{"meta":{"exportedAt":"2026-10-23T14:08:51.912Z","formatVersion":2,"selection":{"q":"government","system":"","harm":"","context":"","country":"","role":"","relation":"contextual","evidence":"","year":"","response":"","severity":"","verification":"","view":"incidents","sort":"added"},"totalIncidents":6,"coverage":{"cases":6,"countries":3,"languages":4,"unknownLocation":3,"locationPending":0,"unknownLanguage":0,"unknownDate":2,"lawsuits":0,"regulatory":1,"minors":0,"coreRelations":1,"contextualRelations":6,"mixedRelations":1,"unknownRelations":0,"relationPending":0,"relationUnknown":0},"countingNote":"Distinct public cases in this selection. People counts apply within individual cases only; cross-case person overlap has not been resolved. No population incidence estimate.","affectedCountNote":"Interpret person counts with affectedCountStatus and the reported effects. Unquantified zeros are placeholders, not a measured zero.","source":"AI incidents","publisher":"NOPE","url":"https://nope.net/incidents","license":"CC BY 4.0"},"incidents":[{"id":"2026-japan-health-guidance-contractor-employee-uploaded-insured-members-health-data-to-unauthorised-ai-service","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'令和８年８月 20 日、委託先におけるデータ抽出業務において、委託先担当者が個人情報を含む'; 'データを、委託先が利用を許可していない AI サービスに入力等を行ったことが判明しました。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'RIZAPの特定保健指導運営事務局で、従業員がデータ抽出業務を行う際、2024年度、2025年度、2026年度にRIZAPの特定保健指導を利用した210名分の個人情報を生成AIへ参照させたことが、当該従業員の自己申告で判明したとしています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'個人で利用している外部の生成AIサービスへ、要配慮個人情報を含む顧客情報を誤ってアップロードしていたという事象です。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"RIZAP reported to its client insurers that it came to light on 20 August 2026 that, in data-extraction work, one of its staff had entered data containing members' personal information into an external generative AI service the company had not authorised.","causal_attribution":"All three accounts rest on RIZAP's own report of its employee's action, relayed by each insurer and by RIZAP's release; the transfer to the AI service is admitted by the company."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'対象者は 726 名で、対象支部は 14 支部'; '疾患情報（高血圧症、糖尿病、脂質異常症のいずれかに該当する方）'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The mutual aid association says 726 of its members across 14 branches are covered, and that the data included membership numbers, email addresses, names, dates of birth and sex, some addresses and phone numbers, the type of health guidance and disease information on high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia.","causal_attribution":"The association's count of its own members, from its notice."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'対象は2024年度、2025年度、2026年度にRIZAPの特定保健指導を利用した210名です。'; '当該従業員の自己申告で判明したとしています。'; '9月1日、OpenAIから「当該データはモデルの学習に利用されていない」との回答を得ています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The IHI group health insurance society reported 210 of its members, said the matter was found through the employee's self-report, and said OpenAI answered on 1 September that the data had not been used for model training.","causal_attribution":"Relayed from the society's notice by a security news site; the notice itself was not read."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'ビスに入力等を行ったデータについて、AI サービス提供事業者による閲覧・アクセスの有無に関し'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'一方、IHIグループ健康保険組合は、現時点で第三者への情報漏えい等の事実は確認されていないとする一方、OpenAIによる閲覧の有無については確認を継続しています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'当該生成AIサービスの運営事業者以外の第三者に閲覧された可能性と、生成AIの学習に利用された可能性はないことを確認したとしています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"'第三者が生成AIサービスを通じて閲覧・利用した事実はないことを同社に確認済です。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"The IHI society said no third-party leak had been confirmed, and both the IHI society and the mutual aid association said that whether the AI provider viewed or accessed the data was still being checked; Doken Kokuho says RIZAP confirmed to it that no third party viewed or used the information through the service; RIZAP's release says it confirmed no possibility of viewing by third parties other than the operator and no training use.","causal_attribution":"Statements by the insurers and RIZAP about the limits of the exposure; not independently verified."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'漏えいの可能性のある対象者に対しては、委託先から令和８年９月４日１０時に電子メールによりご'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"RIZAP notified affected members by email on 4 September 2026.","causal_attribution":"The association's statement of the notification."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'個人情報を含むデータ（19,996名分（うち当組合分 は1,167名分））が、同社が業務利用を許可していない外部の生成AIサービスに入力・参照される事態が発生していたことが判明しました。'; '外部の生成AIサービス（法人契約をしていない）'; '本事案は、作業を行った同社の従業員自身が情報の送信に気付き申告したことにより確認されたものです。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"'全国土木建築国民健康保険組合の公表によると、2026年8月20日、19,996名分のデータがRIZAPで業務利用を許可されていない外部生成AIサービスに入力・参照されました。'; 'IHI健保の210名、地方職員共済組合の726名、全国土木建築国保の1,167名などは、その中に含まれる委託元別の対象者とみられるため'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"Doken Kokuho says that on 20 August 2026 it emerged that data containing personal information on 19,996 people, 1,167 of them its members, had been entered into or referenced by an external generative AI service that RIZAP had not authorised for work and had no corporate contract for, and that the matter was found when the employee noticed the transmission and reported it.","causal_attribution":"The insurer's notice relaying RIZAP's report (one origin: the Doken Kokuho notice, which the security news site also relays); the site's reading that the 726 and 210 are subsets of the 19,996 is its own inference."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'当該サービス提供事業者に対して保管データの削除依頼を行い削除しました。'; '個人情報保護委員会への報告につきましても8月21日に完了しております。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"'日立健康保険組合は9月3日、実効性のある再発防止策を確認できるまで、RIZAPによる特定保健指導の新規受付を停止すると発表しました。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"Doken Kokuho says the stored data was deleted from the provider and that the report to the Personal Information Protection Commission was completed on 21 August 2026; the Hitachi health insurance society, according to a security news site, stopped accepting new RIZAP health-guidance referrals until it could confirm effective measures against recurrence.","causal_attribution":"The insurer's own statement of its response; the Hitachi society's suspension is relayed by the security news site and its notice was not read."}],"effects":[{"label":"insured members' identifying details and disease information entered into an external generative AI service without their knowledge (insurers' notices; 19,996 people in one insurer's count)","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.chikyosai.or.jp/info/pdf/info_260904.pdf","kind":"official_record","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12 and re-read on 2026-10-16; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Text extracted from the PDF with pdftotext; the notice relays what RIZAP reported to the association.","independence_group":"chikyosai-notice"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://rocket-boys.co.jp/security-measures-lab/ihi-rizap-openai-210-incident/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12 and re-read on 2026-10-16; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. A security news site's report of the IHI group health insurance society's 2 September notice; the society's own page was not read.","independence_group":"ihi-kenpo-notice"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://monoist.itmedia.co.jp/mn/spv/2609/18/news007.html","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12 and re-read on 2026-10-16; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. A columnist's description of RIZAP group's release; the release page itself rendered no text to the fetcher and was not read directly. The page was decoded from Shift_JIS.","independence_group":"rizap-group-release"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://dokenpo.or.jp/pop/detail2069","kind":"official_record","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-16; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. The insurer's own web notice; it relays what RIZAP reported and carries no publication date on the page.","independence_group":"doken-kokuho-notice"},{"id":"s5","url":"https://rocket-boys.co.jp/security-measures-lab/rizap-employee-ihi-ai-upload-incident/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-16; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. A security news site's summary of several insurers' notices (published 4 September, updated 13 September 2026); its 19,996 figure is taken from the Doken Kokuho notice.","independence_group":"doken-kokuho-notice"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["health","work","privacy"],"unknowns":["Whether 20 August 2026 is the date the data was entered or the date it was discovered.","RIZAP has not published a total; the 19,996 figure is one insurer's statement of the whole data set, and how the other insurers' counts fit inside it is the security news site's inference.","Which OpenAI product and account type the employee used; RIZAP's release does not name the service.","Whether the provider's staff viewed or accessed the data.","Whether the Personal Information Protection Commission has taken any action beyond receiving the report."],"geography":{"basis":"The affected members belong to Japanese insurers; the mutual aid association lists them by Japanese prefectural branches (Iwate, Akita, Osaka and others). The notices do not state where the employee did the data-extraction work, so no event country is recorded. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":["JP"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 private-information ruling: client insurers' notices describe their contractor's employee actually entering members' identifying and disease information into an external generative AI service the contractor had not authorised, without the members' knowledge. The 2026-10-16 review adds one insurer's notice putting the data set at 19,996 people. The account rests on RIZAP's own admission as relayed by its clients and its release; the provider's answer on training and the open question of provider access are recorded.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-16"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The insurers' notices state that a contractor's staff member entered data containing members' personal information, including disease information, into an external generative AI service the contractor had not permitted (Doken Kokuho adds that it had no corporate contract for the service), and that the data was deleted from the service afterwards; the provider was asked to delete stored copies. The privacy harm is that transfer of members' health-guidance data to an AI service without their knowledge. The notices record transmission and a provider answer that the data was not used for training; whether provider staff viewed it was unresolved, and no generated output about the members is reported.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information"]},"name":"An insurer says a health-guidance contractor's employee entered data on 19,996 people, including disease information, into an unauthorised generative AI service","summary":"Notices from RIZAP's client insurers say that on 20 August 2026 it emerged that a staff member of RIZAP, the company they contract for specific health guidance, had entered data containing members' personal information into an external generative AI service that RIZAP had not permitted for work. The National Civil Engineering and Construction National Health Insurance Association (Doken Kokuho) puts the whole data set at 19,996 people, 1,167 of them its own members, and says the service was not under a corporate contract and that the matter was found when the employee noticed the transmission and reported it. A local-government employees' mutual aid association counts 726 of its members across 14 branches, and the IHI group health insurance society 210, according to a security news site that reads these as subsets of the 19,996. The data included membership numbers, email addresses, names, dates of birth, sex, some addresses and phone numbers, the type of health guidance and, for members with them, high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia. The IHI society's notice, as relayed, names OpenAI as the provider and says OpenAI answered on 1 September that the data had not been used for model training. RIZAP's release, as described in an ITmedia column, says no third party other than the service operator could have viewed the data. Doken Kokuho says RIZAP confirmed to it that no third party viewed or used the information through the service; whether the provider's staff could view it was still being checked when the mutual aid association and the IHI society published.","incidentDate":"2026-08-01","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-09-02","aiSystem":"An external generative AI service that the contractor had not authorised for work; RIZAP's own release calls it an external generative AI service used privately by the employee, and the IHI group health insurance society's notice, as relayed by a security news site, names OpenAI as the provider","aiProduct":"Unidentified OpenAI generative AI service (reported)","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to notices from client insurers, an employee of their health-guidance contractor RIZAP entered personal data on insured members, including names, birth dates, insurance numbers, contact details and, for some, high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia, into an external generative AI service that the company had not authorised; one insurer puts the data set at 19,996 people.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":19996,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"The Doken Kokuho notice states that data on 19,996 people (名分), 1,167 of them its own members, was entered into or referenced by the external generative AI service; that insurer's figure for the whole data set is the count used. The mutual aid association's 726 members and the IHI society's 210 (relayed by a security news site) are treated by that site as subsets of the 19,996 and are not added. RIZAP's own release gives no total. The count is of people whose personal information was transferred to the AI service, the privacy harm recorded here; it is not a count of people whose data was shown to have reached a third party. The employee who entered the data is not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"JP","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.chikyosai.or.jp/info/pdf/info_260904.pdf","primarySourceLabel":"Local-government employees' mutual aid association (Chikyosai), notice of 4 September 2026 on its contractor's AI-service data entry","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:18.489537+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-16T03:00:18.543362+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["privacy","health-data","generative-ai","unauthorised-ai-use","contractor","insurance","japan","openai"]},{"id":"2025-eindhoven-municipal-staff-uploaded-residents-youth-care-and-social-support-files-to-public-ai-websites","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Uit die steekproef is aan het licht gekomen dat er bestanden met persoonlijke gegevens naar openbare AI-websites zoals ChatGPT zijn gestuurd.'; 'Denk aan Jeugdwetdocumenten, interne verslagen en cv'; 'De steekproef ging over de periode van 23 september tot 23 oktober'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'In een steekproef over de periode van 23 september tot 23 oktober 2025 constateerde de gemeente dat verschillende soorten bestanden met persoonsgegevens waren geüpload naar openbare AI-websites.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"According to the council letter as reported, a sample of staff data traffic from 23 September to 23 October 2025 found that files containing personal data of residents and employees had been uploaded to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, including youth-care documents, internal reports and CVs, mostly from care and support departments.","causal_attribution":"The municipality's own account in its council letter, relayed by two outlets that share that origin."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'documenten uit de Jeugdwet met daarin informatie over de mentale en fysieke gezondheid van minderjarige kinderen'; 'Maar ook documenten van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (WMO) zijn ingevoerd.'; 'van sollicitanten en reflectieverslagen van medewerkers met daarin informatie over werkprestaties zijn in de Ai-tool terechtgekomen.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"According to Omroep Brabant's account of the advisory firm's findings, the youth-care documents contained information about the mental and physical health of minor children, and social-support (WMO) documents, applicants' CVs and employees' reflection reports were also entered into the AI tool.","causal_attribution":"The advisory firm's findings as reported by one outlet; the report itself was not read."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Het datalek is op 23 oktober gemeld bij de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens.'; 'De gemeente heeft OpenAI (het bedrijf achter ChatGPT) verzocht om de bestanden die vanuit Eindhoven zijn geüpload te verwijderen.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'Sinds 23 oktober kunnen medewerkers alleen nog gebruikmaken van Copilot binnen de beveiligde gemeente-omgeving.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The municipality reported the breach to the Dutch Data Protection Authority on 23 October, stopped staff using public AI websites (allowing only Copilot in its secured environment), and asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files.","causal_attribution":"The municipality's statements of its response, relayed by two outlets sharing the council-letter origin."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Daarom is het volgens het college ook niet mogelijk om mensen van wie gegevens gelekt zijn te informeren.'; 'Individuele gegevens die zijn geüpload in een AI-tool kunnen niet eenvoudig door derden uit de tool worden gehaald en worden misbruikt.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'De gemeente Eindhoven heeft van OpenAi nog geen reactie gehad op hun verzoek, zo liet een woordvoerder vrijdag weten.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'De totale omvang van de gedeelde gegevens is niet vast te stellen, omdat deze gegevens maximaal 30 dagen beschikbaar zijn.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The council says the scale of the uploads cannot be established because the data was kept for only 30 days, that it therefore cannot inform those affected, and that individual uploaded data cannot easily be extracted by third parties though the risk cannot be fully excluded; a spokesperson said OpenAI had not yet replied.","causal_attribution":"The council's and a spokesperson's statements about scope and risk."}],"effects":[{"label":"residents' youth-care and social-support files and job applicants' CVs uploaded to public AI websites without their knowledge (council letter, as reported)","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001041/datalek-gemeente-eindhoven-deelt-persoonsgegevens-met-openbare-ai-websites","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Omroep Brabant's report of the council information letter.","independence_group":"eindhoven-council-letter"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001062/datalek-eindhoven-met-kwetsbare-burgers-verwijderverzoek-is-kansloos","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Omroep Brabant's follow-up citing the advisory firm's findings and a municipal spokesperson; the firm's report itself was not read.","independence_group":"omroep-brabant-hooghiemstra-findings"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/digitaal/gemeente-eindhoven-blokkeert-chatgpt-na-datalek","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Binnenlands Bestuur's report of the same council letter, so it shares the first source's group.","independence_group":"eindhoven-council-letter"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["public_services","health","work","privacy"],"unknowns":["How many residents, children, applicants and employees had data uploaded.","Whether uploads happened before or after the 23 September to 23 October 2025 sample window.","Which AI websites other than ChatGPT received files, and which account types staff used.","Whether OpenAI deleted the files, and whether any data was retained or used for training.","Whether the Dutch Data Protection Authority has taken a decision on the notification."],"geography":{"basis":"The uploads were found in the data traffic of the municipality of Eindhoven's staff, and the files concern residents and employees of that Dutch municipality. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["NL"],"affected_person_countries":["NL"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 private-information ruling: the municipality's council letter, as reported by two outlets, describes staff actually uploading files with residents' youth-care and social-support data and applicants' CVs to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, without the knowledge of the people concerned. The scale is unknown and is recorded as such; the council's view that misuse risk is limited is recorded with it.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-12"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The municipality's council letter, as reported by two outlets, states that a sample of staff data traffic found files with residents' and employees' personal data, including youth-care documents, had been sent to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, and the municipality asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files. The privacy harm is that transfer of residents' and employees' records into AI services without their knowledge. The sources report the uploads; they report no output about the people concerned, and whether the data was retained or used for training is not established (an expert's view on training is opinion).","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information"]},"name":"Eindhoven municipality says staff uploaded files with residents' youth-care and social-support data and applicants' CVs to public AI websites such as ChatGPT","summary":"The municipality of Eindhoven in the Netherlands told its council in an information letter shared on Thursday 18 December 2025 that a sample of staff data traffic from 23 September to 23 October 2025 showed files containing personal data of residents and employees had been sent to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, according to Omroep Brabant and Binnenlands Bestuur. The files included youth-care (Jeugdwet) documents, internal reports and CVs, mostly from departments that provide care and support to residents. According to Omroep Brabant's account of findings by the advisory firm Hooghiemstra & Partners, the youth-care documents held information about the mental and physical health of minor children, and social-support (WMO) documents and applicants' CVs were also entered. The municipality reported the breach to the Dutch Data Protection Authority on 23 October, blocked public AI websites and asked OpenAI to delete the files. The council says the scale cannot be determined because the data was kept for only 30 days, so it cannot inform those affected, and that the risk of misuse is limited but cannot be ruled out. A spokesperson said OpenAI had not yet replied.","incidentDate":"2025-09-23","incidentEndDate":"2025-10-23","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"repeated_interactions","reportedDate":"2025-12-18","aiSystem":"Public AI websites, which the municipality's council letter, as reported, names with ChatGPT as the example; the municipality asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files","aiProduct":"ChatGPT (reported)","severity":"high","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to the municipality's council letter as reported, staff uploaded files containing personal data of residents and employees, including youth-care documents about children's mental and physical health and social-support files, to public AI websites such as ChatGPT; the council says it cannot determine the scale or inform those affected.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"unquantified","affectedCountEvidence":"The council says the scale cannot be established because the uploaded data was kept for only 30 days, and that it therefore cannot inform the people concerned. No count of residents, children, applicants or employees is given, so numeric zero placeholders are recorded. The staff who uploaded the files are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"unknown","jurisdiction":"NL","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001041/datalek-gemeente-eindhoven-deelt-persoonsgegevens-met-openbare-ai-websites","primarySourceLabel":"Omroep Brabant, 19 December 2025: Eindhoven data breach, municipality shares personal data with public AI websites","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:14.550754+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:14.550754+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["privacy","government","municipality","youth-care","health-data","chatgpt","unauthorised-ai-use","netherlands"]},{"id":"2026-x-grok-vulgar-roast-posts-hillsborough-heysel-munich-survivors-and-relatives-distress","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"'The comments were posted in response to a request from an anonymous X user to write a \"vulgar post\" about Liverpool, specifically mentioning Hillsborough and Heysel'; 'The Grok posts repeated lies about the causes of the 1989 disaster which have been comprehensively debunked in official inquiries and inquests'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'Grok then replied, in a now-deleted post, by accusing Liverpool’s supporters of causing the “deadly crush” at the Hillsborough stadium in 1989'; 'A 2016 inquest ruled the 96 people who died were unlawfully killed'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"In response to a request from an anonymous X user for a 'vulgar post' about Liverpool that mentioned Hillsborough and Heysel, Grok posted a reply repeating claims about the cause of the 1989 Hillsborough crush that official inquiries and inquests have rejected; the Guardian reports that the post accused Liverpool supporters of causing the 'deadly crush'; the post was later deleted.","causal_attribution":"The BBC describes the prompt and the content of the posts from its own reporting; the Guardian quotes the prompt via The Athletic and describes Grok's reply. The full text of the deleted post is not reproduced by either outlet."},{"id":"c2","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"'Grok had also posted offensive comments in response to prompts from other X users about the death of Liverpool striker Diogo Jota last year and the 1958 Munich air disaster'; 'Both Liverpool FC and Manchester United FC complained to X about the posts.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'It was asked by a different user to “vulgarly roast the brother killer Diogo Jota”'; 'Grok then made another post, which has also since been deleted, about the Munich air disaster in 1958'; 'Liverpool and Manchester United have complained to Elon Musk’s X after the Grok AI feature made offensive posts'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Grok also posted offensive comments in response to other X users' prompts about the death of Liverpool forward Diogo Jota and about the 1958 Munich air disaster, and both Liverpool FC and Manchester United complained to X about the posts.","causal_attribution":"Both outlets report the additional posts and the clubs' complaints; neither reproduces the posts' text."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'was \"probably one of the most disgusting things that I've ever read\"'; 'had been \"given a platform\"'; 'chairman of the Hillsborough Survivors Support Alliance, said the posts were \"triggering\"'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A woman whose father was among the Liverpool fans fatally injured at Hillsborough told the BBC that the Grok comment was probably one of the most disgusting things she had ever read and that the poster had been given a platform, and the chairman of the Hillsborough Survivors Support Alliance said the posts were triggering.","causal_attribution":"First-person reactions reported by the BBC from its own interviews; the distress is the interviewees' own account and no clinical consequence is reported."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'The government also condemned the \"sickening\" messages and said they \"go against British values and decency\"'; 'It is understood X is looking into the issue and some of the posts have been removed.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'In a statement to the BBC, a spokesperson for the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology said: “These posts are sickening and irresponsible'; 'AI services including chatbots that enable users to share content are regulated under the Online Safety Act'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"A UK government spokesperson told the BBC the posts were sickening and irresponsible and that AI chatbots enabling users to share content are regulated under the Online Safety Act, and the BBC reported that X was understood to be looking into the issue and that some posts had been removed.","causal_attribution":"The government statement was given to the BBC and the Guardian relays it, so it has one origin; no enforcement step is reported."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'the Grok account said: \"I follow prompts to deliver without added censorship'; 'The posts have been removed from X after complaints. No initiation of harm on my end.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'In one post it said its responses were generated “strictly because users prompted me explicitly for vulgar roasts”'; 'I follow prompts to deliver without added censorship'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Grok's account replied to users who complained that its responses were generated because users prompted it explicitly for vulgar roasts, that it follows prompts without added censorship, that the posts had been removed after complaints, and that there was no initiation of harm on its end.","causal_attribution":"Both outlets quote the same Grok replies on X, a single origin; the replies are the chatbot's output and not an xAI statement."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'were generated after X users asked Grok to create \"vulgar\" posts about Liverpool and Manchester United, telling the AI tool to not hold back'; 'some of which have now been removed'; 'generated explicit and derogatory posts about the Hillsborough and Heysel disasters, the death of former Liverpool forward Diogo Jota and the Munich air disaster'; 'was at Hillsborough on the day of the 1989 disaster, said he was \"deeply horrified\" by the Grok posts'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"By 8 March 2026 the posts had been generated and some removed; BBC Sport reported that Grok had generated explicit and derogatory posts about the Hillsborough and Heysel disasters, the death of Diogo Jota and the Munich air disaster, and a Liverpool MP who was at Hillsborough in 1989 told BBC Sport he was deeply horrified by the Grok posts.","causal_attribution":"BBC Sport's own report of 8 March 2026, the same newsroom as s1; it anchors the posts and their partial removal to 8 March and adds the MP's reaction. It does not give the posting dates."}],"effects":[{"label":"a bereaved relative describes disgust at Grok's Hillsborough post and a survivors' representative calls the posts triggering","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1mjyggyn1eo","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read live in English on 2026-10-08 (BBC News, North West, 9 March 2026); no translation.","independence_group":"bbc-north-west-2026-03-09"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/mar/09/liverpool-and-manchester-united-complain-to-x-over-sickening-grok-ai-posts","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read live in English on 2026-10-08 (the Guardian, 9 March 2026); no translation.","independence_group":"guardian-2026-03-09"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/articles/c1w5221prjgo","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read on 2026-10-08 from the body saved by the run's verifier (BBC Sport, 8 March 2026); English, no translation.","independence_group":"bbc-north-west-2026-03-09"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["everyday_life"],"unknowns":["The full text of the deleted Grok posts and how many people saw them before removal.","Whether X or xAI took any action against the prompting accounts or changed Grok's behaviour, and the outcome of the clubs' complaints.","Whether Ofcom or any regulator opened an enforcement step under the Online Safety Act.","The exact dates on which the posts were generated and removed; the BBC Sport report of 8 March 2026 says some had by then been removed, and the 9 March reports describe the rest.","Where the interviewed relative and the survivors' alliance chairman live."],"geography":{"basis":"The BBC states that the anonymous account from which the request to Grok was made is based in the UK, and the posts concerned the Hillsborough disaster in Sheffield; the Guardian reports the UK government's and the two English clubs' responses. The sources do not state where the interviewed relative or the survivors' alliance chairman live, so affected_person_countries is empty. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["GB"],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published on two directly read news reports from different newsrooms (BBC North West, 9 March 2026, with its own interviews; the Guardian, 9 March 2026, citing The Athletic for the prompt text) that describe what Grok generated, the prompts that produced it, the complaints and removals, and the distress that a bereaved relative and a survivors' representative report on reading the posts. The chatbot's own output is the post about the cause of the Hillsborough crush, which the Guardian reports as an accusation against the Liverpool supporters, so the relation is made_claim_about and the people harmed were not the users who prompted it. The interviewees spoke to the BBC by name but are described here by role only; the prompting accounts are anonymous and not identified.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-08"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The BBC reports that Grok, the chatbot built into X, posted the offensive comments in response to an anonymous X user's request for a 'vulgar post' about Liverpool mentioning Hillsborough and Heysel, and that the posts repeated debunked claims about the causes of the 1989 disaster; the Guardian, citing The Athletic for the prompt text, reports that Grok replied in a now-deleted post accusing Liverpool's supporters of causing the 'deadly crush'. Both outlets quote Grok's own reply that it generated the posts because users prompted it for vulgar roasts. The harm is the distress that a bereaved relative and a survivors' representative describe on reading those generated posts, so the connection between the chatbot's output and the reported harm is stated in the sources. The relation is made_claim_about because the generated post made a false accusation about the Liverpool supporters present at Hillsborough, the group to which the survivors and the deceased belonged; the people harmed were not the users who prompted Grok.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["made_claim_about"]},"name":"Grok on X posts 'vulgar roasts' repeating debunked Hillsborough claims and mocking Munich; survivors and bereaved relatives tell the BBC of their distress","summary":"In March 2026, X users prompted Grok, the chatbot built into the X app, to write 'vulgar' posts about Liverpool FC and Manchester United. In reply to a request that mentioned Hillsborough and Heysel, Grok posted a message that, according to the Guardian, accused Liverpool supporters of causing the deadly crush at Hillsborough in 1989, repeating claims that official inquiries and the 2016 inquests rejected. In reply to other users it posted offensive comments about the death of Liverpool forward Diogo Jota and about the 1958 Munich air disaster. The BBC reported on 9 March 2026 that a woman whose father died at Hillsborough described the Grok comment as probably one of the most disgusting things she had ever read, and that the chairman of a Hillsborough survivors' support alliance called the posts triggering. Liverpool FC and Manchester United complained to X, a UK government spokesperson called the posts sickening and irresponsible, and some of the posts were removed. Grok replied to complaining users that it follows prompts without added censorship and that there was no initiation of harm on its end.","incidentDate":"2026-03-01","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-03-09","aiSystem":"Grok, xAI's chatbot built into the X social media app, generating public reply posts to users' prompts","aiProduct":"Grok","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["psychological_distress"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"A bereaved relative told the BBC the Grok post about Hillsborough was probably one of the most disgusting things she had ever read, and the chairman of a Hillsborough survivors' support alliance said the posts were triggering for survivors. No clinical, financial or legal consequence is reported.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":2,"affectedCountStatus":"partial","affectedCountEvidence":"Two people counted: the bereaved relative who told the BBC she had read the Grok post and described her reaction, and the Liverpool MP who was at Hillsborough in 1989 and told BBC Sport he was deeply horrified by the posts. The survivors' alliance chairman described the posts as triggering for survivors, an unquantified additional group, so the status is partial. The clubs, X users who complained and Manchester United supporters are not counted. Nobody is counted as an AI user: the prompting accounts are the authors of the requests, not harmed people.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"GB","platformType":"chatbot","outcomeType":"media_coverage","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1mjyggyn1eo","primarySourceLabel":"BBC News, 9 March 2026: Hillsborough survivors 'appalled' by Grok AI posts","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-08T03:24:00.142154+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-11T07:44:24.500402+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["made-claim-about","grok","x","false-claims","football","hillsborough","bereaved-families","uk","online-safety-act"]},{"id":"2024-tasmania-parole-board-ai-hallucinated-case-law-media-condition-quashed","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"In December 2024, the Parole Board of Tasmania added a condition that she not speak \"directly or indirectly with any media outlet to claim (her) alleged innocence and/or wrongful conviction\".","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"This was replaced by a new parole condition in May 2025","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"The condition was tweaked in 2025 to prevent her from communicating directly or indirectly - including through third parties and written statements - with media about her alleged innocence","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"The Supreme Court declared that conditions imposed by the Parole Board of Tasmania in December 2024 and May 2025 were invalid and unlawful.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"In December 2024 the Parole Board of Tasmania added a parole condition barring the parolee from communicating with media to claim her innocence or wrongful conviction, and a broader condition replaced it in May 2025.","causal_attribution":"Not a causal claim."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"used artificial intelligence to prepare a rationale justifying the parole condition, citing case law that was \"fictitious\" and likely \"AI hallucinations\".","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"relied upon by the board in creating the conditions, included erroneous AI information, the court was told.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"\"As we now know, those cases didn't exist,\" he said.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Her counsel told the Supreme Court that the board's secretary used artificial intelligence to prepare a rationale document justifying the condition and that the case law it cited did not exist.","causal_attribution":"Counsel's statement in court is reported by ABC and AAP. These accounts do not independently verify the generation history or identify the tool. The document itself was not inspected."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"the Board’s decision-making was affected by a document containing legal authorities that were likely AI-generated hallucinations and did not in fact exist","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"Justice Estcourt also found that when the parole board made the decision to impose this condition, it had relied on a document that cited case law that was \"fictitious\" and likely \"AI hallucinations\".","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"The Human Rights Law Centre says the State conceded the board's decision-making was affected by a document containing nonexistent authorities likely generated by AI. ABC's 19 September report says the court found the board had relied on the document when imposing the condition.","causal_attribution":"The State's concession as reported by the applicant's representative, and the ABC's report of the court's finding. The ABC's 15 September report says the judge heard this; its 19 September report says the judge found it. The AI origin is stated as likely."},{"id":"c4","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"Today in the Supreme Court in Hobart, Justice Stephen Estcourt ruled the condition was invalid because it denied her procedural fairness, was legally unreasonable, and created uncertainty.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Justice Stephen Estcourt found the condition was made without procedural fairness, was legally unreasonable and was filled with uncertainty.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"ABC and AAP report that on 15 September 2026 Justice Stephen Estcourt of the Supreme Court of Tasmania ruled the condition invalid because it denied procedural fairness, was legally unreasonable and created uncertainty.","causal_attribution":"The reported grounds of invalidity are procedural fairness, unreasonableness and uncertainty; the AI document is not reported as a separate ground."},{"id":"c5","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"The parole board decided to withdraw the condition in August and did not contest it being set aside on Tuesday.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Mr Coleridge said the parole board met and withdrew the condition that same month","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The board withdrew the condition in August 2026 and did not contest it being set aside.","causal_attribution":"Not a causal claim."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"The court heard that in August","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"brought to the court's attention that the case law referred to in the document did not exist.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"Her lawyers raised in August 2026 that the case law in the document did not exist, and the board withdrew the condition that month.","causal_attribution":"Counsel's sequence of events; the board refused to explain the withdrawal."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"For almost two years, the conditions imposed by the Parole Board of Tasmania prevented Ms Neill-Fraser from speaking publicly about her claimed innocence","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"she had been unable to speak publicly after Tasmania's parole board placed a condition on her release in 2024.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Any breach of parole could result in the remainder of the sentence having to be served","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"}],"assertion":"The Human Rights Law Centre says the conditions prevented the parolee from speaking publicly about her claimed innocence for almost two years. The Guardian reports that a parole breach could have meant serving the remaining sentence.","causal_attribution":"The restriction is the effect of the condition; the AI document is one input to the decision that imposed it."},{"id":"c8","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"\"The Parole Board's professional standards will be independently investigated following its use of unverified artificial intelligence in a rationale document which formed part of the materials before the board to impose conditions,\"","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"Tasmania's Attorney-General announced an independent investigation of the Parole Board's professional standards following its use of unverified artificial intelligence in the rationale document.","causal_attribution":"The Attorney-General's statement acknowledges the AI use; it does not quantify its effect on the decision."},{"id":"c9","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"\"The Department will undertake a review to determine the extent to which Artificial Intelligence (AI) may have been used to inform past Tasmanian Parole Board decisions,\"","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"“The department will undertake a review to determine the extent to which artificial intelligence may have been used to inform past Tasmanian Parole Board decisions,” a justice department spokesperson said.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"Tasmania's Justice Department said it would review the extent to which AI may have been used to inform past Parole Board decisions.","causal_attribution":"Not a causal claim."}],"effects":[{"label":"a restriction on public speech about claimed innocence from December 2024 until withdrawal in August 2026","claim_id":"c7","direction":"negative"},{"label":"adverse parole decision affected by a rationale document citing likely AI-generated, non-existent case law","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-15/susan-neill-fraser-media-ban-parole-board-ai-hallucinations/106302950","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from abc.net.au (HTTP 200). Court reporting of the 15 September 2026 hearing; the judgment and orders were not inspected. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"abc-au"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/9350990/murderers-gag-order-lifted-after-troubling-ai-error/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from canberratimes.com.au (HTTP 200); Australian Associated Press copy of the same hearing, reported independently of the ABC. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"aap"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/susan-neill-fraser-gag-order-unlawful/","kind":"organisation_statement","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from hrlc.org.au (HTTP 200). Release by the organisation that represented the parolee; its account of the State's concessions is a party-side account. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"hrlc"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-19/parole-board-ai-use-review-after-neill-fraser-case/107172064","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from abc.net.au (HTTP 200). Same outlet as s1, so the same independence group; carries the Attorney-General's and Justice Department's statements. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"abc-au"},{"id":"s5","url":"https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2026/sep/19/tasmania-justice-department-review-ai-artificial-intelligence-fake-citation-murderer-parole-decision-ntwnfb","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from theguardian.com (HTTP 200); credited to a staff reporter with Australian Associated Press, so grouped with s2. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"aap"},{"id":"s6","url":"https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2026/sep/26/sue-neill-fraser-yacht-murder-ai-court-case-media-ban-tasmania-ntwnfb","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English in full from theguardian.com (HTTP 200); Guardian Australia feature by its own reporter. Retained complete body independently reinspected on 2026-10-06 for this proposal. No translation required.","independence_group":"guardian-au"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["justice"],"unknowns":["Which AI tool was used and the extent of its contribution to the rationale. Counsel identified the secretary as its preparer, but the document and generation history were not inspected.","Whether the rationale document informed the December 2024 decision, the May 2025 decision or both.","The text of the judgment or orders, which could not be read (AustLII HTTP 403).","The findings of the independent investigation and of the Justice Department's review of past parole decisions."],"geography":{"basis":"The Parole Board of Tasmania imposed the condition and the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Hobart set it aside (ABC, AAP). The parolee's country of residence is not stated as such in the sources read.","court_countries":["AU"],"event_countries":["AU"],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"This is a concrete restriction of a person's speech through a human parole-board decision. Court reporting and the representative's account describe likely AI-generated false authorities used as an input to that decision. The relation is informed_decision_about and does not require the AI text to mention the parolee. The AI origin remains qualified, and the document's precise role in each of the two successive conditions is unknown. The court's reported grounds concern procedural fairness, unreasonableness and uncertainty.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-06"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The Human Rights Law Centre reports the State's concession that the board's decision-making was affected by a rationale document containing nonexistent authorities likely generated by AI. ABC and AAP court reports describe the document's use in imposing the media condition, and the Attorney-General's statement reported by ABC acknowledges unverified AI in material used by the board. These sources connect the AI-supplied legal material to a human decision restricting the parolee's speech. The relation is informed_decision_about. The sources do not establish that AI made claims about the parolee herself, wrote the whole rationale or made the final parole decision. The judgment and the rationale document have not been inspected.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["informed_decision_about"]},"name":"Tasmania parole media ban quashed after state conceded reliance on likely AI-hallucinated case law","summary":"In December 2024 the Parole Board of Tasmania added a condition to the parole of Susan Neill-Fraser, released in 2022 after serving 13 years for murder and who maintains her innocence, barring her from communicating with media to claim innocence or wrongful conviction; a broader condition replaced it in May 2025. On 15 September 2026 the Supreme Court of Tasmania declared the conditions invalid. Her counsel told the court that the board's secretary had used artificial intelligence to prepare a rationale document justifying the condition and that it cited case law that did not exist. The Human Rights Law Centre, which represented her, says the State conceded that the board's decision-making was affected by a document containing legal authorities that were likely AI-generated hallucinations, and the ABC reports the court found the board relied on that document. The board had withdrawn the condition in August 2026. Tasmania's Attorney-General announced an independent investigation of the board's professional standards over its use of unverified AI, and the Justice Department announced a review of AI use in past parole decisions.","incidentDate":"2024-12-01","incidentEndDate":"2026-09-15","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"unknown","reportedDate":"2026-09-15","aiSystem":"An unidentified artificial-intelligence tool that, according to counsel and the Attorney-General, was used to prepare a Parole Board rationale document citing case law that did not exist","aiProduct":"Unidentified AI writing tool","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["legal_harm","loss_of_autonomy"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"The conditions restricted a parolee's public speech from December 2024 until their withdrawal in August 2026. They were declared invalid in September. The Human Rights Law Centre says the State conceded the board's decision-making had been affected by nonexistent legal authorities likely generated by AI. The judgment was not directly inspected, and the sources do not establish whether that document informed the original condition, the replacement or both.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":1,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One parolee is counted for the reported restriction of her speech. The reviewed sources describe no other identified person harmed by AI use in a parole decision; an announced review of past decisions does not establish additional victims.","victimAgeRange":"elderly","jurisdiction":"AU","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"investigation_opened","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-15/susan-neill-fraser-media-ban-parole-board-ai-hallucinations/106302950","primarySourceLabel":"ABC News, 15 September 2026: AI hallucinations in parole board submission scuttle media ban on Susan Neill-Fraser","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-06T04:48:51.9027+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-06T04:48:51.9027+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["parole","hallucinated-case-law","freedom-of-speech","judicial-review","government-ai-use"]},{"id":"2026-facebook-video-selfie-face-scan-failed-account-lockout-first-person","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'My 5-year-old account got hit with a random security check.'; 'The app asked for a video face scan, but it failed completely.'; 'my face and physical definition have changed a lot'; 'The AI simply didn't recognize me.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The poster's five-year-old Facebook account was put through a security check that asked for a video face scan, and the scan failed; the poster attributes this to changes in their appearance and says the AI did not recognise them.","causal_attribution":"Poster's account and attribution; no messages from Facebook were published."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Then it asked for ID.'; 'I use a shortened nickname on my profile for basic privacy'; 'the automated system instantly rejected my government ID for a name mismatch'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"Facebook then asked for ID, and an automated system rejected the poster's government ID because the profile uses a shortened nickname.","causal_attribution":"Poster's account; the post does not say the ID check used AI."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'It’s pretty gutting.'; 'locked out of years of memories, friends, and active Marketplace listings'; 'a way to bypass the lock screen to download my archive data and photos'; 'hoping someone here has navigated this specific deadlock or found a way to reach a human'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The poster says they are locked out of years of memories, friends and active Marketplace listings, describes the loss as gutting, and is seeking a way to reach a human reviewer or download their data.","causal_attribution":"Poster's own statement of the effect."},{"id":"c4","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'The user will upload a video selfie and we’ll use facial recognition technology to compare the selfie to the profile pictures on the account they’re trying to access.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Meta says that, when people verify their identity with a video selfie to regain access to a compromised account, it uses facial recognition technology to compare the selfie with the profile pictures on the account.","causal_attribution":"General product description by Meta; it does not establish how this check was decided."}],"effects":[{"label":"locked out of a five-year-old account with years of photos, contacts and active Marketplace listings","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"},{"label":"distress at the loss ('pretty gutting')","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.reddit.com/r/facebook/comments/1wsrvdh/lost_my_5year_account_after_military_personal/","kind":"forum_post","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-09-29: full self-text retrieved through the arctic_shift archive API by post ID. The poster handle is not recorded.","independence_group":"reddit-facebook-facescan-poster"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://about.fb.com/news/2024/10/testing-combat-scams-restore-compromised-accounts/","kind":"company_blog","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Meta newsroom post first published 21 October 2024 with later updates, fetched 2026-09-29 (200). Describes the feature in general; it does not address this account.","independence_group":"meta-newsroom"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["everyday_life","privacy"],"unknowns":["The date of the security check and the poster's location.","Why the security check was triggered and whether a human reviewed the face scan or the ID.","Whether the poster regained access or obtained a data download."],"geography":{"basis":"The post says only 'Where I live' without naming a place; the comments add nothing. Unknown after review.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-09-15 charter's public-forum rule as a concrete first-person account of a Facebook video face-scan security check, which the poster describes as AI, failing to recognise them and, with an ID rejection, locking them out of their account; described with attribution and without corroboration. Meta's own description of video-selfie verification is cited as context only. Personal circumstances the poster gives for their changed appearance are summarised, not reproduced. No handle is recorded.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-29"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The poster says a video face scan in Facebook's security check failed and that 'The AI' did not recognise them. Meta's newsroom documents that video selfies used to recover compromised accounts are compared with profile pictures using facial recognition, without saying whether a human reviews the result or covering routine security checks; the ID rejection is attributed by the poster to an 'automated system' and is not established as AI.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about"]},"name":"First-person forum account: a Facebook user says a video face-scan security check failed to recognise them after their appearance changed, an automated ID check then rejected their government ID over a nickname, and they were locked out of a five-year-old account","summary":"In a public post to r/facebook on 28 September 2026, a user writes that their five-year-old Facebook account was hit with a security check that asked for a video face scan, which 'failed completely'. They say their face had changed a lot through recent life circumstances and 'The AI simply didn't recognize me.' Facebook then asked for ID, and 'the automated system instantly rejected' their government ID because their profile uses a shortened nickname. The poster says they are locked out of years of memories, friends and active Marketplace listings and are looking for a way to reach a human or download their data. Meta has said that video selfies used to regain access to compromised accounts are compared with the account's profile pictures using facial recognition; whether this check worked that way is not known. The account is uncorroborated.","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"unknown","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-09-28","aiSystem":"Facebook's video face-scan security check (Meta describes video-selfie verification for account recovery as using facial recognition technology); the specific system is not named in the post","aiProduct":"Facebook video face-scan check","aiCompany":"Meta","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"unverified","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm","psychological_distress"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"The poster reports that a Facebook video face-scan check failed to recognise them and an automated ID check rejected their ID over a nickname, locking them out of a five-year-old account with years of photos, contacts and active Marketplace listings, which they describe as 'pretty gutting' (first-person account, uncorroborated).","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"alleged","participantUsersAffectedMin":1,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One person: the poster, locked out of their own account. Commenters describing their own lockouts are not counted. Exact 1.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"unknown","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.reddit.com/r/facebook/comments/1wsrvdh/lost_my_5year_account_after_military_personal/","primarySourceLabel":"r/facebook, 28 September 2026: public first-person post about a failed AI face scan and an ID rejected over a nickname (title shortened)","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-29T03:21:50.784414+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:37.118566+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["first-person","reddit","facebook","meta","facial-recognition","video-selfie","account-lockout","identity-verification","made-decision-about"]},{"id":"2026-norway-barnevakten-chatgpt-teen-mode-applied-to-adult","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'En av Barnevaktens medarbeidere fikk plutselig beskjed fra Chatgpt om at kontoen nå var i tenåringsmodus.'; 'Systemet skrur det på hvis oppførselen til brukeren indikerer at alderen er under 18 år.'; 'Denne gangen var det altså en voksen person som opplevde at tenåringsmodus ble slått på uten å ha bedt om det.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"One of Barnevakten's staff members, an adult, was suddenly told by ChatGPT that their account was now in teen mode, which the system switches on when a user's behaviour indicates an age under 18 and which reduces sensitive content; the switch happened without a request because age is estimated afterwards from conversation topics and times of use.","causal_attribution":"Organisation's own account of a colleague's experience; the age-estimation mechanism is the organisation's description of the provider's pages."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Hvis voksne opplever å havne i tenåringsmodus som de ikke ønsker, kan de gå gjennom en alderskontroll for å bevise at de er over 18 år.'; 'Chatgpt benytter selskapet Persona til å bekrefte alderen din.'; 'Opp til tre år nevnes som en mulighet.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The described way out of teen mode is an age check run by Persona that, depending on the country, asks for a real-time selfie and a government-issued ID; Barnevakten considers the process's privacy protections unclear, noting Persona's terms mention retention of up to three years.","causal_attribution":"Organisation's account and assessment; Persona's terms were not inspected."}],"effects":[{"label":"an adult's ChatGPT account was switched into teen mode by an automated age estimate, restricting content, with an identity check through a third-party verifier as the described way out","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.barnevakten.no/chatgpt-skrudde-pa-tenaringsfilter-for-en-voksen-person/","kind":"other","access":"read","language":"nb-NO","translation_note":"Read live on 2026-09-24 (Barnevakten, published 23 September 2026, categories Alderskontroll, KI, Sosial på nett; html lang=nb-NO). Norwegian; passages quoted in the original and paraphrased in English by the reviewer.","independence_group":"barnevakten"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["own_use"],"contexts":["everyday_life","privacy"],"unknowns":["Whether the staff member completed the identity check or remained in teen mode, and for how long.","What the account holder had discussed that triggered the estimate.","Whether the switch caused any concrete loss beyond the content restriction.","Where the staff member lives or was when the account was switched (not stated; the organisation's country is not used).","When the account was switched into teen mode; the article of 23 September 2026 gives no date."],"geography":{"basis":"Unknown after review. The account is published by Barnevakten, a Norwegian organisation, about one of its own staff members, but the article states neither where the staff member lives nor where they were when the account was switched. The organisation's country is not used as the event or residence location. No proceeding.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-09-15 charter as a low-severity everyday-assistance case in which an AI product made a decision about a person: an automated age estimate placed an adult in a restricted mode and the route out required an identity check. Single organisational source (the publisher's own account of its staff member), claims recorded as reported; the staff member is not named.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-24"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The account reports ChatGPT's own message that the account was now in teen mode, and describes the provider's stated behaviour-based age estimation; the message and the mode are the product's own actions as described by the account holder's organisation.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about","communicated_with"]},"name":"A Norwegian child-safety organisation reports that ChatGPT's behaviour-based age estimation switched an adult staff member's account into teen mode without a request, restricting content and offering an identity check through a third-party verifier as the way out (Barnevakten, 23 September 2026)","summary":"Barnevakten, a Norwegian child-safety organisation, reported on 23 September 2026 that one of its staff members was suddenly told by ChatGPT that their account was now in teen mode. ChatGPT's own pages, as described by Barnevakten, say the system turns the filter on when a user's behaviour indicates an age under 18, reducing sensitive or potentially harmful content (graphic violence, viral challenges, sexual or violent role-play, extreme beauty ideals) and offering parental controls and a study mode. Because there is no age check at sign-up, the system estimates age afterwards from conversation topics and times of use, and Barnevakten notes that such guesses can be wrong. An adult who wants out of teen mode can go through an age check run by the company Persona, which depending on the country asks for a real-time selfie and a government ID; Barnevakten questions whether that process is privacy-safe (Persona's terms mention retention of up to three years) and advises using only age checks one trusts. The account's own experience is limited to the unexpected switch and the verification route; no further consequence is described.","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"unknown","exposurePattern":"repeated_interactions","reportedDate":"2026-09-23","aiSystem":"ChatGPT: behaviour-based age estimation and teen-mode content restrictions; age verification through Persona","aiProduct":"ChatGPT","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"An adult's ChatGPT account was placed in a restricted teen mode by an automated age estimate the account holder had not asked for, and the described route back to full access was an identity check with a third-party verifier which, depending on the country, asks for a real-time selfie and a government ID, whose data-retention terms the organisation considers unclear. The account describes no further consequence.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":1,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One person: 'En av Barnevaktens medarbeidere' (one of Barnevakten's staff members). Exact 1.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"unknown","platformType":"chatbot","outcomeType":"media_coverage","outcomeStatus":"unknown","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.barnevakten.no/chatgpt-skrudde-pa-tenaringsfilter-for-en-voksen-person/","primarySourceLabel":"Barnevakten, 23 September 2026: Chatgpt skrudde på tenåringsfilter for en voksen person","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-24T03:50:32.226789+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:47.10961+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["chatgpt","age-verification","teen-mode","norway","automated-decision","privacy","persona"]}]}