{"meta":{"exportedAt":"2026-10-12T09:11:39.512Z","formatVersion":2,"selection":{"q":"employee","system":"","harm":"","context":"","country":"","role":"","relation":"contextual","evidence":"","year":"","response":"","severity":"","verification":"","view":"incidents","sort":"added"},"totalIncidents":8,"coverage":{"cases":8,"countries":3,"languages":4,"unknownLocation":3,"locationPending":0,"unknownLanguage":0,"unknownDate":1,"lawsuits":1,"regulatory":0,"minors":0,"coreRelations":0,"contextualRelations":8,"mixedRelations":0,"unknownRelations":0,"relationPending":0,"relationUnknown":0},"countingNote":"Distinct public cases in this selection. People counts apply within individual cases only; cross-case person overlap has not been resolved. No population incidence estimate.","affectedCountNote":"Interpret person counts with affectedCountStatus and the reported effects. Unquantified zeros are placeholders, not a measured zero.","source":"AI incidents","publisher":"NOPE","url":"https://nope.net/incidents","license":"CC BY 4.0"},"incidents":[{"id":"2026-japan-health-guidance-contractor-employee-uploaded-insured-members-health-data-to-unauthorised-ai-service","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'令和８年８月 20 日、委託先におけるデータ抽出業務において、委託先担当者が個人情報を含む'; 'データを、委託先が利用を許可していない AI サービスに入力等を行ったことが判明しました。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'RIZAPの特定保健指導運営事務局で、従業員がデータ抽出業務を行う際、2024年度、2025年度、2026年度にRIZAPの特定保健指導を利用した210名分の個人情報を生成AIへ参照させたことが、当該従業員の自己申告で判明したとしています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'個人で利用している外部の生成AIサービスへ、要配慮個人情報を含む顧客情報を誤ってアップロードしていたという事象です。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"RIZAP reported to its client insurers that it came to light on 20 August 2026 that, in data-extraction work, one of its staff had entered data containing members' personal information into an external generative AI service the company had not authorised.","causal_attribution":"All three accounts rest on RIZAP's own report of its employee's action, relayed by each insurer and by RIZAP's release; the transfer to the AI service is admitted by the company."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'対象者は 726 名で、対象支部は 14 支部'; '疾患情報（高血圧症、糖尿病、脂質異常症のいずれかに該当する方）'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The mutual aid association says 726 of its members across 14 branches are covered, and that the data included membership numbers, email addresses, names, dates of birth and sex, some addresses and phone numbers, the type of health guidance and disease information on high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia.","causal_attribution":"The association's count of its own members, from its notice."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'対象は2024年度、2025年度、2026年度にRIZAPの特定保健指導を利用した210名です。'; '当該従業員の自己申告で判明したとしています。'; '9月1日、OpenAIから「当該データはモデルの学習に利用されていない」との回答を得ています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The IHI group health insurance society reported 210 of its members, said the matter was found through the employee's self-report, and said OpenAI answered on 1 September that the data had not been used for model training.","causal_attribution":"Relayed from the society's notice by a security news site; the notice itself was not read."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'ビスに入力等を行ったデータについて、AI サービス提供事業者による閲覧・アクセスの有無に関し'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'一方、IHIグループ健康保険組合は、現時点で第三者への情報漏えい等の事実は確認されていないとする一方、OpenAIによる閲覧の有無については確認を継続しています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'当該生成AIサービスの運営事業者以外の第三者に閲覧された可能性と、生成AIの学習に利用された可能性はないことを確認したとしています。'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The IHI society said no third-party leak had been confirmed, and both insurers said that whether the AI provider viewed or accessed the data was still being checked; RIZAP's release says it confirmed no possibility of viewing by third parties other than the operator and no training use.","causal_attribution":"Statements by the insurers and RIZAP about the limits of the exposure; not independently verified."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'漏えいの可能性のある対象者に対しては、委託先から令和８年９月４日１０時に電子メールによりご'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"RIZAP notified affected members by email on 4 September 2026.","causal_attribution":"The association's statement of the notification."}],"effects":[{"label":"insured members' identifying details and disease information entered into an external generative AI service without their knowledge (insurers' notices)","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.chikyosai.or.jp/info/pdf/info_260904.pdf","kind":"official_record","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Text extracted from the PDF with pdftotext; the notice relays what RIZAP reported to the association.","independence_group":"chikyosai-notice"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://rocket-boys.co.jp/security-measures-lab/ihi-rizap-openai-210-incident/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. A security news site's report of the IHI group health insurance society's 2 September notice; the society's own page was not read.","independence_group":"ihi-kenpo-notice"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://monoist.itmedia.co.jp/mn/spv/2609/18/news007.html","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"ja","translation_note":"Read in Japanese on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. A columnist's description of RIZAP group's release; the release page itself rendered no text to the fetcher and was not read directly. The page was decoded from Shift_JIS.","independence_group":"rizap-group-release"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["health","work","privacy"],"unknowns":["Whether 20 August 2026 is the date the data was entered or the date it was discovered.","The total number of people across all of RIZAP's client insurers, and whether the 726 and 210 counts overlap.","Which OpenAI product and account type the employee used; RIZAP's release does not name the service.","Whether the provider's staff viewed or accessed the data.","Whether the Personal Information Protection Commission has taken any action."],"geography":{"basis":"The affected members belong to Japanese insurers; the mutual aid association lists them by Japanese prefectural branches (Iwate, Akita, Osaka and others). The notices do not state where the employee did the data-extraction work, so no event country is recorded. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":["JP"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 private-information ruling: two insurers' notices describe their contractor's employee actually entering members' identifying and disease information into an external generative AI service the contractor had not authorised, without the members' knowledge. The account rests on RIZAP's own admission as relayed by its clients and its release; the provider's answer on training and the open question of provider access are recorded.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-12"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The insurers' notices state that a contractor's staff member entered data containing members' personal information, including disease information, into an external generative AI service the contractor had not permitted, and that the data was deleted from the service afterwards; the provider was asked to delete stored copies. The privacy harm is that transfer of members' health-guidance data to an AI service without their knowledge. The notices record transmission and a provider answer that the data was not used for training; whether provider staff viewed it was unresolved, and no generated output about the members is reported.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information"]},"name":"Health-guidance contractor says an employee entered insured members' names and disease information into an unauthorised external generative AI service","summary":"A local-government employees' mutual aid association said in a notice dated 4 September 2026 that RIZAP, the company it contracts for specific health guidance, had reported that on 20 August 2026 it emerged that a RIZAP staff member, during data-extraction work, had entered data containing personal information into an external generative AI service that RIZAP did not permit. The association says 726 of its members across 14 branches are covered and lists the data as membership numbers, email addresses, names, dates of birth, sex, some addresses and phone numbers, the type of health guidance and, for members with them, high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia. The IHI group health insurance society reported 210 of its members in a 2 September notice that, according to a security news site, names OpenAI as the provider, says the matter came to light through the employee's own report, and says OpenAI answered on 1 September that the data had not been used for model training. RIZAP's own release, as described in an ITmedia column, says the information was uploaded by mistake to a generative AI service the employee used privately, and that the company confirmed no possibility of viewing by third parties other than the service operator or of use in training. Whether the provider's staff could view the data was still being checked when the insurers published.","incidentDate":"2026-08-01","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-09-02","aiSystem":"An external generative AI service that the contractor had not authorised for work; RIZAP's own release calls it an external generative AI service used privately by the employee, and the IHI group health insurance society's notice, as relayed by a security news site, names OpenAI as the provider","aiProduct":"Unidentified OpenAI generative AI service (reported)","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to notices from two client insurers, an employee of their health-guidance contractor RIZAP entered personal data on insured members, including names, birth dates, insurance numbers, contact details and, for some, high blood pressure, diabetes or dyslipidaemia, into an external generative AI service that the company had not authorised; one insurer counts 726 affected members and another 210.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":726,"affectedCountStatus":"partial","affectedCountEvidence":"One insurer's notice (a local-government employees' mutual aid association) states that 726 of its members were covered by the data entered into the AI service, across 14 branches; that is the counted minimum. A second client, the IHI group health insurance society, separately reported 210 of its members, as relayed by a security news site; these people are additional but the two lists are not shown to be disjoint, so they are left in the unquantified remainder. RIZAP's own release, as described in an ITmedia column, gives no total. The employee who entered the data is not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"JP","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.chikyosai.or.jp/info/pdf/info_260904.pdf","primarySourceLabel":"Local-government employees' mutual aid association (Chikyosai), notice of 4 September 2026 on its contractor's AI-service data entry","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:18.489537+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:18.489537+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["privacy","health-data","generative-ai","unauthorised-ai-use","contractor","insurance","japan","openai"]},{"id":"2025-eindhoven-municipal-staff-uploaded-residents-youth-care-and-social-support-files-to-public-ai-websites","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Uit die steekproef is aan het licht gekomen dat er bestanden met persoonlijke gegevens naar openbare AI-websites zoals ChatGPT zijn gestuurd.'; 'Denk aan Jeugdwetdocumenten, interne verslagen en cv'; 'De steekproef ging over de periode van 23 september tot 23 oktober'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'In een steekproef over de periode van 23 september tot 23 oktober 2025 constateerde de gemeente dat verschillende soorten bestanden met persoonsgegevens waren geüpload naar openbare AI-websites.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"According to the council letter as reported, a sample of staff data traffic from 23 September to 23 October 2025 found that files containing personal data of residents and employees had been uploaded to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, including youth-care documents, internal reports and CVs, mostly from care and support departments.","causal_attribution":"The municipality's own account in its council letter, relayed by two outlets that share that origin."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'documenten uit de Jeugdwet met daarin informatie over de mentale en fysieke gezondheid van minderjarige kinderen'; 'Maar ook documenten van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (WMO) zijn ingevoerd.'; 'van sollicitanten en reflectieverslagen van medewerkers met daarin informatie over werkprestaties zijn in de Ai-tool terechtgekomen.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"According to Omroep Brabant's account of the advisory firm's findings, the youth-care documents contained information about the mental and physical health of minor children, and social-support (WMO) documents, applicants' CVs and employees' reflection reports were also entered into the AI tool.","causal_attribution":"The advisory firm's findings as reported by one outlet; the report itself was not read."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Het datalek is op 23 oktober gemeld bij de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens.'; 'De gemeente heeft OpenAI (het bedrijf achter ChatGPT) verzocht om de bestanden die vanuit Eindhoven zijn geüpload te verwijderen.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'Sinds 23 oktober kunnen medewerkers alleen nog gebruikmaken van Copilot binnen de beveiligde gemeente-omgeving.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The municipality reported the breach to the Dutch Data Protection Authority on 23 October, stopped staff using public AI websites (allowing only Copilot in its secured environment), and asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files.","causal_attribution":"The municipality's statements of its response, relayed by two outlets sharing the council-letter origin."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Daarom is het volgens het college ook niet mogelijk om mensen van wie gegevens gelekt zijn te informeren.'; 'Individuele gegevens die zijn geüpload in een AI-tool kunnen niet eenvoudig door derden uit de tool worden gehaald en worden misbruikt.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'De gemeente Eindhoven heeft van OpenAi nog geen reactie gehad op hun verzoek, zo liet een woordvoerder vrijdag weten.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'De totale omvang van de gedeelde gegevens is niet vast te stellen, omdat deze gegevens maximaal 30 dagen beschikbaar zijn.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The council says the scale of the uploads cannot be established because the data was kept for only 30 days, that it therefore cannot inform those affected, and that individual uploaded data cannot easily be extracted by third parties though the risk cannot be fully excluded; a spokesperson said OpenAI had not yet replied.","causal_attribution":"The council's and a spokesperson's statements about scope and risk."}],"effects":[{"label":"residents' youth-care and social-support files and job applicants' CVs uploaded to public AI websites without their knowledge (council letter, as reported)","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001041/datalek-gemeente-eindhoven-deelt-persoonsgegevens-met-openbare-ai-websites","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Omroep Brabant's report of the council information letter.","independence_group":"eindhoven-council-letter"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001062/datalek-eindhoven-met-kwetsbare-burgers-verwijderverzoek-is-kansloos","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Omroep Brabant's follow-up citing the advisory firm's findings and a municipal spokesperson; the firm's report itself was not read.","independence_group":"omroep-brabant-hooghiemstra-findings"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/digitaal/gemeente-eindhoven-blokkeert-chatgpt-na-datalek","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"nl","translation_note":"Read in Dutch on 2026-10-12; quoted passages were translated into English by the research agent (an AI), not by a human translator. Binnenlands Bestuur's report of the same council letter, so it shares the first source's group.","independence_group":"eindhoven-council-letter"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["public_services","health","work","privacy"],"unknowns":["How many residents, children, applicants and employees had data uploaded.","Whether uploads happened before or after the 23 September to 23 October 2025 sample window.","Which AI websites other than ChatGPT received files, and which account types staff used.","Whether OpenAI deleted the files, and whether any data was retained or used for training.","Whether the Dutch Data Protection Authority has taken a decision on the notification."],"geography":{"basis":"The uploads were found in the data traffic of the municipality of Eindhoven's staff, and the files concern residents and employees of that Dutch municipality. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["NL"],"affected_person_countries":["NL"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 private-information ruling: the municipality's council letter, as reported by two outlets, describes staff actually uploading files with residents' youth-care and social-support data and applicants' CVs to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, without the knowledge of the people concerned. The scale is unknown and is recorded as such; the council's view that misuse risk is limited is recorded with it.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-12"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The municipality's council letter, as reported by two outlets, states that a sample of staff data traffic found files with residents' and employees' personal data, including youth-care documents, had been sent to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, and the municipality asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files. The privacy harm is that transfer of residents' and employees' records into AI services without their knowledge. The sources report the uploads; they report no output about the people concerned, and whether the data was retained or used for training is not established (an expert's view on training is opinion).","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information"]},"name":"Eindhoven municipality says staff uploaded files with residents' youth-care and social-support data and applicants' CVs to public AI websites such as ChatGPT","summary":"The municipality of Eindhoven in the Netherlands told its council in an information letter shared on Thursday 18 December 2025 that a sample of staff data traffic from 23 September to 23 October 2025 showed files containing personal data of residents and employees had been sent to public AI websites such as ChatGPT, according to Omroep Brabant and Binnenlands Bestuur. The files included youth-care (Jeugdwet) documents, internal reports and CVs, mostly from departments that provide care and support to residents. According to Omroep Brabant's account of findings by the advisory firm Hooghiemstra & Partners, the youth-care documents held information about the mental and physical health of minor children, and social-support (WMO) documents and applicants' CVs were also entered. The municipality reported the breach to the Dutch Data Protection Authority on 23 October, blocked public AI websites and asked OpenAI to delete the files. The council says the scale cannot be determined because the data was kept for only 30 days, so it cannot inform those affected, and that the risk of misuse is limited but cannot be ruled out. A spokesperson said OpenAI had not yet replied.","incidentDate":"2025-09-23","incidentEndDate":"2025-10-23","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"repeated_interactions","reportedDate":"2025-12-18","aiSystem":"Public AI websites, which the municipality's council letter, as reported, names with ChatGPT as the example; the municipality asked OpenAI to delete the uploaded files","aiProduct":"ChatGPT (reported)","severity":"high","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to the municipality's council letter as reported, staff uploaded files containing personal data of residents and employees, including youth-care documents about children's mental and physical health and social-support files, to public AI websites such as ChatGPT; the council says it cannot determine the scale or inform those affected.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"unquantified","affectedCountEvidence":"The council says the scale cannot be established because the uploaded data was kept for only 30 days, and that it therefore cannot inform the people concerned. No count of residents, children, applicants or employees is given, so numeric zero placeholders are recorded. The staff who uploaded the files are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"unknown","jurisdiction":"NL","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6001041/datalek-gemeente-eindhoven-deelt-persoonsgegevens-met-openbare-ai-websites","primarySourceLabel":"Omroep Brabant, 19 December 2025: Eindhoven data breach, municipality shares personal data with public AI websites","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:14.550754+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:14.550754+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["privacy","government","municipality","youth-care","health-data","chatgpt","unauthorised-ai-use","netherlands"]},{"id":"2026-texas-health-plan-employee-uploaded-members-personal-and-prescription-data-to-chatgpt","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'On the evening of April 29, 2026, a Community First employee uploaded a file containing personal information of some Community First members to ChatGPT from a home computer network'; 'Community First does not utilize ChatGPT, and our systems immediately detected the violation and notified our IT department.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The health plan says that on the evening of 29 April 2026 an employee uploaded a file containing personal information of some members to ChatGPT from a home computer network, circumventing its firewall safeguards and violating its policy, and that its systems detected the violation.","causal_attribution":"The plan's own account of its employee's action; no independent account was inspected."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'name, address, date of birth, member identification number, and prescription drug information'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The plan says the affected information may have included members' names, addresses, dates of birth, member identification numbers and prescription drug information.","causal_attribution":"The plan's description of the file's contents."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'directed and verified that the employee had deleted all personal information from their ChatGPT account'; 'contacted OpenAI, LLC (the operator of ChatGPT) to demand deletion of any related data'; 'promptly ended with its relationship with the employee'; 'complimentary identity monitoring services for twelve (12) months'; 'Community First is not aware of any impacted information having been misused'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The plan says it had the employee delete the data from their ChatGPT account, asked OpenAI to delete related data, ended its relationship with the employee, notified agencies and members, offered identity monitoring and is not aware of any misuse.","causal_attribution":"The plan's statement of its response; OpenAI's reply, if any, is not reported."}],"effects":[{"label":"health-plan members' personal and prescription information uploaded to ChatGPT without their knowledge (plan's release)","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://communityfirsthealthplans.com/press-release/community-first-health-plans-announces-data-security-incident/","kind":"official_statement","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-10-12 from the plan's own press-release page; no translation needed. The research agent (an AI) read the text directly.","independence_group":"community-first-release"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["health","work","privacy"],"unknowns":["How many members' information was in the uploaded file.","What the employee was using ChatGPT for and which account type was used.","Whether OpenAI replied or confirmed deletion, and whether the data was retained or used for training.","Where the employee's home network was located.","Whether any regulator has acted on the notification."],"geography":{"basis":"The affected people are members of a nonprofit health plan that the release places in San Antonio, Texas and the Bexar service area. The release says the upload was made from a home computer network without saying where, so no event country is recorded. No court is involved.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":["US"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-10-06 private-information ruling: the health plan's own release describes an employee actually uploading a file of members' personal and prescription information to ChatGPT, without the members' knowledge and against the plan's policy. All facts are attributed to that release; the number of members and OpenAI's response are unknown.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-12"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The health plan states that its employee uploaded a file of members' personal information, including prescription drug information, to ChatGPT from a home network in breach of policy, that its systems detected the upload, and that it had the data deleted from the employee's ChatGPT account and asked OpenAI to delete related data. The privacy harm is that transfer of members' information into an AI service without their knowledge. The release reports the transmission; it does not report any ChatGPT output about the members, any retention finding or any use in training.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["received_personal_information"]},"name":"Texas health plan says an employee uploaded a file of members' personal and prescription data to ChatGPT from a home network, against its policy","summary":"Community First Health Plans, a nonprofit health plan in San Antonio, Texas, said in a 29 June 2026 release that on the evening of 29 April 2026 one of its employees uploaded a file containing personal information of some members to ChatGPT from a home computer network, circumventing the plan's firewall safeguards and violating its policy. The plan says it does not use ChatGPT and that its systems detected the violation and alerted its IT department. According to the release, the file may have included members' names, addresses, dates of birth, member identification numbers and prescription drug information. The next morning the plan revoked the employee's access, directed and verified deletion of the data from the employee's ChatGPT account, asked OpenAI to delete any related data, and ended its relationship with the employee. It notified affected members and federal and state agencies, offered 12 months of identity monitoring and says it is not aware of any misuse. The release gives no number of affected members.","incidentDate":"2026-04-29","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-06-29","aiSystem":"ChatGPT (OpenAI), used by an employee from a home computer network in breach of the health plan's policy; the plan says it does not use ChatGPT","aiProduct":"ChatGPT","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to the health plan, an employee uploaded a file containing some members' names, addresses, dates of birth, member identification numbers and prescription drug information to ChatGPT on 29 April 2026, in breach of its policy; the plan notified members, offered identity monitoring and says it knows of no misuse.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"unquantified","affectedCountEvidence":"The plan's release refers to 'some Community First members' and 'affected Members' but gives no number, so no count is recorded (numeric zero placeholders). The employee who uploaded the file is not counted.","victimAgeRange":"unknown","jurisdiction":"US","platformType":"other","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://communityfirsthealthplans.com/press-release/community-first-health-plans-announces-data-security-incident/","primarySourceLabel":"Community First Health Plans press release, 29 June 2026: data security incident","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:10.75316+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-12T03:35:10.75316+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["privacy","health-data","chatgpt","unauthorised-ai-use","health-plan","employee"]},{"id":"2025-alsace-franchise-recruiter-chatgpt-cv-filter-age-sex-origin-criteria-ex-employees-allege","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'quelque 740.000 CV de commerciaux. Chiffre ensuite ramené à 130.000 en seulement cinq jours, grâce à ChatGTP, après application de filtres discriminants, raconte un autre ex-salarié.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A former employee says the company collected about 740,000 sales CVs from job platforms in spring 2025 and reduced them to 130,000 in five days with ChatGPT after applying discriminatory filters.","causal_attribution":"A former employee's account relayed by AFP."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'et à exclure les moins de 27 ans.' and 'il faut (que) le nom de famille du candidat ne SOIT PAS d' and 'un motif de rejet figure en face de chaque nom: \"Hors cible - trop jeune\", ou encore \"Trop âgé\". Les femmes, repérées à leur prénom, sont renvoyées à leurs chères études avec la mention \"Exception\".'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'un motif de rejet figure en face de chaque nom'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"AFP consulted the prompt, which told the AI to exclude candidates over 55 or under 27 and those whose surname was of African origin, and a results table assigning a rejection reason to each name, with women marked \"Exception\".","causal_attribution":"Documents described by AFP; the record does not reproduce them and AFP does not say how many candidates the table covers."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'tous les commerciaux retenus ont le même profil: blanc, dans la quarantaine'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"A former employee said all the sales agents retained had the same profile, white and in their forties.","causal_attribution":"A former employee's statement."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'contenait des développements contraires à notre cahier des charges et aux consignes de la direction' and 'a jamais été mise en service et n' and 'a servi à évaluer aucun candidat'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The company denies asking anyone to build discriminatory criteria into its tools; it says a version containing developments contrary to its specifications was never put into service, evaluated no candidate and was built by a since-dismissed former employee.","causal_attribution":"The company's statement to AFP, recorded as contrary evidence."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Le troisième affirme avoir saisi la Commission nationale de l' and 'ainsi que le défenseur des droits' and 'a indiqué ne pas pouvoir communiquer sur un cas individuel.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"One former employee says he has referred the matter to the CNIL and the Défenseur des droits; the CNIL said it could not comment on an individual case.","causal_attribution":"Former employee's statement and the CNIL response, via AFP."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'Plus que pro a trié des milliers de CV sur des critères de genre et d' and 'entre 2023 et 2026, Plus que pro a mis en place un système de discrimination pour choisir ses futurs franchisés, basé sur l'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"Rue89 Strasbourg reported, from working documents and testimony, that the company sorted thousands of CVs on criteria of gender and supposed origin without the candidates' knowledge, between 2023 and 2026.","causal_attribution":"A separate investigation; its readable portion does not mention AI, so it supports the discriminatory sorting and not the AI role."}],"effects":[{"label":"job-seekers screened out of consideration by an AI filter applying age, sex and surname-origin criteria, according to former employees","claim_id":"c2","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.boursorama.com/actualite-economique/actualites-amp/ni-femmes-ni-profils-exotiques-quand-l-ia-est-programmee-pour-discriminer-8819657638628fd90de0e90be62ff869","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"fr","translation_note":"Read in French by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-11; quotations in the record are the original French and the English renderings in public text are the research agent's own translation. No human translator or reviewer inspected the text. AFP dispatch on Boursorama (AMP page), HTTP 200, full text retained.","independence_group":"afp-plus-que-pro"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.20min.ch/fr/story/alsace-ni-femmes-ni-noms-africains-l-ia-fait-le-job-pour-une-start-up-103647007","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"fr","translation_note":"Read in French by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-11; quotations in the record are the original French and the English renderings in public text are the research agent's own translation. No human translator or reviewer inspected the text. 20 minutes republishes the AFP dispatch and credits AFP; HTTP 200.","independence_group":"afp-plus-que-pro"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.rue89strasbourg.com/discrimination-recrutement-plus-que-pro-398436","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"fr","translation_note":"Read in French by the research agent (an AI) on 2026-10-11; quotations in the record are the original French and the English renderings in public text are the research agent's own translation. No human translator or reviewer inspected the text. Subscriber-only investigation: only the standfirst and opening paragraphs were readable (HTTP 200); the rest, including any AI detail, was not inspected.","independence_group":"rue89-strasbourg-plus-que-pro"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["work"],"unknowns":["How many candidates were excluded on discriminatory criteria by the AI filter, and whether the filter ran on the collected CVs as the former employees say or never ran as the company says.","Whether the Rue89 Strasbourg investigation ties the sorting system (named Vortex) to the AI tool; its subscriber-only text was not read in full.","The outcome of the CNIL and Défenseur des droits referrals."],"geography":{"basis":"AFP places the company and the former employees who ran the screening in Schiltigheim, near Strasbourg, France. The candidates' countries are not stated; the CVs came from job platforms such as Hellowork. No court proceeding is reported.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["FR"],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published as an automated hiring decision case: AFP describes a prompt instructing an AI to reject candidates by age and surname origin and a results table of per-candidate rejection reasons, and a former employee names ChatGPT as the filter that cut 740,000 CVs to 130,000. Rue89 Strasbourg separately reports discriminatory CV sorting at the company. The company denies that the discriminatory version was used on any candidate, so causation is recorded as disputed and all claims as reported.","reviewed_on":"2026-10-11"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"AFP reports that it consulted the prompt sent to the AI, which instructed it to estimate candidates' ages and exclude those over 55 or under 27 and to require that surnames not be of African origin, and a results table assigning a rejection reason to each name. A former employee says the CVs were cut from 740,000 to 130,000 in five days \"grâce à ChatGTP\" after the discriminatory filters were applied. The AI output (the per-candidate rejection decisions) is the described connection to the candidates' exclusion. The company says the discriminatory version was never used on any candidate.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about"]},"name":"France: ex-employees say Alsace firm Plus que pro used AI to screen out job-seekers' CVs by age, sex and African-origin surnames; firm says it never ran","summary":"Plus que pro, a company founded in 2014 in Schiltigheim near Strasbourg that recruits franchised sales agents, is accused by three former employees interviewed by AFP of building a recruitment tool that screened candidates on unlawful criteria with the help of AI. According to one of them, in spring 2025 the company collected about 740,000 sales CVs from job platforms such as Hellowork and reduced them to 130,000 in five days with ChatGPT after applying discriminatory filters. AFP says it consulted the prompt, which told the AI to estimate each candidate's age, keep those under 55, infer age from the baccalaureate year and exclude those under 27, and require that the candidate's surname not be of African origin, and a results table listing a rejection reason against each name, such as \"too young\" or \"too old\", with women identified by first name marked \"Exception\". A former employee said that all the sales agents retained had the same profile, white and in their forties; another said the AI only systematised a practice already established when CVs were sorted by hand. One former employee says he has referred the matter to the CNIL and the Défenseur des droits; the CNIL said it could not comment on an individual case. The company denies ever asking anyone to build discriminatory criteria into its tools; it acknowledges that one version of the tool contained developments contrary to its specifications, but says that version was never put into service, evaluated no candidate and was developed by a former employee acting on their own initiative, who has since been dismissed. Rue89 Strasbourg separately reported, from working documents and testimony, that the company sorted thousands of CVs on criteria of gender and supposed origin without the candidates' knowledge between 2023 and 2026; its subscriber-only report could be read only in part.","incidentDate":"2025-01-01","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"year","exposurePattern":"unknown","reportedDate":"2026-10-09","aiSystem":"A recruitment tool built from late 2024 by the company, which sent instructions to a generative AI to screen collected CVs; a former employee quoted by AFP names ChatGPT (\"ChatGTP\" in the AFP text).","aiProduct":"ChatGPT (reported)","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["professional_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"According to former employees and documents described by AFP, job-seekers whose CVs were collected from job platforms were screened out of consideration for franchised sales-agent positions by an AI filter applying age, sex and surname-origin criteria. No individual rejected candidate is identified in the inspected AI-related reporting and the number excluded on those criteria is not reported. The company says the discriminatory version was never used on any candidate.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"disputed","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":0,"affectedCountStatus":"unquantified","affectedCountEvidence":"No reliable count of people harmed. The 740,000 and 130,000 figures are CVs collected and retained, as described by a former employee; the difference includes candidates removed for any reason and is not a count of people excluded on discriminatory criteria. Numeric fields are zero placeholders.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"FR","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"media_coverage","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.boursorama.com/actualite-economique/actualites-amp/ni-femmes-ni-profils-exotiques-quand-l-ia-est-programmee-pour-discriminer-8819657638628fd90de0e90be62ff869","primarySourceLabel":"AFP via Boursorama, 9 October 2026: an Alsace start-up accused by ex-employees of building a discriminatory AI recruitment tool","firstPublishedAt":"2026-10-11T03:25:30.958981+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-10-11T03:25:30.958981+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["hiring","recruitment","discrimination","chatgpt","cv-screening","france","alsace","made-decision-about","institutional-use"]},{"id":"2026-us-meta-26-employees-sue-alleging-ai-assisted-may-layoff-selection-penalized-protected-leave","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"OAKLAND DIVISION","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Filed 07/13/26","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on July 13, 2026, bringing claims against Meta","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"A group of 26 Meta employees has sued the company, claiming it used artificial intelligence systems to select people for layoffs, disproportionately targeting those on medical, parental or family leave.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"}],"assertion":"On 13 July 2026 twenty-six anonymous plaintiffs (Does 1 through 26) filed a complaint against Meta Platforms, Inc. in the US District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland division, alleging employment discrimination in the May 2026 reduction in force.","causal_attribution":"The filing of the complaint is documented by the court record. The complaint establishes only the plaintiffs’ allegations."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"activity-monitoring data, AI-token-usage dashboards, and algorithmically assisted","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"artificial-intelligence-assisted systems to score, rank, and select employees for inclusion","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"algorithmic productivity scoring drawn from keystroke, screen-content, mouse,","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"The parties dispute whether Meta utilized AI in deciding to terminate plaintiffs’","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"They claim that Meta used a number of internal AI-assisted systems to score and rank employees on a termination list.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s7"}],"assertion":"The complaint alleges, on information and belief, that Meta used a set of internal AI-assisted systems to score, rank and select employees for the termination list: the Metamate internal large-language-model assistant, employee-trained \"second brain\" agents, keystroke and other activity-monitoring data, AI-token-usage dashboards, and algorithmically assisted performance ranking and calibration.","causal_attribution":"These are the plaintiffs’ allegations, pleaded on information and belief and supported by plaintiff declarations that were not inspected (they are quoted in the complaint and the order). Meta disputes them (claim c4). The news reports and the court order restate the complaint and are one reporting chain with it."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"be accumulated by an employee who is on protected medical or family leave, or whose","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"protected-leave-takers or accommodation-seekers for individualized human review. Meta","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"On information and belief, Meta did not neutralize any of the foregoing inputs for","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"result was that employees who took protected leaves were disproportionately selected for","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Plaintiffs are twenty-six current and former Meta employees, each of whom Meta","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"selected for separation in the RIF, and each of whom","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"About half the plaintiffs had taken leave for caregiving or pregnancy-related reasons.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"}],"assertion":"The complaint alleges that the inputs to these systems cannot be accumulated by an employee on protected medical, family or parental leave, that Meta did not neutralise them for protected leave, and that employees who took protected leave were therefore disproportionately selected for layoff. It states that each plaintiff was selected for separation in the reduction in force and had, within the 24 months before it, taken, requested or been approved for protected leave, or requested or received a disability accommodation.","causal_attribution":"Allegation of the plaintiffs. The court found on 17 July 2026 only serious questions going to the merits and no likelihood of success on that record (claim c5). Whether any AI system affected any plaintiff’s selection is unresolved."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Workforce management and organizational decisions were and are made by people, not AI.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"},{"locator":"selection decisions in the RIF were “made by human","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"promotion history over a defined period. There was no AI-","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"was selected based on leave status, disability, or any other protected characteristic,","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"“selection decision [was] made by ‘AI.’” Id. ¶ 11.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Selection decisions were made by human business leaders","relation":"supports","source_id":"s9"},{"locator":"defined period. There was no AI-assisted “scoring” or “ranking” related to employee","relation":"supports","source_id":"s9"},{"locator":"guidance does not permit AI adoption and usage metrics to be used as negative factors in","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"performance reviews in 2025 or as selection criteria in the RIF.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"Meta denies the allegations. A Meta spokesperson said workforce management and organisational decisions were made by people, not AI. In declarations filed by a Meta human-resources director, Meta states that selection decisions were made by human business leaders using documented neutral criteria, that no AI-assisted scoring or ranking of employee performance was used, that no plaintiff was selected on the basis of leave status or disability, and that no selection decision was made by AI.","causal_attribution":"Meta’s statements and declarations about its own process. They are a party account and had been tested only through briefing and court hearings (claims c5 and c7), not in discovery."},{"id":"c5","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"described below, the TRO is DENIED.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"The parties dispute whether Meta utilized AI in deciding to terminate plaintiffs’","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, but rather a “serious question[]”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Loss of health care, employment, protected leave, and unvested restricted stock units (“RSUs”) are","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Loss of immigration status is different. Four of the plaintiffs have employment-based,","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"they were not in the rooms where it happened.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"On 17 July 2026 the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The order records that the parties dispute whether Meta used AI in deciding to terminate the plaintiffs, finds serious questions going to the merits but no shown likelihood of success on that record, finds that loss of health care, employment, protected leave and unvested equity can be remedied in arbitration, and treats the possible loss of immigration status for four plaintiffs with Meta-sponsored visas as a potentially irreparable harm that needed more information.","causal_attribution":"A court order establishes what the court ruled and recorded. It does not establish that AI was or was not used in the selection."},{"id":"c6","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"On May 20, 2026, Meta began notifying the selected employees by email, beginning with","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"finalized on or about July 22, 2026 (and on or about August 20, 2026 for New York","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"laid off on May 20, 2026.” Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 1] ¶ 45 (the “mass reduction in force”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"Though they have been notified of their layoffs, all 26 remain employed by Meta, with separations set to begin July 22.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"},{"locator":"Meta in May notified nearly 8,000 employees, or about 10% of its global workforce, that they were losing their jobs","relation":"supports","source_id":"s7"},{"locator":"Laid-off workers remain on the payroll but lost access to Meta systems on May 20","relation":"supports","source_id":"s7"}],"assertion":"Meta began notifying employees selected in the reduction in force on 20 May 2026 (about 8,000 employees, roughly 10 percent of its workforce). The complaint says the plaintiffs were notified of their selection from that date, and that separations were scheduled for about 22 July 2026 (later for some plaintiffs). Meta said in court filings that laid-off workers stayed on the payroll but lost access to Meta systems on 20 May.","causal_attribution":"The notification date and the scheduled separation dates come from the complaint and Meta court filings as relayed by Reuters. The sources inspected do not report whether each separation took place on its scheduled date, although Courthouse News called the plaintiffs former employees on 24 August 2026."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction conducted via videoconference. The Court","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"summarizes tentative. Argument of counsel heard. Motion taken under submission; written order","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"I have a record I have to deal with and the record at the moment does not persuade me of the merits","relation":"supports","source_id":"s8"},{"locator":"categorical denial of any impact of AI in the termination process","relation":"supports","source_id":"s8"},{"locator":"whether what plaintiffs think happened, happened","relation":"supports","source_id":"s8"}],"assertion":"The court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion on 24 August 2026, heard argument and took the motion under submission with a written order to follow. Courthouse News reports that the judge said the record at that time did not persuade the judge of the merits, that the plaintiffs’ evidence raised some potential questions about Meta’s categorical denial of any impact of AI in the termination process, and that the case turns on whether what plaintiffs think happened, happened.","causal_attribution":"The minute entry documents that the hearing occurred and the motion was taken under submission. The judge’s remarks are reported by one news outlet and the transcript was not inspected. No written ruling on the preliminary injunction was found as of 29 September 2026."},{"id":"c8","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"and only Plaintiff Doe 20, hereby voluntarily dismisses","relation":"supports","source_id":"s10"},{"locator":"remain parties and continue to prosecute this action","relation":"supports","source_id":"s10"},{"locator":"Doe 20 was voluntarily dismissed from this action on August 3, 2026 pursuant to Federal","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"is made on behalf of Doe 20, and no relief is sought on Doe 20’s behalf.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"One plaintiff (Doe 20) voluntarily dismissed all of that plaintiff’s claims without prejudice on 3 August 2026 (Dkt. 33), and the notice states that Does 1 through 19 and 21 through 26 remain parties. No reason is given in the notice.","causal_attribution":"A filing by the plaintiffs’ counsel records the dismissal. It does not say whether that plaintiff was selected in the reduction in force or why the dismissal was made."},{"id":"c9","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"They recognize that their claims must be arbitrated, and they have initiated arbitration proceedings","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Here, they seek a temporary restraining order:","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"while they pursue their claims in private arbitration","relation":"supports","source_id":"s7"},{"locator":"from this Court only the status-quo-preserving provisional relief that Meta’s own","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"G. Reserve to the arbitral forum all relief on the merits, including but not limited to","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The 17 July 2026 order records that the plaintiffs recognize their claims must be arbitrated and that they have initiated arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association. The complaint says the plaintiffs seek from the court only status-quo-preserving provisional relief pending an independent audit of the selection process and arbitration of the merits, and it reserves merits relief such as reinstatement, back pay and damages to the arbitral forum.","causal_attribution":"The order records the plaintiffs’ own statement about their arbitration filings. The arbitration itself is confidential and its progress is unknown."}],"effects":[{"label":"Employees on or after protected leave allegedly disproportionately selected for layoff by an AI-assisted process that did not account for leave (disputed by Meta)","claim_id":"c3","direction":"negative"},{"label":"Plaintiffs notified of selection for termination on 20 May 2026, with separations scheduled from 22 July 2026 and possible loss of health coverage, unvested equity and (for four plaintiffs) work-visa status","claim_id":"c6","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.1.0.pdf","kind":"court_filing","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"meta-complaint"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.25.0.pdf","kind":"court_order","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"ndcal-court-record"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.42.1_1.pdf","kind":"court_filing","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"meta-court-declarations"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.46.0.pdf","kind":"court_filing","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"ndcal-court-record"},{"id":"s5","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.49.0.pdf","kind":"court_record","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"ndcal-court-record"},{"id":"s6","url":"https://www.cbsnews.com/news/26-meta-workers-sue-ai-aided-layoffs-medical-family-leave/","kind":"wire_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"meta-complaint"},{"id":"s7","url":"https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2026/jul/17/us-judge-wont-block-meta-from-laying-off-workers-w/","kind":"wire_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"reuters-tro-coverage"},{"id":"s8","url":"https://www.courthousenews.com/meta-workers-claiming-ai-fired-them-unlikely-to-see-relief/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"courthouse-news-hearing"},{"id":"s9","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.31.0.pdf","kind":"court_filing","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"meta-court-declarations"},{"id":"s10","url":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.33.0.pdf","kind":"court_filing","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"ndcal-court-record"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["work","health"],"unknowns":["Whether any AI system scored, ranked or selected any plaintiff is unresolved. The complaint pleads it on information and belief. Meta denies it in declarations. No discovery had occurred in the sources inspected, and the judge said on 17 July 2026 that plaintiffs were not in the rooms where the selections happened.","The sources inspected do not show how many people beyond the plaintiffs were selected because of leave, or how many of the roughly 8,000 laid-off employees were scored by any AI-assisted system. Only the plaintiffs are counted as reported harmed.","The order on the preliminary injunction motion (argued 24 August 2026, taken under submission) had not been found by 29 September 2026. The hearing remarks were read only through one news report and the transcript was not inspected.","Whether each plaintiff’s separation took place on its scheduled date (22 July 2026 for most, later for some) is not stated in the sources inspected. Reuters and CBS/AP describe the plaintiffs as still employed in July, and Courthouse News called them former employees on 24 August 2026.","One plaintiff (Doe 20) was voluntarily dismissed on 3 August 2026 and no reason is stated. The affected count therefore uses 25.","The complaint and declarations contain individual medical, pregnancy and immigration details. They are anonymised in the public copies and are deliberately not described here.","Reuters and WSJ pages for the initial filing could not be read (HTTP 401). Reuters coverage of the 17 July ruling was read through a Spokesman-Review copy. The Law.com article was behind a subscription wall and was not cited.","The complaint alleges that data captured by a separate Meta employee-monitoring program (the Model Capability Initiative) supplied inputs to the selection process, and Meta denies that AI was used in the selection. That program’s own privacy and security consequences are a different event, recorded as 2026-meta-mci-us-employee-keystroke-and-screen-capture-for-ai-training-then-internal-data-exposure, and are not part of this record."],"geography":{"basis":"The complaint states that the plaintiffs worked in California, Illinois, Washington, New York, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and Florida and the suit is in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. Meta also notified employees in other countries in the same reduction in force, but no plaintiff outside the US is described.","court_countries":["US"],"event_countries":["US"],"affected_person_countries":["US"]},"publication":{"basis":"The complaint, the court order denying the temporary restraining order, two Meta declarations, the plaintiffs’ notice of dismissal of one plaintiff and the hearing minute entry were read from the court record (CourtListener copies), with CBS/AP, Reuters and Courthouse News reports. Every AI-related statement is attributed. The plaintiffs are anonymous in the record and are not described individually. Meta denies that AI made or informed any selection decision and the court has not resolved the dispute.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-29"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The complaint alleges, on information and belief, that Meta used internal AI-assisted systems (Metamate, second-brain agents, activity-monitoring scoring, AI-token-usage dashboards, algorithmic ranking and calibration) to score, rank and select employees for the 20 May 2026 termination list. Meta’s declarations say selection decisions were made by human business leaders and that there was no AI-assisted scoring or ranking related to employee performance, and the court described the declarations as saying Meta did not use AI in any way with respect to the RIF. The court recorded that the parties dispute whether Meta used AI in deciding to terminate the plaintiffs and found on 17 July 2026 that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the current record. On 24 August 2026 the judge said the plaintiffs’ evidence raised some potential questions about Meta’s categorical denial. No discovery had tested Meta’s account in the sources inspected.","status":"disputed"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about","made_claim_about"]},"name":"US: 26 Meta employees sue alleging an AI-assisted May 2026 layoff selection penalized workers on protected leave, Meta says people made the decisions","summary":"On 20 May 2026 Meta began notifying about 8,000 employees (roughly 10 percent of its workforce) that they had been selected for layoff. On 13 July 2026 twenty-six anonymous employees who had taken or requested medical, pregnancy, parental or family leave, or a disability accommodation, sued Meta in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleges, on information and belief, that Meta used internal AI-assisted systems (including the Metamate assistant, keystroke and activity monitoring, AI-token-usage dashboards and algorithmic performance ranking) to score, rank and select employees, and that these inputs could not accumulate during protected leave, so plaintiffs on leave were disproportionately selected. Meta says workforce decisions were made by people, not AI, and that no selection decision was made by AI. On 17 July 2026 the court denied a temporary restraining order, recording that the parties dispute whether Meta used AI in the terminations and finding serious questions on the merits but no shown likelihood of success. One plaintiff was voluntarily dismissed on 3 August 2026. The preliminary injunction motion was argued on 24 August 2026 and taken under submission. The plaintiffs are pursuing their merits claims in arbitration and the allegations are unproven.","incidentDate":"2026-05-20","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"day","exposurePattern":"unknown","reportedDate":"2026-07-14","aiSystem":"Meta internal AI-assisted systems alleged in the complaint: the Metamate internal LLM assistant, employee-trained \"second brain\" agents, keystroke and activity-monitoring productivity scoring, AI-token-usage dashboards and AI-assisted performance calibration (Meta denies AI was used in selecting employees for the layoff)","aiProduct":"Meta internal AI systems (reported)","aiCompany":"Meta Platforms, Inc.","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"disputed","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["professional_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"The complaint alleges that 26 employees were selected for termination in Meta’s May 2026 reduction in force through an AI-assisted process that penalised protected leave, with separations scheduled from 22 July 2026 and asserted losses of employer-subsidised health coverage, unvested equity and, for four plaintiffs, work-visa status. Meta denies that AI was used in the selections. The court found the alleged harms other than immigration status remediable in arbitration and has not decided the merits.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"disputed","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":25,"affectedCountStatus":"documented_minimum","affectedCountEvidence":"The complaint states that each of 26 plaintiffs was selected for separation in the May 2026 reduction in force. One plaintiff was voluntarily dismissed on 3 August 2026 without a stated reason, so 25 active plaintiffs are counted as a documented minimum. The roughly 8,000 other employees notified in the reduction in force are not counted because no source ties their selection to the alleged AI process.","victimAgeRange":"adult","platformType":"other","primarySourceUrl":"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.474171/gov.uscourts.cand.474171.1.0.pdf","primarySourceLabel":"Complaint, Does 1 through 26 v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (N.D. Cal., filed 13 Jul 2026)","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-29T21:16:06.345461+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:57.733761+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["historical-2026"]},{"id":"2025-us-yale-law-scholar-suspended-after-ai-empowered-news-site-article","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Last week, though, she was abruptly barred from Yale’s campus in New Haven, Conn., and placed on administrative leave.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Yale officials cited the reason as allegations that she was tied to entities subject to U.S. sanctions.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"on administrative leave last week and barred her from campus.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"Yale placed the scholar on administrative leave and barred the scholar from campus in early March 2025, after allegations that the scholar was tied to entities subject to US sanctions.","causal_attribution":"The New York Times is the origin. Inside Higher Ed relays it. Yale's own statement to The National is a separate party statement (claim c8). The leave letter and the exact date were not inspected."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"The decision came three days after a news site, powered at least in part by artificial intelligence, published a story about","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"The news site, Jewish Onliner, said that the scholar was connected to Samidoun","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"prompted by allegations on a lesser-known, largely AI-powered news site called Jewish Onliner","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"Yale's decision came three days after a news site described as powered at least in part by artificial intelligence published a story on the scholar's connections to Samidoun. Inside Higher Ed and Middle East Eye identify the site as Jewish Onliner.","causal_attribution":"The New York Times states the sequence and does not name the site in the inspected extract. The article date and Yale's internal reasoning are not documented in the inspected sources."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"“The initial email from the general counsel had specifically linked to the Jewish Onliner article and said that was the trigger of the investigation, so there's no dispute about that,”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"I received the email notifying us from Yale's general counsel that she had been put on administrative leave and on the grounds that we had failed to cooperate with their investigation, which was ridiculous,”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"The scholar's lawyer says Yale's general counsel wrote that the Jewish Onliner article was the trigger of the investigation, and that Yale later placed the scholar on leave on the ground that, in the lawyer's words, 'we' (the scholar and the lawyer) had failed to cooperate with its investigation.","causal_attribution":"Single account by the scholar's lawyer as relayed by Middle East Eye. The Yale email was not inspected."},{"id":"c4","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"Jewish Onliner describes itself as “your online hub for insights, investigations, data and exposes about issues impacting the Jewish community. Empowered by AI capabilities\".","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"While AI plays a significant role in enhancing and accelerating our work and content, we want to emphasise that it’s only a tool.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"each person handles every part of a project: conducting OSINT [open source intelligence] research, analyzing the findings, and writing the piece. AI tools also play a significant role in enhancing and accelerating the work","relation":"supports","source_id":"s6"},{"locator":"articles are ultimately done by the site's human fact-checking team.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"The organization told the Times that humans, not AI, make the final edits on stories.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The site describes itself as empowered by AI. A person affiliated with the site says AI tools play a significant role and that each team member does the research, analysis and writing. The site's email to The National and its statement to the Times, as relayed by Inside Higher Ed, say humans fact-check content and make the final edits.","causal_attribution":"These are the site operators' own statements (emails to The National and to JTA, and a statement to the New York Times). How AI was used in the article about the scholar is not documented, and the JTA statement describes human research and writing."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"“I am not a member of any organization that would constitute a violation of U.S. law.”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"},{"locator":"told the Times that she’s not part “of any organization that would constitute a violation of U.S. law.”","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The scholar told the New York Times of not being a member of any organization that would constitute a violation of US law.","causal_attribution":"The scholar's own statement as quoted by Gizmodo and as paraphrased by Inside Higher Ed, which attributes it to a Times interview. The Times interview text beyond the extract was not inspected."},{"id":"c6","status":"disputed","evidence":[{"locator":"said she is not a member of Samidoun","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"has yet to explicitly deny her membership in Samidoun.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"The scholar's lawyer says the scholar is not a member of Samidoun, and the site says the scholar has yet to explicitly deny membership.","causal_attribution":"Both positions are party statements. The inspected sources do not verify membership either way, and the site's underlying evidence (appearances on panels at Samidoun-sponsored events per the New York Times) was not inspected."},{"id":"c7","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"had been enduring online harassment ever since the Jewish Onliner published its article.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"},{"locator":"and Yale were reportedly the subject of intense harassment after Jewish Onliner published the article","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The scholar was reportedly subjected to online harassment after the article was published.","causal_attribution":"Lawyer's account relayed by Middle East Eye and an unsourced 'reportedly' statement in Gizmodo. The harassment itself was not inspected."},{"id":"c8","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"In response to allegations about potential unlawful conduct, the appropriate process is to place an employee on a temporary administrative leave while a review is conducted to understand the facts of the matter.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"},{"locator":"short-term position as an associate research scholar with the LPE Project expires next month.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s5"}],"assertion":"A Yale Law School representative said placing an employee on temporary administrative leave while a review is conducted is the appropriate process after allegations of potential unlawful conduct, and that the scholar's short-term position was due to expire the month after the statement.","causal_attribution":"Yale Law School's own statement as quoted by The National. The statement date is not given, so the expiry month is not established, and the effect of the leave on the scholar's employment is not reported."}],"effects":[{"label":"Administrative leave and campus ban after an AI-empowered news site article linked the scholar to a sanctioned group","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/12/us/yale-suspends-scholar-terrorism.html","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"nyt-report"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.insidehighered.com/news/quick-takes/2025/03/13/ai-empowered-site-accuses-yale-scholar-terrorism-connection","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"nyt-report"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://gizmodo.com/yale-suspends-palestine-activist-after-ai-article-linked-her-to-terrorism-2000575148","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"nyt-report"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/muslim-scholar-international-law-barred-yale-university-after-ai-powered-terrorism-accusation","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"scholar-lawyer-account"},{"id":"s5","url":"https://www.thenationalnews.com/future/technology/2025/03/26/ai-powered-jewish-onliner-helyeh-doutaghi/","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"the-national-statements"},{"id":"s6","url":"https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/all-news/article-848011","kind":"news","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"","independence_group":"site-own-statements"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["work","education","everyday_life"],"unknowns":["The New York Times article was read only as a preview extract (a Wayback capture of about 3,000 characters ending at the paywall); passages beyond it were not seen.","The date the Jewish Onliner article was published and the exact date of Yale's leave decision are not stated in the inspected sources, so the incident date is given at month precision.","Which statements in the article, if any, were generated or drafted by AI, and whether any AI error contributed, is unknown.","The Jewish Onliner article itself was not inspected.","The National quotes a Yale Law School statement that the scholar's short-term position expires 'next month'. The statement date is not given, and the outcome of the investigation and any effect on the scholar's employment are not reported.","A person affiliated with the site says each team member does the research, analysis and writing, so the extent of AI use in the article about the scholar is unknown.","Whether the scholar was later reinstated, or how Yale's investigation concluded, is not covered by the inspected sources."],"geography":{"basis":"The New York Times places the barred campus in New Haven, Conn. The scholar's residence or nationality, the site operators' location and any court are not used.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":["US"],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Six public news reports were read. The New York Times original is cited from a preview extract only. Claims are attributed and left at reported or disputed status because the leave letter, the article and Yale's statements were not inspected beyond press quotations. The scholar is not named in any public field.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-29"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The New York Times describes the site as 'powered at least in part by artificial intelligence', the site describes itself as empowered by AI capabilities, and a person affiliated with the site says AI tools play a significant role in its work and humans fact-check. A person affiliated with the site also says each team member does the research, analysis and writing, and the inspected sources do not show that AI produced the article about the scholar.","status":"suspected"},"person_relations":["made_claim_about"]},"name":"Yale Law School scholar placed on leave and barred from campus after article on an AI-empowered news site linked the scholar to a sanctioned group","summary":"In March 2025 Yale placed a Yale Law School scholar, who was deputy director of a Yale Law School project, on administrative leave and barred the scholar from campus. The New York Times reports the decision came three days after a news site described as powered at least in part by artificial intelligence published a story on the scholar's connections to Samidoun, a group on a US sanctions list. Inside Higher Ed and Middle East Eye identify the site as Jewish Onliner. The scholar's lawyer says Yale's general counsel named the article as the trigger of the investigation. The scholar told the Times of not being a member of any organization that would violate US law, and the lawyer says the scholar is not a member of Samidoun. A Yale Law School representative told The National that placing an employee on temporary administrative leave while a review is conducted is the appropriate process and that the scholar's short-term position was due to expire the following month. The site says humans fact-check and that AI tools play a significant role in its work. The inspected sources do not show that AI produced the article.","incidentDate":"2025-03-01","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"month","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2025-03-12","aiSystem":"Jewish Onliner (Substack news site describing itself as empowered by AI capabilities; models and tools not identified in the inspected sources)","aiProduct":"Jewish Onliner (suspected)","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"unverified","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["professional_harm","reputational_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"The New York Times reports the scholar was barred from Yale's campus and placed on administrative leave, and the scholar's lawyer told Middle East Eye the article was named as the trigger of Yale's investigation, that the scholar suffered online harassment and that Yale should restore the scholar's reputation.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"alleged","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":1,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One scholar reported placed on leave and barred from campus. Yale, the site's other subjects and the harassers are not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","platformType":"other","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/12/us/yale-suspends-scholar-terrorism.html","primarySourceLabel":"The New York Times (12 Mar 2025), preview extract","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-29T13:28:55.093356+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:19.811349+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["historical-2025"]},{"id":"2026-england-gemini-meet-notetaker-kept-transcribing-prospects-after-host-left-first-person","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'My boss was in a meeting with a prospective client and his business partner'; 'Gemini Notetaker was on.'; 'my boss said goodbye and left the meeting, and the two business partners stayed on the call to discuss the proposal and the other agencies they were looking at.'; 'What they didn't know was that Gemini was still taking notes'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'it was on meet.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"During a Google Meet pitch with Gemini note-taking on, the agency's boss left at the end, the prospective client's two business partners stayed on the call to discuss the proposal and competing agencies, and Gemini kept taking notes of that discussion.","causal_attribution":"Poster's account; the poster does not say they attended the meeting and describes reading the conversation in the notes and transcript."},{"id":"c2","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'My boss sent me the notes and transcript from the meeting to create a follow-up deck'; 'They named the other agency they were looking at and talked about personal details of who they spoke to specifically on the call.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"}],"assertion":"The boss sent the poster the notes and transcript to build a follow-up deck from them; the partners had named a competing agency and talked about personal details of the people they had spoken to.","causal_attribution":"Poster's account of what they received and were asked to do."},{"id":"c3","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'I assumed the notetaker stops when the person who activates them leaves'; 'I don't think they were aware because the things they spoke about were very in detail and slightly scathing towards my boss' proposal.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The poster believes the partners did not know they were still being transcribed; the poster says they had assumed the note-taker stops when the person who started it leaves.","causal_attribution":"The poster's inference from the content of the discussion; commenters disputed it, arguing Meet notifies all participants."},{"id":"c4","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"'Google Meet informs all meeting participants that notes are being taken and the pencil icon appears on all participants' screens.'; 'The meeting organizer and participants internal to the host’s organization can start or stop notes.'","relation":"supports","source_id":"s4"}],"assertion":"Google's help page says Meet informs all participants when notes are being taken, shows a pencil icon on all participants' screens, and lets only the organizer and participants internal to the host's organization start or stop notes.","causal_attribution":"General product documentation; it does not establish what the partners saw in this meeting."}],"effects":[{"label":"two prospective clients' private discussion after the host left the call was transcribed and summarised without their apparent knowledge","claim_id":"c1","direction":"negative"},{"label":"the notes, including a named competing agency and personal details, were passed to agency staff to shape a follow-up pitch","claim_id":"c2","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://www.reddit.com/r/LegalAdviceUK/comments/1wsd4ul/my_boss_recorded_a_transcript_of_a_meeting/","kind":"forum_post","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-09-29: full self-text retrieved through the arctic_shift archive API by post ID. The poster handle is not recorded.","independence_group":"reddit-meet-notetaker-poster"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://www.reddit.com/r/LegalAdviceUK/comments/1wsd4ul/my_boss_recorded_a_transcript_of_a_meeting/pckanew/","kind":"forum_comment","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"The poster's own reply in the thread (archive API, 2026-09-29); a near-identical second reply (pckasgw) adds 'it was on meet.'","independence_group":"reddit-meet-notetaker-poster"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.reddit.com/r/LegalAdviceUK/comments/1wsd4ul/my_boss_recorded_a_transcript_of_a_meeting/pckasgw/","kind":"forum_comment","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"The poster's second reply, stating the call was on Google Meet (archive API, 2026-09-29).","independence_group":"reddit-meet-notetaker-poster"},{"id":"s4","url":"https://support.google.com/meet/answer/14754931?hl=en","kind":"company_documentation","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Google Meet Help page for \"Take notes for me\", fetched 2026-09-29 (200). Describes the feature in general; it does not address this meeting.","independence_group":"google-meet-help"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["others_use"],"contexts":["work","privacy"],"unknowns":["Whether the partners saw or understood Meet's note-taking notice after the host left.","The date of the meeting and the partners' location.","Whether the follow-up deck was made or the prospective client learned of the transcript.","Where the call participants were located."],"geography":{"basis":"The poster titles the post '(England)', answering the subreddit's instruction to say whether the poster is in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland; that locates the poster and the law they ask about, not the call. The post does not say where the boss or the prospective clients were during the Google Meet call. Unknown after review.","court_countries":[],"event_countries":[],"affected_person_countries":[]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-09-15 charter's public-forum rule as a concrete first-person account of an AI note-taker capturing and summarising people who were not its users, with the notes then used commercially, described with attribution and without corroboration. Google's documentation of participant notification is included as context. No handle, company or client name is recorded.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-29"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The poster names Gemini note-taking in a Google Meet call as the tool that kept producing notes and a transcript after the host left; Google's help page documents the feature. No notes or screenshots were published.","status":"reported"},"person_relations":["made_claim_about"]},"name":"First-person forum account: an agency employee in England says Gemini note-taking in Google Meet kept transcribing two prospective clients after the agency's boss left the call, and that the boss passed their private post-meeting discussion to staff to shape a follow-up pitch","summary":"In a public post to r/LegalAdviceUK on 28 September 2026, an employee of a marketing agency in England writes that their boss pitched a prospective client and the client's business partner on a Google Meet call with Gemini note-taking switched on. After the boss said goodbye and left, the two business partners stayed on the call to discuss the proposal and the other agencies they were considering, and Gemini kept taking notes. The boss then sent the employee the notes and transcript, which named a competing agency and included 'personal details of who they spoke to specifically on the call', and asked for a follow-up deck built on what the partners liked and disliked. The poster believes the partners did not know they were still being transcribed. Google's help page says Meet tells all participants when notes are being taken; whether the partners noticed is not known. The account is uncorroborated.","incidentKind":"single_event","incidentDatePrecision":"unknown","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-09-28","aiSystem":"Gemini note-taking in Google Meet ('Gemini Notetaker' in the poster's words; Google's help page calls the feature \"Take notes for me\")","aiProduct":"Gemini note-taking in Google Meet","aiCompany":"Google","severity":"low","verificationStatus":"unverified","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["other_material_harm"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"An agency employee reports that Gemini note-taking in Google Meet kept transcribing two prospective clients' private discussion after the agency's host left the call, and that the boss passed the notes, including a named competing agency and personal details, to staff to shape a follow-up pitch; the poster believes the partners were unaware (first-person account, uncorroborated).","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"alleged","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":2,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"Two people: 'the two business partners' who stayed on the call and whose discussion was transcribed. They were not the users of the note-taker (the agency's boss was). The poster, who reports discomfort at being asked to use the notes, is not counted. Exact 2.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"GB","platformType":"assistant","outcomeStatus":"unknown","primarySourceUrl":"https://www.reddit.com/r/LegalAdviceUK/comments/1wsd4ul/my_boss_recorded_a_transcript_of_a_meeting/","primarySourceLabel":"r/LegalAdviceUK, 28 September 2026: \"My boss recorded a transcript of a meeting without consent (England)\" (public first-person post)","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-29T03:21:48.445579+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:36.507533+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["first-person","reddit","gemini","google-meet","meeting-notetaker","transcription","privacy","work","made-claim-about"]},{"id":"2026-dillon-faces-wrongful-arrest-florida","caseFacts":{"claims":[{"id":"c1","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"'took pictures of the screen with his cell phone… low resolution… partially shadowed and off-axis'; '93 percent confidence'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Warrant based on the FR hit + 'a statement from a restaurant employee who picked his photo out of a lineup'; 'police called Dillon in 2023, he denied involvement citing skin-cancer scars'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The warrant rested on a 93%-confidence FACES result obtained from low-resolution cell-phone photos of the restaurant's surveillance screen (partially shadowed, off-axis) plus a restaurant employee's photo-lineup identification; police had called Dillon in 2023 and he denied involvement, citing skin-cancer scars.","causal_attribution":"The evidentiary basis is the complaint's account, carried by two chains; whether '93%' was system-generated or an investigator's characterization is unverified (the suit says the system 'spit out' his photo as a 'possible match')."},{"id":"c2","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"'arrested Aug 2024 in Fort Myers'; 'more than two months later, prosecutors dropped the charges'; 'it took an entire year… to take down his mug shot and expunge the arrest'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Arrest bodycam 'outside his San Carlos Park home' via Gulf Coast affiliate; the Dillon interview ('I don't wish this on my worst enemy').","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"'charges… dropped… in October 2024'; 1 night jail, bonded out pledging his truck's title.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"Dillon was arrested at his San Carlos Park home in August 2024, spent one night in jail and bonded out pledging his truck's title; prosecutors dropped the charges in October 2024 after work-alibi evidence; the arrest took about a year to expunge, with his mugshot lingering online.","causal_attribution":"The custody and expungement timeline is consistent across three chains."},{"id":"c3","status":"corroborated","evidence":[{"locator":"'suit in M.D. Fla. vs. city of Jacksonville Beach + officers/officials incl. Sheriff T.K. Waters'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"Suit 'includes the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, which oversees the use of the AI facial recognition technology across Florida'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"},{"locator":"ACLU attorney Nathan Wessler interview; defendants: Jacksonville Beach PD + Jacksonville and Pinellas County sheriffs' offices.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The ACLU filed a federal lawsuit in the week of 8 June 2026 in the Middle District of Florida against the city of Jacksonville Beach, Jacksonville Sheriff T.K. Waters and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, seeking damages and policy safeguards.","causal_attribution":"The suit's existence and parties are carried by three chains; the exact filing date within the week of 8 June is not pinned in the inspected sources."},{"id":"c4","status":"documented","evidence":[{"locator":"PCSO response passages ('patently false'; 'never \"matches\"'; 'rests solely with any officer').","relation":"supports","source_id":"s2"}],"assertion":"The Pinellas County Sheriff's Office responded that a training-failure claim 'is patently false', that 'facial recognition results are never \"matches\"', and that liability 'rests solely with any officer who did so'.","causal_attribution":"The agency's position is quoted directly and preserved as contrary evidence."},{"id":"c5","status":"reported","evidence":[{"locator":"'one of at least 14 people arrested since 2019'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s1"},{"locator":"'one of 15 known people'.","relation":"supports","source_id":"s3"}],"assertion":"The ACLU counts Dillon as at least the 14th known person wrongfully arrested since 2019 from police reliance on facial recognition (Reason, 11 June); a later WUSF attorney interview puts the count at 15 known.","causal_attribution":"The advocacy count is attributed to the ACLU; the two figures are recorded as stated on their dates."}],"effects":[{"label":"wrongful felony arrest on a 93% facial-recognition hit, with a year-long expungement fight","claim_id":"c2","direction":"negative"}],"sources":[{"id":"s1","url":"https://reason.com/2026/06/11/aclu-sues-after-facial-recognition-falsely-identifies-florida-man-as-a-child-abductor/","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-09-15 (11 Jun 2026, Joe Lancaster).","independence_group":"reason"},{"id":"s2","url":"https://abcnews.com/GMA/News/man-sues-law-enforcement-alleging-ai-facial-recognition/story?id=133810835","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-09-15 (12 Jun 2026, Hipos & Yu).","independence_group":"abc-news"},{"id":"s3","url":"https://www.wusf.org/courts-law/2026-06-18/ai-facial-recognition-tool-led-to-florida-man-wrongful-arrest-lawsuit","kind":"news_report","access":"read","language":"en","translation_note":"Read in English on 2026-09-15 (18 Jun 2026, Lyden/Peddie).","independence_group":"wusf"}],"version":1,"ai_roles":["institutional_use"],"contexts":["justice"],"unknowns":["The exact filing date within the week of 8 June 2026 and the docket number are not pinned in the inspected sources.","Whether the '93%' figure was system-generated or an investigator's characterization is unverified.","The lineup procedure's details (who administered it and how) are only partly reported.","The expungement's completion date is given only as 'about a year' after the arrest.","The actual perpetrator of the 2023 luring attempt is not reported as identified."],"geography":{"basis":"Event: the warrant (Jacksonville Beach) and the arrest (San Carlos Park / Fort Myers), Florida. Affected person: Dillon, Florida. Court: the felony charge (dropped) and the federal suit in the Middle District of Florida.","court_countries":["US"],"event_countries":["US"],"affected_person_countries":["US"]},"publication":{"basis":"Published under the 2026-09-15 charter as an institutional automated-decision case (made_decision_about / made_claim_about): a facial-recognition hit treated as warrant-grade identification, documented by three independent chains including the ACLU's own attorney and the vendor agency's response. Dillon spoke publicly; the PCSO denial is preserved as contrary evidence.","reviewed_on":"2026-09-15"},"ai_involvement":{"basis":"The warrant rested on the FACES 93%-confidence result plus a lineup identification, per the complaint as carried by Reason and WUSF; the vendor (Pinellas County Sheriff's Office FACES) is confirmed by WUSF, and the PCSO's own response acknowledges its technology's role while rejecting liability.","status":"supported"},"person_relations":["made_decision_about","made_claim_about"]},"name":"Florida: 93% facial-recognition hit led to Robert Dillon's arrest as an attempted child abductor; charges dropped, ACLU suit filed","summary":"In August 2024, Robert Dillon, a 52-year-old self-employed commercial crabber from the Fort Myers area, was arrested at his San Carlos Park home on a third-degree felony warrant for the attempted luring of a child at a Jacksonville Beach McDonald's in November 2023 — a crime he had no part in. The warrant rested on a 93%-confidence result from FACES, the Face Analysis Comparison and Examination System maintained by the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, run against low-resolution cell-phone photos of a surveillance screen, plus a restaurant employee's photo-lineup identification. Dillon spent a night in jail and bonded out against his truck's title; prosecutors dropped the charges in October 2024 after work-alibi evidence, but it took about a year to expunge the arrest and remove his mugshot. In June 2026 the ACLU filed a federal lawsuit (M.D. Fla.) against Jacksonville Beach, the Jacksonville sheriff and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, calling Dillon one of at least 14 known wrongful arrests from police reliance on facial recognition since 2019.","incidentDate":"2024-08-01","incidentEndDate":"2024-10-01","incidentKind":"bounded_series","incidentDatePrecision":"range","exposurePattern":"single_interaction","reportedDate":"2026-06-11","aiSystem":"FACES (Face Analysis Comparison and Examination System), Pinellas County Sheriff's Office","aiProduct":"FACES facial recognition","aiCompany":"Pinellas County Sheriff's Office (FACES centralized database)","severity":"medium","verificationStatus":"credible","harmCategories":[],"harmOutcomes":["legal_harm","reputational_harm","psychological_distress"],"harmOutcomeSummary":"Arrested at home on a child-abduction-class felony from a 93% facial-recognition hit on grainy screen photos; a night in jail, two months to clear the charge, and about a year to expunge the record and remove the mugshot.","frameworkFacets":[],"causationStatus":"supported","participantUsersAffectedMin":0,"otherPeopleHarmedMin":1,"affectedCountStatus":"exact","affectedCountEvidence":"One documented harmed person: Dillon, the misidentified arrestee (three independent chains). The child in the underlying luring attempt is a victim of the actual perpetrator, not of the misidentification, and is not counted.","victimAgeRange":"adult","jurisdiction":"US","platformType":"other","outcomeType":"lawsuit_filed","outcomeStatus":"ongoing","primarySourceUrl":"https://reason.com/2026/06/11/aclu-sues-after-facial-recognition-falsely-identifies-florida-man-as-a-child-abductor/","primarySourceLabel":"Reason (11 Jun 2026, Joe Lancaster) — complaint-based account: the screen photos, the 93% hit, the arrest, the expungement, the suit","firstPublishedAt":"2026-09-15T10:27:54.71948+00:00","updatedAt":"2026-09-30T01:17:35.503237+00:00","scopeVersion":"facts-v3","tags":["made-decision-about","made-claim-about","facial-recognition","wrongful-arrest","justice","florida","aclu"]}]}