it showed signs of AI synthetic-voice generation, and the imitated voices of a party leader and a journalist were spread as a record of them plotting election fraud. The leader denounced it and the journalist filed a criminal complaint for defamation, which police later suspended for want of a suspect.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-22"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"AFP Fakty quotes the director of the Slovak Interior Ministry's Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats saying that the centre's evaluation of this recording found several signs that it was created with AI algorithms producing a synthetic voice trained on real people's voices, citing tone, unnatural diction and word choice; several analysts consulted by AFP said the same on the basis of features of the recording. The generated voices of the party leader and the journalist were what spread as a supposed record of them plotting election fraud. The tool is not identified, and one expert said the file could alternatively have been spliced from other calls.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["depicted_or_impersonated"]},"name":"Slovakia: audio of a party leader and a journalist discussing vote rigging, which a ministry unit said showed signs of AI, spread before the 2023 election","summary":"Two days before Slovakia's parliamentary election of 30 September 2023, during the pre-election moratorium, an audio file presented as a phone call between Progressive Slovakia leader Michal Šimečka and Denník N journalist Monika Tódová spread on Facebook, Telegram, TikTok and chain e-mails. In it, the two voices discuss rigging the election in the party's favour. The director of the Interior Ministry's Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats told AFP that the ministry's evaluation found several signs that the recording was created with AI synthetic-voice algorithms trained on real people's voices, and other analysts consulted by AFP said it was an AI-made fake. A former member of parliament shared it as authentic, calling Šimečka a traitor and fraudster. Šimečka called it fake. Tódová filed a criminal complaint for defamation; according to Denník N, police first dismissed it, a prosecutor ordered an investigation, and in 2024 an investigator suspended the case because no suspect could be identified.","incidentDate":"2023-09-28","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2023-09-28","aiSystem":"Synthetic-voice (audio deepfake) generation imitating the voices of a party leader and a journalist, according to the Slovak Interior Ministry's Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats and analysts consulted by AFP (tool not identified)","aiProduct":"Unidentified voice-cloning tool","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["reputational_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to AFP Fakty and Denník N, a party leader and a journalist were falsely depicted, through imitated voices that the Interior Ministry's hybrid-threats centre said showed signs of AI generation, as plotting to rig an election; the file spread widely during the moratorium, a former MP presented it as genuine and called the leader a traitor, the leader denounced it, and the journalist filed a criminal complaint for defamation.","frameworkFacets":[],"pathwayDirection":"outward","causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":2,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"Two depicted people, the party leader and the journalist, each with a reported objection (the leader's public denial reported by AFP; the journalist's criminal complaint reported by Denník N). Voters who heard or shared the file are an audience and are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"SK","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"investigation_opened","outcomeStatus":"unknown","primarySourceUrl":"https://fakty.afp.com/doc.afp.com.33WY9LF","primarySourceLabel":"AFP Fakty, 28 Sep 2023: Údajná nahrávka telefonátu predsedu PS a novinárky Denníka N vykazuje podľa expertov početné známky manipulácie","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-22T03:05:17.620696+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-22T03:05:17.620696+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["voice_clone","audio_deepfake","election","journalist","defamation","slovakia"]},{"id":"2023-victoria-child-protection-worker-entered-family-information-into-chatgpt-for-court-report-regulator-finds","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"Report: 'The Deputy Commissioner therefore found that DFFH contravened both IPP 3.1 and IPP 4.1 and determined that the contraventions were “serious”'; 'Issue a direction to Child Protection staff setting out that they are not to use any web-based or external Application Programming Interface (API)-based GenAI text tools (such as ChatGPT) as part of their official duties'; 'This action must be implemented by 5 November 2024 and maintained until 5 November 2026'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'The regulator issued orders to the department, including blocking IP and domains for a range of generative AI websites, including ChatGPT, Meta AI, Gemini and Copilot.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"OVIC's investigation report, published in September 2024, found that DFFH contravened Information Privacy Principles 3.1 and 4.1 over a child protection worker's use of ChatGPT, that the contraventions were serious, and issued a compliance notice requiring DFFH to direct child protection staff not to use web-based generative AI text tools and to block them until 5 November 2026.","causal_attribution":"The regulator's own report and compliance notice establish its findings and orders."},{"id":"c2","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"Compliance notice: 'In or around September 2023, a Child Protection worker (CPW1) of the Organisation used'; 'ChatGPT, a web-based generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) tool, when drafting a Protection'. Report: 'The report had been submitted to the Children’s Court for a case concerning a young child whose parents had been charged in relation to sexual offences'; 'CPW1 admitted that they had used ChatGPT in drafting the report, but denied inputting personal information as part of this'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"OVIC found that in or around September 2023 a DFFH child protection worker used ChatGPT when drafting a Protection Application Report that was submitted to the Children's Court in a case about a young child whose parents had been charged in relation to sexual offences; the worker admitted to DFFH using ChatGPT for the report.","causal_attribution":"OVIC's finding, based on indicators in the report and the worker's admission to DFFH."},{"id":"c3","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"Report: 'OVIC found, on the balance of probabilities, that CPW1 input personal information, including names'; 'By entering personal and sensitive information about the mother, father, carer, and child into ChatGPT, CPW1 also disclosed this information to OpenAI (the company which operates ChatGPT)'; DFFH response: 'it is not possible to definitively confirm that personal information has ever been entered into ChatGPT by the Child Protection Practitioner who no longer works in the department'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'Ovic found that, on the balance of probabilities, the worker had entered in personal information.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"OVIC found on the balance of probabilities that the worker entered personal information, including names, about the child, mother, father and carer into ChatGPT, disclosing it to OpenAI; the worker denied entering personal information, and DFFH says this cannot be confirmed definitively.","causal_attribution":"A regulator's finding on the balance of probabilities, contested by the worker's denial; organisations cannot see what staff typed into ChatGPT."},{"id":"c4","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"Report: 'First, the PA Report referenced how the child’s father used a particular toy, a doll, for sexual purposes.'; 'The report later referenced the same toy as a notable strength, in that the parents had provided the child with “age-appropriate toys”'; 'ChatGPT failed to properly understand the relevant context, and generated inappropriate and inaccurate content as a result'; 'these deficiencies in the report did not ultimately change the decision-making of either Child Protection or the Court in relation to the child'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'But it also said the report did not change the decision-making of either the child protection agency or the court.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"OVIC's report attributes inaccurate content in the report to ChatGPT: having described a doll the father had reportedly used for sexual purposes, the report later cited the same toy as a parental strength ('age-appropriate toys'), which downplayed the risk to the child; the deficiencies did not change the decisions of Child Protection or the court.","causal_attribution":"OVIC attributes the doll passage to ChatGPT from the content itself and the worker's admission of ChatGPT use."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Report: 'DFFH arranged with the Court for the PA Report to be withdrawn and a replacement one submitted. It also notified affected parties about the incident'; 'In the present case, the mother, father, and carer variously described feelings of anxiety and being overwhelmed when informed about their information being disclosed'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"According to OVIC's report, DFFH arranged with the court for the report to be withdrawn and replaced and notified the affected parties; the mother, father and carer described feelings of anxiety and being overwhelmed when told their information had been disclosed.","causal_attribution":"DFFH's account to OVIC; the family members' reactions are relayed by the regulator, not in their own words."},{"id":"c6","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"DFFH response, 18 September 2024: 'I accept that there was an unauthorized use of ChatGPT by a Child Protection Practitioner'; 'when developing a Protection Application Report for court'; 'the Child Protection Practitioner who no longer works in the department'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'In response, the department said it accepted the findings and would work to implement the orders. It said it no longer employed the worker.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"DFFH's Secretary accepted that a child protection practitioner had used ChatGPT without authorisation for a court report and that the department breached the two privacy principles, and the department said it no longer employs the worker.","causal_attribution":"DFFH's own letter, annexed to the report."}],"effects":[{"label":"personal information about a child, the mother, father and carer was entered into ChatGPT and disclosed to OpenAI, regulator finds","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"},{"label":"ChatGPT-generated content in a Children's Court report downplayed the risk to the child; the report was withdrawn and replaced","claim_id":"c4","direction":"negative"},{"label":"the mother, father and carer described anxiety and being overwhelmed when told of the disclosure","claim_id":"c5","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://ovic.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DFFH-ChatGPT-investigation-report-20240924-Re-upload.pdf","kind":"official_record","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"OVIC investigation report under s8C(2)(e) of the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic), September 2024, with the compliance notice (Annexure A) and DFFH's response letter of 18 September 2024 (Annexure B); the PDF (re-uploaded November 2024) was read in full on 2026-10-22 from ovic.vic.gov.au (HTTP 200); the report page gives 'Last updated 24 September 2024'.","independence_group":"ovic-dffh-chatgpt-investigation"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/sep/26/victoria-child-protection-chat-gpt-ban-ovic-report-ntwnfb","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"The Guardian (Australia), 26 September 2024, read in full on 2026-10-22 (HTTP 200). Its account comes from OVIC's report, so it shares that group. Its statement that the worker may have used ChatGPT in 100 cases does not match the report, which attributes the 100 cases to the worker's broader work unit; that statement is not relied on.","independence_group":"ovic-dffh-chatgpt-investigation"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["privacy","public_services","justice"],"unknowns":["Exactly what text the worker entered into ChatGPT; neither DFFH nor OVIC could see the prompts, and the input of personal information rests on a balance-of-probabilities finding.","The exact date of the ChatGPT use (the compliance notice says 'in or around September 2023') and of the court hearing.","Whether OpenAI retained or used the information entered.","Which people were affected in the 100 other cases with indicators of ChatGPT use, and whether their information was entered.","How DFFH has complied with the compliance notice since its first monitoring reports."],"geography":{"basis":"OVIC is Victoria's information regulator, DFFH is a Victorian government department, and the report says the affected child protection case went before the Children's Court, a Victorian court. The family's case was handled by the department in Victoria.","court_countries":["AU"],"event_countries":["AU"],"affected_person_countries":["AU"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 privacy clarification: a regulator's investigation report finds that a child protection worker entered a family's personal information into ChatGPT, without authorisation, and that ChatGPT-generated text minimising the risk to a child went into a court report. Relations: received_personal_information and made_claim_about. The case adds a statutory child protection setting, a court report and a compliance notice banning generative AI tools.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-22"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"OVIC's report finds that ChatGPT received personal information about the child, mother, father and carer that the worker typed in, which disclosed it to OpenAI, and that ChatGPT generated report text inaccurately describing the parents' care of the child (the doll passage), which went into a report submitted to the Children's Court and downplayed the risk to the child. The finding rests on indicators in the report text, the worker's admission of ChatGPT use and colleagues' accounts; the input of personal information was found on the balance of probabilities and the worker denied it.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information","made_claim_about"]},"name":"Victorian child protection worker put a family's information into ChatGPT to draft a court report that minimised risk to the child, regulator finds","summary":"Victoria's Information Commissioner (OVIC) found in a report published on 24 September 2024 that a child protection worker at the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (DFFH) used ChatGPT in or around September 2023 to draft a Protection Application Report submitted to the Children's Court about a young child. On the balance of probabilities, OVIC found the worker entered personal information, including names, about the child, mother, father and carer, disclosing it to OpenAI; the worker admitted using ChatGPT but denied entering personal information. OVIC found generated content in the report described a doll that the father had reportedly used for sexual purposes as a parental strength ('age-appropriate toys'), downplaying the risk to the child, although the court's and the department's decisions did not change. The report was withdrawn and replaced, and the mother, father and carer described anxiety when told of the disclosure. OVIC found serious breaches of two privacy principles and issued a compliance notice requiring DFFH to ban and block generative AI text tools for child protection staff until November 2026; DFFH accepted the breach findings.","incidentDate":"2023-09-01","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2024-09-24","aiSystem":"ChatGPT (OpenAI), used through its website by a child protection worker of Victoria's Department of Families, Fairness and Housing to draft a court report, without departmental authorisation (per OVIC's investigation report)","aiProduct":"ChatGPT","aiCompany":"OpenAI","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm","psychological_distress"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"OVIC found that personal information about a child, the mother, father and carer was entered into ChatGPT and disclosed to OpenAI, and that ChatGPT-generated content in a court report downplayed the risk to the child; the mother, father and carer described anxiety when told, according to OVIC's report.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":4,"affectedCountStatus":"documented_minimum","affectedCountEvidence":"OVIC's report finds that personal and sensitive information about the mother, father, carer and child in this case was entered into ChatGPT (four people), and records that the mother, father and carer described anxiety when informed. OVIC says personal information had likely been entered in other cases too; those people are not counted. The worker, the court and DFFH staff are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"unknown","jurisdiction":"AU-VIC","platformType":"chatbot","outcomeType":"regulatory_action","outcomeStatus":"resolved","primarySourceUrl":"https://ovic.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DFFH-ChatGPT-investigation-report-20240924-Re-upload.pdf","primarySourceLabel":"Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner: Investigation into the use of ChatGPT by a Child Protection worker (report, 24 Sep 2024)","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-22T03:03:14.588614+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-22T03:03:14.588614+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["chatgpt","child-protection","court-report","privacy-regulator","unauthorised-ai-use","personal-information","victoria"]}]}